COOPERATION, STABILITY, AND SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC?

Strategies for Moving Forward

A Conference Held in Honour of the 60th Anniversary of Massey College
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CONFERENCE REPORT



Addressing the Question:
How can we engage Russia in the shared pursuit of pan-Arctic security, stability, and cooperation, while still holding it to account for its egregious violation of international law in invading Ukraine?

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Cooperation, Stability, and Security in the Arctic? Strategies for Moving Forward

Conference Report

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Introduction to the Conference

Dr. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon

The conference brought together experts from Canada, Greenland, Germany, Norway, and the United States to address the question: how can we engage Russia in the shared pursuit of pan-Arctic security, stability, and cooperation, while still holding it to account for its egregious violation of international law in invading Ukraine? The discussion focused on prospects for enhancing cooperation rather than on defining problems.

Russia's war on Ukraine ended what many of us previously referred to as "Arctic exceptionalism."[1] From the early 1990s until Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the Arctic was widely considered to be an exceptional region, charactered by cooperation and peaceful relations among all eight Arctic countries. Arctic exceptionalism conveyed the idea of

[1] Gail Osherenko and Oran Young are credited with being the first to define and critique the term "Arctic exceptionalism." See *The Age of the Arctic: Hot Conflicts and Cold Realities* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989). The idea was reflected in the popularized Norwegian slogan "High North, Low Tension" (NATO, "The Future of the High North", May 12, 2023, https://www.act.nato.int/article/the-future-of-the-high-north). As Heather Exner-Pirot and Robert Murray pointed out, Arctic exceptionalism resulted from deliberate efforts by states "to negotiate an order and balance of power predicated on norms such as cooperation and multilateralism" ("Regional Order in the Arctic: Negotiated Exceptionalism," *Politik 20*(3) (2017), p. 48). Hence, the Arctic Council has no mandate to discuss highly contentious matters of military security, and instead focuses on environmental protection and scientific collaboration where interests are shared and cooperation is much easier to achieve. War in the Arctic was not considered impossible—there was always the possibility of spillover from conflict in another part of the globe—however, armed conflict was not expected to erupt over Arctic issues. Although the idea of Arctic exceptionalism was widely accepted, it was not without its critics. See Gunhild Hoogensen Gjorv and Kara K. Hodgson ""Arctic Exceptionalism" or "Comprehensive Security"? Understanding Security in the Arctic," *Arctic Yearbook*, 2019, https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2019/Scholarly-Papers/11_AY2019_Hoogensen_Hodgson.pdf.

an area isolated from the geopolitical tensions that were all too prevalent in other parts of the globe.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine marked a geopolitical tipping point and the end of Arctic exceptionalism.[2] It drove a wedge between Russia, on one hand, and the other seven Arctic states (the Arctic Seven), on the other. On March 3, 2022, just eight days after Russia's invasion, the Arctic Seven paused the work of the Arctic Council. Although three months later, on June 8, 2022, they authorized the resumption of work on Arctic Council projects not involving the Russian Federation, pan-Arctic cooperation remains a pipe dream.

Today the Arctic Seven—Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, and the United States—face competing imperatives. On one hand, there is the need for cooperation, stability, and security in the Arctic. All Arctic states have an interest in avoiding military encounters in the Arctic that risk escalation. Cooperation, stability, and security are important in ensuring the well-being of Arctic inhabitants, particularly their Indigenous Peoples; in dealing with search and rescue emergencies; in responding to oil spills; in developing effective region-wide approaches to environmental and climate change challenges; and in ensuring sustainable resource development. On the other hand, there is a need to hold the Russian Federation accountable for its egregious violation of international law in waging war on Ukraine. How, in light of these competing imperatives, can and should the Arctic Seven, their Indigenous Peoples, and Arctic experts best ensure the health, peace, and security of the Arctic?

To answer these questions and to help us chart a way forward, our stellar speakers have shared their expertise and insights with us. We begin with Evan Bloom, our keynote speaker. Thereafter a section is devoted to each of our three panels. Each section begins with an introduction by the panel chair, followed by abstracts of the panelists' presentations. In her concluding remarks, Jennifer Spence draws together the findings of the day's deliberations. The final section of the report provides photographs and short biographies of the conference speakers.

[2] See Kai Kornhuber, Kira Vinke, Evan T. Bloom, Loyle Campbell, Volker Rachold, Sara Olsvig, and Dana Schirwon, "The Disruption of Arctic Exceptionalism: Managing Environmental Change in Light of Russian Aggression" (German Council on Foreign Relations, *DGAP Report* 2 (February 8, 2023), https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/disruption-arctic-exceptionalism.

Keynote Address

Arctic Governance and Foreign Relations Nearly Two Years after the Invasion of Ukraine

Evan T. Bloom, Senior Fellow, Wilson Center Polar Institute

I've been asked to provide an American perspective on the central theme of this conference, namely what strategies can be employed to deal with the competing imperatives of the need for cooperation, stability, and security in the Arctic, plus the need to address Russia's aggression in Ukraine.

I should begin by noting that while I bring an American perspective, I don't represent the U.S. Government and any views are my own. After a diplomatic career, I'm now at the Wilson Center in Washington, which is a non-partisan foreign policy think tank established by the U.S. Congress. Thus, these days I try to think through issues related to polar geopolitics, which is an increasingly busy field.

The themes of this conference are particularly important just now. Prior to the Russian further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Arctic was already an increasing area of attention for the Arctic States, including the United States. The rise of climate change as a major policy concern had brought considerable attention to the Arctic as a place where key science relevant to the entire planet would need to be pursued. Receding ice created the prospect of increased shipping and other economic activities, and the changing environment is having significant impacts on the Indigenous Peoples and others who make their home there. Before 2022, the idea of Arctic exceptionalism, that cooperation in the Arctic with Russia was possible despite serious tensions in other contexts, was generally, if a bit optimistically, accepted.

There had been in prior decades considerable military activity in the Arctic, and with access to sea areas rising due to changing ice conditions there was an increasing sense of the need to pay attention to security issues, something increasingly reflected in national policies. Yet overall there was a sense that relations could be managed adequately, especially in the context of the Arctic Council, the main diplomatic forum for the region. The Russians found that to be an agreeable forum for them, and the atmosphere in the Council was generally pretty good (although Trump administration positions on climate tested the patience of a number of Arctic State partners at times). All States' interests were protected by the Council's adherence to consensus-based decision-making; there was no possibility of a State being outvoted or forced to accept a politically unpalatable result.

In other areas, such as cooperation among the five littoral states that surround the Arctic Ocean on issues such as securing rights to the extended continental shelf, cooperation was the norm; indeed, all five countries, including the United States and Russia, were content to look to the rules in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to determine their rights. Fisheries were also being managed in a largely cooperative manner, and I'll get back to

that later. Disagreements over the status of waterways, such as the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage, continued in their traditional way but did not give rise to conflict.

I'm not suggesting that everyone got along all the time and that the Arctic was a harmonious paradise. Far from it. But the Arctic States seemed to want to have productive relations in this regional setting, and there was a sense of hope about this continuing.

So, high north, low tension was not an inaccurate way of describing the Arctic just a couple of years ago, but that now seems like a long time in the past.

The Russian invasion in 2022 was a shock to the system, which while not occurring in the Arctic was felt there. And there were new conclusions about the ability to cooperate with Russia that fundamentally altered Arctic relations.

You know the story well. States other than Russia, the "A7," paused the work of the Arctic Council, thus halting activities during the Russian chairship of the Council. The A7 then resumed some Arctic Council cooperation on projects that didn't involve Russia. Finally, when it came time for the Norwegian chairship, the transition was successfully accomplished, and Norway was able to lead the negotiation of guidelines that allow for some forward progress in the Council, at least in terms of certain activities of the Council's working groups. But the Council is far from fully operational, and is limited in what it can achieve, which I'll get to in a bit.

It was necessary for the West and allied states to react strongly to Russian aggression, which challenged key assumptions about the post-World War II order. The invasion was contrary to Western values and impacted the security of both the United States and Canada. There could be no business as usual in diplomatic relations with Russia; if the United States and allies were going to stand up against aggression, this was the time to do it.

The logic of this in terms of how to conduct relations with Russia flowed rather directly into Arctic geopolitics as a result of the Council's basic subject matter, namely environmental protection and sustainable development. Neither are good candidates for cooperation with a country like Russia where others are providing military support to a country fighting a war with Russia. Moreover, Russia was chairing the Council and foreign officials weren't willing to go to Russia for meetings, or to follow Russian leadership on on-going activities.

In any event, this is a good time to assess where we are in terms of Arctic governance. After the initial shock of the invasion in 2022, we appear to be in a period where Russia and Ukraine are locked into a conflict that has bogged down. Even though the Ukrainian government doesn't like the idea, and the recent statement by one of its generals that there is a now a kind of military "stalemate" seems apt. I wish the Ukrainians well in their attempt to push the Russians out from the entire extent of the land that was invaded in February 2022, but that, much less kicking Russia out of Crimea, doesn't seem likely at any time in the coming months. It also doesn't seem as if Russia can defeat Ukraine. Thus—barring the unlikely scenario of a

negotiated peace agreement in the near term—it feels like the war will go on, and we are stuck with some serious, chronic policy problems.

What are some of those? One is that Russian aggression has resulted in a fundamental rupture in relations with North America, most of Europe, Japan, South Korea, and many others. Russia is friendly with some countries such as China, India, Brazil, South Africa, North Korea, and Iran. But it continues to bomb Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure. Vladimir Putin is subject to an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court for war crimes. There is wholescale repression of dissent within Russia. This is not a country that the United States can easily mend fences with, at least under current circumstances.

At the same time, Russia is a large, important country with a critical role in world geopolitics and the future of the planet. There is a profound need, in all our interests, to deal with the immense challenge of climate change and the Arctic plays an important role in that respect. Science conducted throughout the Arctic is needed to help inform policy related to climate issues worldwide. The Arctic is warming nearly four times faster than the rest of the planet, with serious consequences for the lives of Arctic inhabitants and infrastructure throughout the region. Indigenous communities are particularly affected, and it is they who have traditional knowledge that will be key for understanding the changing climate and for figuring out how to adapt.

We hear constantly about increasing estimates of near-term melting of the Greenland ice sheet, which will have a significant impact on global sea levels. The estimate for when the Arctic will be "ice free" in summer (which from a science perspective means having only 1 million square kilometers of ice, not no ice at all) keeps getting nearer in time, perhaps just decades away.

It is very hard to conduct climate science without Russia, in the sense that it is difficult if not impossible to understand the entire Arctic region without including Russian territory, which now can't be accessed by most other scientists, at least not by those from other Arctic States. Cooperation with Russian science institutions is largely curtailed. It is difficult to get needed data out of Russia, including historical data sets. Effectively addressing black carbon or challenges of melting permafrost depends in part on working with Russia.

This is a serious problem. I often hear the question asked whether in the interests of humankind scientists could simply work across borders and not worry about "politics." As tempting as that idea is, it doesn't always work in practice. Keep in mind that many Russian scientists work for institutions funded by and directed by the Russian government; as a result, cooperating with these scientists can involve in effect cooperation with the Russian state. U.S. Government scientists aren't likely to be in a position to work with Russian institutions and their various priorities. Current U.S. guidance, announced in June 2022 but still current, indicated that the U.S. government would "wind down institutional, administrative, funding, and personnel relationships and research collaborations in the fields of science and technology with Russian government-affiliated research institutions and individuals who continue to be

employed by or work under the direction of those institutions." However, independent U.S. scientists are not prohibited from working with Russian ones where they are inclined to do so. But this isn't always feasible, and can give rise to problems for the safety of Russians if they come to be viewed as tainted by Western influence.

It is hard to think in terms of environmental protection in the Arctic without a Russian contribution. As a state under Putin that emphasizes petro-development, Russia was never going to be a likely candidate to limit oil and gas production to constrain greenhouse gas emissions, but in current circumstances cooperation in the context of the Paris Agreement, or to meet the urgent need to restrict methane emissions and leaks, is not to be expected.

The security situation is more tense in the Arctic. With Finland joining NATO, that organization has strengthened considerably. This development increased Russia's border area with NATO by 1,340 km. When Sweden joins NATO, the entire membership of the Arctic Council will be NATO members except Russia. This is certainly disquieting to Russia and not what it hoped for when it invaded Ukraine.

While this does not mean that armed conflict in the Arctic is likely, it does mean that Arctic security will be of heightened interest to NATO, and to Russia as well, which has already been increasing its capabilities and investments in military infrastructure in that region. The United States and Canada will not only pay more attention to Arctic security, they will spend more money for defense there. That is a long term proposition.

If we are looking for areas of cooperation with Russia, there are some checkmarks on the other side of the ledger. Let me mention a few.

Bilateral fisheries cooperation, in particular related to enforcement along borders, has continued. The relevant coast guards have remained in touch, and I have some confidence that in the event of an incident requiring search and rescue there would be coordination and assistance with Russia in accordance with relevant treaties and maritime practices.

Arctic governance depends on the operation of any number of multilateral instruments to which Russia is a party, and Russia remains a party to and participant in those treaties alongside other Arctic States. Thus, Russia and others are present in the International Maritime Organization, which has an important role in regulations related to the Arctic Ocean, as well as treaties such as the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, and the *Convention on International Civil Aviation*, both of which cover the Arctic. Of course, Russia continues to participate at the UN and as a permanent member of the Security Council.

At a smaller scale, but quite important in this context, is the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement ("CAOFA," formally the *International Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean*). This agreement, which has ten parties, including Canada, the U.S., and Russia, entered into force in 2021 and applies modern approaches of fishing management to the Central Arctic Ocean. It takes a precautionary approach to the question of

when and how fish stocks may be exploited in the future and an ecosystem- and science-based approach to fisheries management. The parties agreed to a moratorium on commercial fishing—committing for the duration of the Agreement not to allow their vessels to conduct commercial fishing operations in the large high seas portion of the Central Arctic Ocean. They understood that currently there isn't enough information with which to manage any commercial fisheries there sustainably. CAOFA has held two Conferences of the Parties so far with participation by Russia and the other parties; a third COP is scheduled for June 2024. The treaty also has special clauses relating to participation by Indigenous groups and use of Indigenous and traditional knowledge.

The quality of engagement with Russia in all these organizations, however, has degraded. Russia is isolated politically, and the ability to work closely with members of their delegations has been limited as a result of the tensions and antagonisms that have come with the Ukraine war. This makes it more difficult to work with Russia in all these fora on issues that are important to the Arctic. All sides are less likely to find compromises for hard issues.

There is also a need to bear in mind that Arctic cooperation not involving Russia is going well, and in some ways better than in the past. The Arctic States other than Russia have cooperated well politically in the Arctic, and have committed to environmental and scientific work in the region. Indeed, the vast majority of Arctic science within the A7 states has never depended on Russia. U.S. scientists can continue their work unhindered in Alaska; if they want to enter Canada, there's no difficulty with that and vice versa. The work of national academies of science goes on, academic institutions remain funded.

The troubles with Russia have in some respects created new opportunities for non-Arctic States. There has been an increase in activity by countries such as Japan and South Korea in polar science, and collaborations with Germany, France, and many other Europeans that are going well these days.

So for a snapshot today, we have a war in Ukraine affecting our relationship with Russia for the medium to long-term with no resolution in sight, and little leeway for improving relations in the Arctic or elsewhere while Russian aggression continues. Lots of very valuable Arctic cooperation goes on without Russia. Some cooperation, in treaty bodies in particular, continues with Russia involved, but marked by tension and mistrust.

Let's go back to considering the state of the Arctic Council, which is the main diplomatic forum for the region. The Arctic Council is a forum, not an international organization, and as such has a certain additional degree of flexibility in how it operates. As I've mentioned, the Norwegians (with lots of involvement by other countries) successfully arranged the transition to their chairship. In my view, that relatively smooth transition was not inevitable. Indeed, there were several possible outcomes (as Heather Exner-Pirot and I have written jointly together some months ago), one being that the A7 would continue the work of the Council without Russia, which would have effectively ended the Council, or the A7 could have decided to establish a new arrangement for cooperation.

The problem with trying to marginalize Russia within the Arctic Council is that there is no Council without Russia. Under the Ottawa Declaration, it is a body comprised of eight states with equal rights under the Council's rules of procedure, and the Council operates by consensus of those states. Thus, to have a transition, there had to be either support or acquiescence from Russia, and that was obtained. Similarly, to restart the activities of the working groups under the recently announced guidelines, Russian acquiescence was needed.

There are two things I want to underscore here. One is that, to have the Council come back to life this way means that all of the eight states have shown a commitment to the Council as an institution. They didn't want it to fail, and that desire included Russia.

Why do the eight States feel that way, at least at this time? One clue is in the Biden administration's National Strategy for the Arctic Region which was released after the invasion but indicates U.S. support for the Council (not just Arctic cooperation). The policy says that the U.S. "will seek to maintain the Arctic Council as the principal multilateral forum for the Arctic by working through the Council whenever possible . . ." (Strategic Objective 4.1). This demonstrates that the U.S. feels that it benefits from the Council and continues to wish to make a commitment to it.

I don't know what Russia was thinking, but I surmise that it too feels that the Council may serve its longer term interests in maintaining its role as a key (and perhaps in its eyes the paramount) Arctic nation. Russia of course is fighting against its own isolation, and in that sense may not wish to back away from the Council, at least yet.

I'll let others characterize Canada's interests here, but I will note that it was Canada that proposed the establishment of the Arctic Council, through the particular leadership of your current Governor General. I'd be surprised if the Canadian government would easily conclude that the Council is surplus to requirements given the huge amount of effort that Canada has put into making it a success.

The new guidelines constitute a limited step forward. The working groups will proceed on the basis of existing mandates, and will operate without meetings via correspondence. No country is required to work with another where it doesn't want to do so. This gets around, initially, the need to have in-person meetings with Russian officials. But this is far from business as usual and doesn't offer the same synergies as in-person exchanges, including in terms of engagement with the observer states.

This is also far from ideal in terms of engagement of the states with the Permanent Participants. Unless great care is taken, this work via correspondence will focus mostly on contacts among officials and the Indigenous groups may find themselves outside the focus of the communications, whether intended or not. Both the Permanent Participants and the Norwegian chair are aware of this potential difficulty and will no doubt strive to avoid it.

I will say that I prefer the result of the Council surviving for several reasons. One is that it does valuable work even now. Another is that the Council has existed for more than 25 years, and I've seen during my career at the State Department that international institution building is difficult; the Council, its working groups and underlying relationships can't easily be pieced back together if terminated. And a third reason is that if and when an understanding is reached with Russia on resuming relations in a more normal mode, it will be good for the Arctic to have this body in existence and available to resume its full range of responsibilities.

That's my sense of where things are. The sponsors of this conference also asked me to provide some thoughts on the prospects of enhancing cooperation.

With respect to enhancing cooperation among the A7, I think that's well underway. The Arctic is too important an area to these countries to let cooperation be undercut by the Ukraine conflict or to depend too much on the Arctic Council now that its effectiveness is constrained. Security cooperation, including in the NATO context, has increased markedly since early 2022. Efforts to promote science cooperation have also increased, and have thrived in many contexts mainly beyond the Arctic Council. I'll note as well that the United States and Canada established a bilateral dialogue on Arctic issues shortly after President Biden took office. The next iteration of that dialogue is scheduled to occur in Ottawa on February 6, 2024.

In addition, there is considerable interest among non-Arctic States in being involved in the Arctic, in particular to explore economic opportunities or to conduct science. This includes many of the Arctic Council observer states who often have considerably advanced polar science programs.

I should mention that we've seen increasing Arctic collaborations by Russia with China as well, including economic and science partnerships. Russia has also indicated a desire to work with India. Facing sanctions and political isolation, Russia needs to put on the table what it can with who it can, and it certainly has Arctic capabilities to offer. Of course, we've also seen enhanced security cooperation between Russia and China, including their conducting joint naval exercises off the coast of Alaska.

In terms of gaining access to information about Russian territory where access to information from Russians directly isn't readily available, we need to increase our ability to use remote sensing and space-based assets to provide information to scientists. Efforts to explore such possibilities are already underway.

In terms of working with Russian scientists to access their knowledge, this remains difficult. Others may have different views, but I don't see it as being realistic for the U.S. Government and other allied governments to work with Russian institutions at this time. (I'll note that the Arctic Council's 2017 *Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation*, for which I was co-chair of the negotiations with a Russian counterpart, can't be implemented just now, at least not vis-à-vis Russia.) I also don't think Russian scientists are going to be given visas

to come to the U.S. anytime soon, and vice versa. There may be ways to use some non-Arctic States which do have relations with Russia as conduits to obtain some scientific information.

Cooperation with Russia on trade and economic policy in the current sanctions environment isn't realistic and would undercut support for Ukraine.

What can we work on with Russia? As I've mentioned, fisheries enforcement, search and rescue, and implementation of the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement are examples of areas where officials are able to make some progress. This may be limited, however, to rather basic steps, such as to work multilaterally to progress the Agreement's science program. I believe that cooperation under UNCLOS towards delimiting extended continent shelf boundaries among the five states bordering the Arctic Ocean can continue.

As the international community moves toward the possibility of convening a fifth International Polar Year, which would likely include invitations for science collaborations to all governments, there is likely to be an opportunity for some Arctic science cooperation with Russia. Although the IPY would be carried out in 2032-33, its planning is going on now.

Panel 1 – Arctic Governance Organizations Promoting Cooperation

Chair: Dr. Heather Exner-Pirot, Senior Fellow and Director of the Natural Resources, Energy and Environment Program, Macdonald-Laurier Institute
Panelists: Dr. Andrew Chater, Assistant Professor of Political Sciences, School of Humanities, Brescia University College; and Fellow, Polar Research and Policy Initiative
Sara Olsvig, International Chair of Inuit Circumpolar Council
Bridget Larocque, Co-lead of the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network; and Chair of the Northern Advisory Board

Chair's Introduction
Heather Exner-Pirot

The *Arctic Exceptionalism* that characterized the 2010s—the compartmentalization of Arctic affairs from broader geopolitical dynamics—ended abruptly on February 24th, 2022. Russia's invasion of Ukraine marked an upending of the role of the Arctic Council, the region's preeminent intergovernmental forum.

While its work continued almost totally unimpeded by Russia' war with Georgia in 2008 and its incursion into Crimea in 2014, the events of 2022 provoked an entirely different response. Almost immediately the work of the Arctic Council was suspended. With the passing of its Chairship from Russia to Norway in May 2023, some activities resumed and multilateral correspondence, via email only, now defines the working relationship between Russia and the other members of the forum.

Where does that leave Arctic cooperation today, and what is the role of regional governance organizations in determining the right balance? Attempting to address that question was the task of this session.

Dr. Andrew Chater, Assistant Professor at Brescia University College, discussed the particular ways in which the Arctic Council could promote pan-Arctic co-operation at this time. Sara Olsvig, President of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, highlighted ways in which the work of the ICC has been inhibited by the pause and disruptions, and the negative impacts this has had on their participation and influence in Arctic governance. Bridget Larocque, Co-lead of the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network and a Métis resident of the Northwest Territories, echoed many of those comments and emphasized the significance of kinship ties with Russian Indigenous Peoples, their safety when it comes to their participation in international fora, and the continued need for cooperation on environmental issues.

Several insights can be gleaned from the presentations and the discussions that followed them. The first is to reiterate that the Arctic Council is not the only Arctic governance organization. A suspension or attenuation of the Arctic Council does not mean there is no state cooperation, scientific endeavours, or Indigenous advocacy ongoing in the region. Indeed, a majority of Arctic scientific work neither depends on nor regularly includes Russian participation; both bilateral and multilateral state negotiations on fisheries in the region have proceeded; and non-Russian Indigenous organizations are still active in international fora such as COP28, the work of the International Maritime Organization, and other platforms.

The second is that while we often focus on *how*, mechanically, cooperation can continue with the Russians, for example under the terms of reference of the Arctic Council, there is still no consensus on *whether* it should. For many, it is untenable that we can be funding Ukraine's defense against a war criminal who has almost certainly committed terrible crimes against humanity, while also engaging in polite negotiations on sharing data on melting permafrost. For others, it would be a tragedy to throw out the progress we have achieved on important issues like Arctic environmental protection and Indigenous rights, following decades of hard work, and it's flippant to imply we could just resume cooperation at some later date without bearing significant and unnecessary costs.

Regardless of how one lands on the topic, it can be acknowledged that thus far the decision on the extent to which Arctic states are continuing their cooperation has happened within states and their diplomatic branches, and without public knowledge or input, including of northerners. At the very least, this session gave different voices the chance to present their opinions and considerations.

The third is that engagement with the Russian state, and also with Russians, is different now than it was before February 2022. There may have been security implications all along; but now those are paramount.

This matters for scientists and researchers who seek to understand, for example, how the Russian Arctic is responding to changes in climate, with regards to both its society (traditional practices, infrastructure resiliency, economic opportunities and challenges) and its environment (greening, melting, impact on plant life and animal populations, and triggers for amplification effects). If data sharing was tricky before, it is almost impossible now, and carries real cybersecurity risks. Field work is out of the question.

But the impacts on Indigenous organizations, especially the three Permanent Participants that represented both Russian and 'western' Indigenous populations (Saami Council, ICC, and Aleut International Association) are particularly severe. All have restricted their communications with their Russian counterparts with the expectation that any contact is likely to be monitored and perhaps wielded for undesirable purposes.

The main takeaway from the panellists was that cooperation at some level with Russia on Arctic issues of mutual concern is both beneficial and in the long run strategic. But it must be done very carefully, and with eyes wide open. And it is a dance to find the balance between advancing legitimate, transboundary policy goals, while not simultaneously ignoring, and thus emboldening, Putin's terrible actions in Ukraine.

Three Ways to Build Trust toward Promoting Pan-Arctic Cooperation Beyond 2023

Andrew Chater

What can be done to promote pan-Arctic cooperation when Russia is egregiously violating international law in its war on Ukraine? Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. On March 3, the seven Arctic states other than Russia (which many have taken to calling the Arctic Seven) announced they "are temporarily pausing participation in all meetings of the [Arctic] Council and its subsidiary bodies."[3] They announced a "limited resumption of our work in the Arctic Council on projects that do not involve the participation of the Russian Federation" on June 8.[4] Perhaps collaboration on climate change and sustainable development in the Arctic is too important to compromise and so cooperation with Russia should continue, despite the war. Or, perhaps work with Russia is impossible due to the horrific abuses of human rights that it has perpetrated. Researchers Timo Koivurova and Akiho Shibata show that cooperation with Russia has continued in treaty-based institutions of Arctic governance, such as the International Maritime Organization, and legal instruments, such as the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement.[5] I propose that there are three things that the Arctic Seven can do to promote pan-

[3] Global Affairs Canada, "Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation Following Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," March 3, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/03/joint-statement-on-arctic-council-cooperation-following-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.html.

[4] Global Affairs Canada, "Re: Joint Statement on Limited Resumption of Arctic Council Cooperation," June 8, 2022, https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2022/06/joint-statement-on-limited-resumption-of-arctic-council-cooperation.html.

[5] Timo Koivurova, and Akiho Shibata, "After Russia's Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Can We Still Co-operate with Russia in the Arctic?" Polar Record 59, no. e12 (2023): 1-9, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247423000049.

Arctic cooperation at this time. First, they can continue as many Arctic Council projects as possible and invite Russian scientists into those projects on a limited basis. Second, they can increase the transparency of the Arctic Council and Arctic governance more broadly. Third, they can support the voices of Indigenous Peoples.

First, the Arctic Seven can continue Arctic Council projects with an eye toward including Russian scientists. The Arctic Council regularly publishes a tracking tool of current Arctic projects and initiatives. It includes items such as information sharing programs, environmental assessments, treaty negotiations, and technical exercises. I reviewed the most recent tracking tool, from December 2021, just before the war.[6] I estimate that 80% of the Arctic Council's projects could potentially continue by narrowing the scope to not involve Russia. These are projects that seek input or data from all Arctic states, or seek to influence the behaviour of all Arctic states on transboundary issues. These projects can be adapted to exclude Russian data or input. The rest mention Russia in a specific way or focus squarely on something in Russia, so they are harder to adapt. As a first step, Arctic Council projects can try to make use of publicly available data from Russian scientists, such as material in peer-reviewed journals. A next step would be to bring independent academic Russian scientists into projects, especially those that are more technical in nature. In August 2023, the current chair of the Arctic Council, Norway, confirmed its officials have had discussions with Russian officials about the Arctic Council. Arctic Council Chair of the Senior Arctic Officials Morten Høglund said that, "The Russians are contributing to making this restart work."[7] Norway can continue to talk with Russian officials in the background, which will likely lead to more engagement in the future. Trust in the Russian state and Russian officials have been shattered due to the invasion of Ukraine. That Finland has joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Sweden seeks membership reduces Russian trust in the Arctic Seven. Continuing Arctic Council projects with gradual and small Russian engagement can help rebuild trust over time around more under-the-radar, less political projects.

Second, the Arctic Seven can increase the transparency of the Arctic Council and governance more generally. A consequence of the war is that the Arctic Council and other governance activities have become less transparent. In August, the Arctic Council negotiated a "first set of modalities for the resumption of work at the Working Group level."[8] The modalities have not been made public as of writing. That Russian and Norwegian officials have engaged in talks about the Arctic Council and regional governance more generally only became clear due to

[6] Arctic Council, *AMAROK Update,* Salekhard, Russia: Arctic Council SAO Meeting, December 1-2, 2011.
[7] Astri Edvardsen, "Light at the End of the Tunnel for the the Arctic Council," *High North News,* September 12, 2023, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/light-end-tunnel-arctic-council.
[8] Arctic Council, "Three Months Into the Norwegian Chairship A Status Update with SAO Chair Morten Høglund," August 31, 2023, https://arctic-council.org/news/three-months-into-the-norwegian-chairship-a-status-update-with-sao-chair-morten-hoglund.

reporting by High North News[9] and Eye on the Arctic.[10] Increasing transparency will build trust and confidence in the future of the institution and regional governance more broadly.

Third, the Arctic Seven can encourage pan-Arctic cooperation by supporting the voices of Indigenous Peoples across the Arctic. Only one of the major Arctic Indigenous Peoples' organizations, the Gwich'in Council International, gave public support to the pause in Arctic Council work by the Arctic Seven.[11] The Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North (RAIPON) has supported Russia's war. The International Committee of Indigenous Peoples of Russia says that RAIPON has been taken over by the Kremlin and become a body for "rubber-stamping government decisions."[12] The other four major Arctic Indigenous Peoples' organizations have been careful to avoid condemning Russia or welcoming the pause, rather calling for dialogue and co-operation. The Inuit Circumpolar Council, Aleut International Association, and Saami Council represent Indigenous Peoples in Russia, so it is easy to imagine why they have been careful. There are many reports of the arrest of Indigenous activists in Russia who are critical of the war.[13] It is crucial to support and consult these actors because they play a key role in pan-Arctic co-operation and represent people in Russia.

In conclusion, continuing Arctic Council projects, increasing transparency, and empowering Indigenous Peoples can help build confidence and trust, fostering future cooperation.

Arctic Indigenous Peoples Strengthen Arctic Governance

Sara Olsvig

The first Arctic Peoples' Conference was held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 1973. Here Indigenous Peoples of Canada, Greenland, and the three Nordic countries Norway, Sweden, and Finland gathered in Copenhagen, for what became a historic event, forging decades of coordinated advocacy and cooperation continuously evolving thereafter. The conference agreed on two resolutions; one calling for the recognition of Arctic Indigenous Peoples' "rights as peoples entitled to the dignity of self-fulfillment and realization," that there "must not be any displacement or interference with [those] rights by governments and/or industry, [or] any disturbance to [their] lands," and that in any crucial negotiations they expected

[9] Edvardsen, "Light at the End of the Tunnel for the Arctic Council," September 12, 2023.
[10] Ellis Quinn, "Arctic Council Charting Way Forward to Resume Work says Norwegian SAO," Eye on the Arctic, September 1, 2023, https://www.rcinet.ca/eye-on-the-arctic/2023/09/01/arctic-council-charting-way-forward-to-resume-work-says-norwegian-sao.
[11] Gwich'in Council International, "Joint Statement on Arctic Council Cooperation following Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," March 3, 2022, https://gwichincouncil.com/sites/default/files/2022%20March%203%20GCI%20Statement.pdf.
[12] International Committee of Indigenous Peoples of Russia (iCIPR) and the Anti-Discrimination Centre Memorial (ADC). Influence of Putin's Aggression against Ukraine on Indigenous Peoples of Russia: The Report by the International Committee of Indigenous Peoples of Russia (iCIPR) and the Anti-Discrimination Centre Memorial to the Anniversary of the Beginning of Russian Aggression Against Ukraine, Second Edition (Brussels, Belgium: Anti-Discrimination Centre Memorial: February 23, 2023), 9.
[13] Ibid., 6-7.

"participation in a position of full equality." The conference participants furthermore proposed "to form a Circumpolar Body of Indigenous Peoples to pursue and advance our shared and collective interests. We emphasize that we are profoundly concerned about protecting now the interests of succeeding generations of our peoples."[14]

Since then, the cooperation was extended throughout the Arctic, and beyond. The contact established in 1973 became invaluable in international and regional developments, as a 1975 international Indigenous Peoples' conference that followed resulted in the establishment of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. Furthermore, the 1973 gathering also resulted in Arctic Indigenous Peoples being ready to directly take part as soon as the more established UN processes to negotiation the status and rights of Indigenous Peoples began.

Throughout the processes, Arctic Indigenous Peoples contributed with worldviews, perspectives, and knowledge different from that put on the table in the predominantly Westphalian governance-driven systems, and that has been a clear strength and incentive for Arctic Indigenous Peoples to continue insisting on connectivity, unity, and recognition as peoples living across borders being recognized by state governments. When the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC) was established in 1977, a call for the Soviet Union to allow for Russian Inuit to join the pan-Inuit organization was tabled.[15] In 1992, after the end of the Cold War, ICC Chukotka became a formal and equal member of the Inuit organization. In the years before ICC Chukotka's participation, empty seats at the tables demonstrated the continued principle put forward by Inuit in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland, in insisting on being seen as one people, living across state borders in four very different jurisdictions. Before the end of the Cold War, delegations of Inuit leadership from Alaska, Canada, and Greenland traveled to Moscow to advocate for the contact and cooperation to be established, and delegations of Chukotka Inuit gradually started attending ICC gatherings through the 1980s.[16]

Parallel to Arctic Indigenous Peoples' building strong people-to-people cooperation across borders, spanning the whole Arctic, influence on international lawmaking and the participation in international agreements grew and manifested. The ICC and the Saami Council, still in existence today, as well as the then Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation, co-founded the Arctic Council in 1996 and pushed for the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples' Organizations as representative institutions, side-by-side with the eight Arctic states, in the structure of the Arctic Council. The category of Permanent Participants was established with the Council, and the Rules of Procedures of the Council included the obligations to consult with the Indigenous Peoples from the outset.

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[14] Kleivan, Inge: *"The Arctic Peoples' Conference in Copenhagen, November 22-25, 1973"*, Études/Inuit/Studies, 1992, Vol. 16, No. 1/2, Droits et pouvoirs collectifs / Collective rights and powers (1992). pp. 227-236.
[15] Resolution 77-18, Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Barrow, Alaska, June 13-18, 1977: https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2018/aanc-inac/R74-42-1977-eng.pdf.
[16] Lynge, Aqqaluk: The Story of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Atuakkiorfik, Nuu, 1993.

Today, the Arctic Council is going through its most severe existential crisis to date, but the fact that the Arctic Council still exists and is intact in the sense that no one—neither member states nor Permanent Participants—has left the table, is a testament to the devotion the states and Indigenous Peoples have to this unique governance body. The May 11, 2023 Joint Statement from the Arctic Council Meeting included the recognition of "the rights of Arctic Indigenous Peoples and the unique role of the Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council, their special relation to the Arctic and the importance of cross-border and people-to-people cooperation in the region."[17] The call for people-to-people cross-border cooperation was also an integral part of the Statement of the Arctic Peoples' Conference, convened in Ilulissat, Greenland, in July 2023. Here, Arctic Indigenous Peoples celebrated the 50 years of cooperation and emphasized "the rights of Arctic Indigenous Peoples, [their] unique relationship to the Arctic, and [their] commitments to cross-border and people-to-people cooperation in the region" as well as reminding the co-founders (the states) "that [Arctic Indigenous Peoples'] consensus must be a prerequisite for any decision on all levels of the organization and that making decisions without consensus undermines its purpose and integrity."[18]

Although still intact in the sense of membership, the Arctic Council is not fully functional, which puts the influence of the Arctic Indigenous Peoples at risk. Written procedures for decision-making have for the time being replaced the direct deliberations conducted in-person in meeting rooms, where the consensus-based decision-making had grown to include the Permanent Participants. The aim of the May 11 Arctic Council Meeting Joint Statement to "work to safeguard and strengthen the Arctic Council" thus needs careful consideration, if the Council is not permanently weakened by the current disruption.

The Norwegian Arctic Council Chairship has organized meetings with the Permanent Participants, ensuring Indigenous Peoples' Organizations some degree of dialogue and influence.[19] This illustrates some willingness to find new paths. More paths should be opened to ensure a continued strong Arctic Council with the full and effective participation of Arctic Indigenous Peoples. At the same time, the Arctic Council should use the current disruption to ensure formalized, equitable and ethical participation of Arctic Indigenous Peoples at all levels of the Council's work, building on the immense development of Indigenous Peoples' rights regimes, recognitions of Indigenous Knowledge and inclusion of Indigenous worldviews in the formation of governance bodies that have continuously developed in the UN and other intergovernmental organizations through the past decades.

[17] Arctic Council Statement on the Occasion of the 13th Meeting of the Arctic Council, 11 May 2023: https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/items/5c41807a-27d8-4545-9169-166fc68a7dab.
[18] Statement of the Arctic Peoples' Conference 2023: https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/news/statement-of- the-arctic-peoples-conference-2023-inuiaat-issittormiut-ataatsimeersuarnerat-2023.
[19] Norwegian Chairship meets with Indigenous Permanent Participant Organizations, 3 October 2023: https://arctic-council.org/news/norwegian-chairship-meets-with-indigenous-permanent-participant-organizations.

Arctic Athabaskan Council: Modifying Intergovernmental Relations

Bridget Larocque[20]

The Arctic Athabaskan Council (ACC) was established in 2000 and gained status as a Permanent Participant in the Arctic Council that same year. "AAC's vision is to build community-to-community relationships, networks and partnerships to further Athabaskan cultural, social, economic and environmental interests on the international stage."[21] They work predominately with the Arctic Council and its working groups, but they also attend the meetings of the United Nations and the Conference of the Parties gatherings. They work closely with universities and other organizations with interests in the Arctic and institutions that support Indigenous Peoples' rights.

"The Athabaskan Peoples, residing in Arctic and sub-Arctic Alaska, U.S.A., and the Yukon Territory and Northwest Territories of Canada have traditionally occupied a vast geographic area of approximately 3 million square kilometers. This vast region has been continuously occupied by Athabaskan peoples for at least 10,000 years and includes three of North America's largest river systems (Mackenzie, Yukon, and Churchill Rivers)."[22] "Athabaskan Peoples are predominately inland taiga and tundra dwellers. Collectively, the Arctic Athabaskan Peoples share 23 distinct languages and live in communities as far-flung as Tanana, Alaska, and Tadoule Lake, northern Manitoba, nearly 5,400 kilometers apart."[23]

"The ancestors of contemporary Athabaskan peoples were semi-nomadic hunters. The staples of Athabaskan life are caribou, moose, beaver, rabbits, birds, and fish."[24] Athabaskan Peoples continue to enjoy their traditions, ceremonial practices, use of land-based medicines, and diet, which contribute to their ability to thrive and self- determining efforts.

"Forms of political and cultural organization vary depending upon the place of residence of a particular Athabaskan people. In Alaska, Athabaskan peoples have organized themselves in accordance with federal and state statutes which provide funding for government operations, including the Indian Reorganization Act for tribal governments, Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act for incorporated Villages, and a variety of state-legislated and traditional political entities. In Canada, Athabaskan peoples have organized themselves into political bodies under federal legislation including bands created under the Indian Act, self-governing First Nations as mandated through negotiated Settlement Agreements, and regional umbrella organizations."[25]

The local-to-international partnerships and networks are based on peaceful engagement and collaboration. However, the war on Ukraine has caused upheaval in the Arctic Council as major projects have been put on hold and the expert knowledge within Russia's administration is not

[20] All views presented are the author's own and not necessarily those of the Arctic Athabaskan Council.
[21] Arctic Athabaskan Council website, https://arcticathabaskancouncil.com.
[22] Arctic Athabaskan Council, "About the Athabaskan People", https://arcticathabaskancouncil.com/about.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.

easy to obtain during times of conflict. The question of how work can resume at the Arctic Council is conflicting as most people cannot condone Russia's killing of innocent people; instead they support upholding the human rights and sovereignty of individuals and nation-states, and the need to shield our Indigenous partners within Russia's state borders and the exiled and expats, yet trying to safeguard kinship ties. There is a need to shield professors and students of Russian ancestry working and studying in other states from aggression. It is proving difficult to work even from an operational level. There are complications as some projects involve Russia and the Russian Association of Indigenous People of the North (RAIPON). In spite of the war, the AAC and other Permanent Participants may engage with their members and kin in Russia but have to make sure not to place them in precarious and dangerous situations. Bilateral collaboration among the Permanent Participants, states, and observers on projects are now of major significance because of Russia's militancy disrupting the Arctic Council's intergovernmental procedures.

Arctic Governance Organizations Promoting Cooperation

The Arctic Athabaskan Council was created to advance the self-determining efforts of Athabaskan communities at the international level. The desire to be internationally recognized as distinct Indigenous Peoples with the need for allies to assist in enhancing their human rights concerns was of major importance. Their need to develop networks and partnerships through participation in the Arctic Council and on the international stage more broadly was to stabilize and promote the well-being of their people. The Arctic Athabaskan Council is one of the organizations for Athabaskan Peoples to work with on the international stage and in scientific research to share their knowledge and Arctic expertise.

The Arctic Athabaskan Council continues to be a peacemaking organization with interests in broadening international cooperation and peaceful cooperation with the Arctic Council family and it is well positioned, with the other Permanent Participants, to promote peace through cross-border Indigenous collaboration and scientific research. The Permanent Participants could consider researching what it is their membership and kinship within Russian borders will need when the war comes to an end. Through their commitment and responsibility to protect and preserve the Arctic environment, it may be more significant now than ever to have conversations with their Indigenous relations to look at possible research projects or share knowledge on Arctic governance structures that allow for 'rebuilding' and reuniting in a trusting and supporting relationship.

Panel 2 – Military Cooperation in a Divided Arctic: Prospects and Possibilities

Chair: Ernie Regehr, Senior Fellow in Arctic Security, The Simons Foundation Canada; and Research Fellow, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies at Conrad Grebel University College
Panelists: Dr. Sergey Sukhankin, Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation; and Fellow at the North American Arctic Defence and Security Network
Dr. Marc Lanteigne, Associate Professor, Political Science at UiT: The Arctic University of Norway
Dr. Kari Roberts, Associate Professor of Political Science, Department of Economics, Justice, and Policy Studies, Mount Royal University

Chair's Introduction
Ernie Regehr

Thanks to the first panel for its clear exploration of Arctic governance dynamics and for having very effectively set the context for the security panel's discussion. We now turn your attention to the fraught subject of military cooperation in the Arctic when one key state of the region is engaged in an egregious, ongoing, and illegal attack on another sovereign state.

It is safe to say that seven of the Arctic states are in broad agreement that there cannot be business-as-usual with Russia in the north as long as its assault on Ukraine continues. At the same time, there is recognition that a posture of strict non-engagement can also have troubling ramifications—especially given that Russia makes up half or more of the Arctic's geography, demography, economy, and, of course, military infrastructure.

One global objective for which the potential consequences of non-engagement loom large is the urgent need to more effectively address the climate crisis, noting especially the rapid environmental and climate changes being experienced in the Arctic. That sense of urgency led a scholar with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs to write in the 2022 *Arctic Yearbook* that "we need Russia's partnership for saving the future."[26] While offering that controversial assessment, he still insisted that Russia's explicit violations of the UN Charter and international law mean "there cannot be a return to business as usual," but he was driven to ask whether the planet has the time to wait for a future and more compatible Russia.[27]

Provocative military operations on both sides of the Arctic divide, for example, the Pentagon's demonstration on Norway's Arctic Andoya Island that it could launch an air-to-surface cruise missile from a C-130 transport aircraft, and Russia's test launch of a Tsirkon hypersonic cruise

[26] Michael Paul, "Russia's war and the prospects for Arctic States' cooperation," *Arctic Yearbook 2022*. https://arcticyearbook.com/images/yearbook/2022/Commentaries/2C_AY2022_Paul.pdf.
[27] Ibid.

missile from within Norway's EEZ,[28] certainly risk further heightening regional tensions. The American commander of the test launch from the C-130 explained, "we are intentionally trying to be provocative without being escalatory,"[29] and it can be assumed that the Russian Tsirkon launch involved a similar rationale—without either side offering any explanation of how deliberate provocation could avoid increasing tension.

Intensified military operations pose serious risks of military close calls, misunderstandings, and the classic security dilemma that sees security enhancement measures on one side produce reciprocal escalations on the other, leaving both less secure. The specific consequences may be unpredictable, but the overall results are inevitable. Such risks necessarily prompt questions of whether security and stability can be served when all security discussions or engagement with Russia in the Arctic are deferred until after the war on Ukraine has ended.

Governor General Mary Simon raised essentially that question by challenging all Arctic states "to figure out how you can continue working together when a terrible war is going on [which is] contradictory to the rules-based international order."[30]

The commander of the US Coast Guard in Alaska has suggested that some level of engagement is prudent. He put it like this: "You have to be able to speak to your neighbor, your next-door neighbor. You don't have to be best friends with them, but you've got to be able to speak with them for shared interests across what is the natural physical border directly with Russia here in Alaska."[31]

The panel, like the public debate more broadly, explored diverse responses. One avenue of analysis proposed stringent conditions and major change in Russian behavior and leadership as prerequisites to engagement. Another approach saw serious impracticality in waiting on Russia to undergo the kinds of changes that would make it a more amenable interlocutor in the Arctic. We can't wait for the Russia we want: rather, we have to deal with the Russia that exists. China's growing interest in the Arctic was also addressed, with the reminder that China and Russia are not the same. They have different Arctic agendas, but both will continue to be challenging interlocutors.

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[28] Thomas Nilsen, "Russia's new hypersonic Tsirkon missile was fired from Norwegian sector of Barents Sea," *The Barents Observer*, 23 February 2022. https://thebarentsobserver.com.

[29] John Vandiver, "'Unconventional' delivery of US airpower in Arctic tailored to serve notice to Russia," *Stars and Stripes*, 09 November 2022. https://www.stripes.com/branches/air_force/2022-11-09/red-dragon-missile-norway-russia-7986361.html.

[30] "Climate change, Indigenous issues transcend boundaries with Russia says Governor General," APTN National News, Canadian Press, 28 February 2023. https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/climate-change-indigenous-issues-transcend-boundaries-with-russia-says-governor-general.

[31] Yereth Rosen, "Despite Russia's post-invasion isolation, some narrow openings for Arctic cooperation remain," *Arctic Today*, 05 April 2023. https://www.arctictoday.com/despite-russias-post-invasion-isolation-some-narrow-openings-for-arctic-cooperation-remain.

Military cooperation across a divided Arctic may not soon be welcomed, but non-cooperation and non-engagement promise their own unwelcome consequences.

A Long Journey Ahead: Fulfilling (Pre)conditions for Re-establishing Dialogue with Russia in the Arctic

Sergey Sukhankin

Russia's ruthless and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022 became an event of profound geopolitical and economic importance and the largest military conflict in Europe since the end of the Second World War. Following its unlawful invasion of Ukraine, Russia has violated multiple bilateral agreements with Ukraine and its foreign partners and openly defied the basics of international law. Domestically, the Russian regime is purposefully throwing a disproportionately high number of non-ethnic Russian citizens, including Indigenous and small-numbered peoples from Siberia and the Far East, into the "Ukrainian meat grinder" —to minimize losses among ethnically Russian residents of large cities and to avoid the spread of anti-government sentiments. Having illegally (temporarily) annexed parts of the sovereign Ukrainian state, Russia's current political regime has no intention to revise its actions or compensate for its consequences, demonstrating determination to continue the murderous war.

Some experts argue that certain areas of cooperation with Russia—such as, for instance, the Arctic region—should not be severed due to their strategic importance. In my view, however, this is a dangerous way of thinking and a path that must not be followed. My knowledge of Russian history and understanding of the Russian identity suggest that a policy of appeasement will never change the behavior of Moscow. Conversely, Russia's military-political leadership will view continued cooperation in the Arctic as a sign of weakness and hesitation on the part of the West, which is most likely to result in a larger war in Europe in the next several years. I firmly believe that re-launching cooperation with Russia in the Arctic with the incumbent political regime will be utterly counterproductive. Instead, the process should be incremental and conditional. To avoid mistakes that the West has committed after 1991 in dealing with Russia—which have led to the emergence of an aggressive and anti-Western Russia—a (partial) reinitiation of cooperation with the Russian Federation should go through three major stages.

First, it is necessary to prepare Russia for a constructive dialogue. At this stage, the key goal is to make sure that Russia loses the war in Ukraine and its economy is devastated. This dual result should facilitate the creation of favorable conditions inside Russia, prompting Russia's political leadership (whoever might be in power) to engage in a constructive dialogue with the West. It is imperative to note that this can only be achieved by military means and economic pressure, and not by diplomacy. Additionally, the Western alliance needs to transform its new Northern Flank into an impregnable bastion and the Russian side should clearly understand that this change is levelled against Russia for the criminal recklessness of its military-political regime and multiple violations of international law both in Ukraine and beyond.

Second, Russia's regime needs to fulfill key conditions. The main goal of this stage is to create a configuration that could provide a set of guarantees against the re-emergence of Russia's assertive militarism and neo-imperial ambitions. In this context, the role of the Arctic region is critical. Russia will have to agree on and fulfill three crucial conditions:

(a) Demilitarization of Russia's Arctic and High North, translated into the disabling of existing (para)military infrastructure and preventing the re-deployment of means of warfare currently present in the macro-region.

(b) The Northern Sea Route (NSR) should be demilitarized and turned into an international transportation artery. Ideally, an intergovernmental monitoring agency consisting of the Arctic nations should be established. Given the growing importance of the NSR (which is to increase exponentially with climactic changes) Russia must not be allowed to exert uncontrollable sway over such a strategic—from a geo-economic point of view—sector of the Arctic. In case this condition is not met over time, the West needs to avoid repeating the same mistake in relations to Russia's commitment to energy security (which was one of the key factors that prompted Russia to start the war against Ukraine).

(c) Establishing an international monitoring agency that will be responsible for tracking Russia`s compliance with the main principles of environmental sustainability in the Arctic to avoid continuing environmental nihilism on the part of Russia in this macro-region with an extremely brittle ecosystem.

Fulfillment of these three steps should result in emergence of a new, less one-state centered configuration of international relations in the Arctic and, most crucially, contribute to the defeat of the ideology of Russia's exceptionalism in the Arctic region.

Third, it may be possible to initiate limited and very cautious cooperation whose course, progress, and directions will depend on Russia's fulfillment of and commitment to the above-indicted conditions. This said, however, it is imperative to exclude military cooperation as well as the transfer of sensitive technologies (including dual use) that could result in Russia's attempt to restore its military-technical potential in the Arctic. Other areas should be treated with caution as well. For instance, while cooperation among respective Indigenous and small-numbered communities may appear harmless, it ought to be treated very cautiously, given Russia's traditional pivot toward using such cooperation for its own geopolitical objectives.

Together Apart – Deconstructing Sino-Russian Arctic Strategic Cooperation

Marc Lanteigne

For the past decade, China has emerged as a significant wild card in many discussions about Arctic security, as Beijing has sought to position itself as a regional stakeholder, while at the same time trying to avoid being singled out as revisionist, or a spoiler. Although five years ago

the Xi Jinping government had grand plans to develop a 'Polar Silk Road' as the northern tier of the Belt and Road Initiative, the reality for China has been more sobering, as the country now finds itself even more dependent on a mercurial Russia for much access to the far north. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has further heightened concerns in Beijing about being too dependent on the Vladimir Putin regime for Arctic access, despite ongoing bilateral affirmations of goodwill including the now-infamous 'no-limits' partnership announced in February 2022. Due to concerns about both Western economic pressures and being cut off from other potential Arctic state partners, Beijing has tried to adopt a lighter touch to Arctic cooperation with Moscow.

As a non-Arctic state, and one which is still seeking to understand the political specifics of the far north, China remains dependent on all Arctic governments for access and acceptance. The potential slowdown of the Arctic Council has further prompted the Xi government to seek other alternatives to regional engagement, but these are also potentially dominated by Russia, including possible joint Arctic strategies by the BRICS (and a potential expanded successor organization), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. The underlying question, therefore, is to what degree the two powers trust each other in ensuring that their Arctic interests remain compatible.

There are numerous external pressures which are bringing Chinese and Russian Arctic policies closer together, with NATO's expansion in the region being at the top of the list. Both powers have developed the narrative that it is in the interests of the 'US-led NATO' to militarize the Arctic in the name of containment, and both governments have also called for mutual regional scientific and economic cooperation. However, Moscow remains wary of China's longer-term Arctic goals, especially as the Central Arctic opens to greater commercial activity in the coming decades. China is also concerned about being vulnerable to Russian pressures in the Arctic, as well as being tied to a declining power as Beijing seeks to revive relations with the European Arctic after a long dormancy period.

It is therefore crucial, when discussing military cooperation in the Arctic, to avoid the trap of viewing China and Russia as two sides of the same coin, and representing a tandem threat to the region. Beijing remains highly dependent on Russian goodwill for far northern access, and the Chinese government remains limited in pursuing any sort of unilateral strategic policies in the Arctic and in many ways is still trying to find its footing in far northern policy discourses. As well, China remains sensitive to how it is perceived in the region, and wishes to avoid being labelled as a revisionist actor as it continues to pursue a research and economic agenda in other parts of the Arctic.

As well, Beijing has sought to avoid any overt challenges to law and governance in the region, (although there have been some emerging exceptions, notably the case of Svalbard and rights to scientific research there). Although Beijing has been advocating a greater say for non-Arctic states in regional governance, there have been no challenges to existing regimes such as the Arctic Council or to the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (UNCLOS) in the Arctic. Other points of contention between China and Russia, including immigration in Siberia and the

Russian Far East, and lingering territorial disputes, have been muted but have not abated. One recent example of this situation was the publication by Beijing in September 2023 of a new national map which included the entirety of Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island, also known as Heixiazi Island (黑瞎子岛) as solely Chinese territory, despite previous agreements ceding part of the island to the USSR.

Despite the current geopolitical situation, China and Russia are nonetheless seen as necessary partners for addressing environmental security threats in the Arctic. As a relative newcomer to the far north, China has been especially interested in various forms of scientific cooperation with other Arctic actors. In July 2023, China's Yellow River Research station was informally reopened after a long dormant period during the pandemic, and plans are underway to launch two new icebreaking vessels to be added to the pair already in service. However, both China and Russia have repeatedly demonstrated the challenges of avoiding dual-use (civilian/military) data transfer in the name of science diplomacy. With Arctic cooperation becoming increasing bifurcated between the West and Russia, there remains the possibility that Beijing and Moscow could be further pushed together due to both external political and security factors. The question therefore is how best to understand the spectrum of Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic, and how Western Arctic nations can address the specific challenges that the two powers represent together, but also separately.

Considerations for Canadian Engagement with Russia in the Arctic

Kari Roberts

The War in Ukraine has upended an historical record of interstate cooperation in the Arctic, and has rendered relations between Russia and Western Arctic nations adversarial. With no end in sight to the war, Canada faces difficult questions about how to navigate relations with Russia in the Arctic and within this adversarial political climate.

Among the options available to Canada are opportunities to reframe the security landscape within the Arctic, including signaling that Canada's activities in the Arctic are defensive in nature, and that Canada is willing to work with Russia as soon as Russian troops leave Ukraine. I co-authored a recent report for the Department of National Defence entitled *Framing Russia's Arctic Interests,* in conjunction with colleagues in the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN),[32] which recommended a host of specific signaling activities that Canada should undertake. They included communicating strongly to Russia that Canada can wait for the war in Ukraine to end, and that we are open to re-engaging with Russia, but that this is contingent upon a clear and constructive change in Russia's actions, including a renewed respect for international law and Ukrainian sovereignty.

[32] Ryan Dean, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and Kari Roberts, *Framing Russia's Arctic Interests: Implications for Canada*, April 2023. Available at: https://www.naadsn.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/23-feb-Framing-Russia-Arctic-Interests-workshop-report.pdf.

The report's recommendations also include urging Canada to directly counter Russian misinformation and its false framing of the malign intentions of Western Arctic states. Such counter narratives are essential to prevent Russia from using the importance of Arctic cooperation as a way to downplay or excuse its unacceptable behavior elsewhere in the world. Canada should respond to Russian narratives that accuse NATO allies of being responsible for militarizing the Arctic, and that Russia wants regional cooperation but it is the West that refuses to engage with Russia. Further steps Canada can take with respect to our messaging include the assertion that we are *defensively* focusing on heightened security and safety risks associated with environmental change and increased accessibility to the region, *defensively* investing in new capabilities to improve surveillance and control within our Arctic through NORAD modernization with the United States. It is essential to stipulate that these activities are defensive measures that support Canadian sovereignty in an increasingly accessible region. Admittedly, this messaging could be challenged by the recommendation of a recent report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security, Defence, and Veteran's Affairs, which suggests that it may be time to revisit Canada's position on joining the American Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program.[33] Finally, Canada is well placed to lead the dialogue between Arctic and Non-Arctic states, including China, India, and European and other nations with an interest in the Arctic. It is in Canada's interest to avoid allowing Russia to determine the terms of Chinese engagement in the region, and instead to find ways to turn Russia's warm welcome of China into the Arctic to our advantage.

In addition to meaningfully countering Russian narratives about relations among Arctic states, it may also be time for a wholesale reconsideration of historically unsuccessful approaches to dealing with Russia, in favor of a more realistic assessment of Russia's future, and what opportunities might exist for engagement. Ultimately, the problem with Russia in the Arctic is not exclusively an Arctic problem. The problem is the West's wider relationship with Russia. For decades, Western efforts to deal with Russia have been largely unsuccessful—from re-setting relations, to sanctions, to encouraging Russian democracy—what these approaches share is a desire to change Russia. But one constant has been Putin's grand strategy to restore Russian greatness and to replace American dominance with a multipolar world order. Western leaders seem determined to ignore this objective, expecting instead that Russia must change before any meaningful discussion or cooperation can occur —an approach that is not universally applied to other nations. Thomas Graham calls this approach to Russia "incipient containment."[34] And what is most important to note about this approach is that it has not worked. Graham calls for a change in the United States' approach to Russia, which offers some relevant advice for Canada in our approach to Russia in the Arctic: we must stop expecting that the Russian regime will somehow collapse and become a democracy. Russia will probably continue to be an authoritarian and somewhat expansionist regime. We should also stop expecting Russia to meaningfully agree to anything that runs counter to its interests. Finally, we must recognize that Russia is not weak (despite narratives to the contrary). The war in Ukraine

[33] Senate of Canada, *Arctic Security Under Threat: Urgent Needs in a Challenging Geopolitical and Environmental Landscape*, June 2023. Available at: https://sencanada.ca/en/info-page/parl-44-1/secd-arctic-defence.
[34] Thomas Graham, *Getting Russia Right*, Polity Press 2023.

has demonstrated that Russia has tremendous potential for disruption and this includes the potential to disrupt the Arctic space. Relatedly, we should remember that an economically devastated and politically unstable Russia may not be in our interests; a stable Russian regime that can manage its Arctic assets, ideally with as little Chinese involvement as possible, is advantageous for Canada.

In summary, Canada must deal with the Russia we have instead of the Russia we want, and resist meddling in Russian domestic politics (Russia greatly fears this, owing in part to its power aspirations). We must strategically prepare for when the war ends (which it will, eventually), and be ready to re-engage with Russia in a region that is essential to Canadian security.

Panel 3 – Networks of Arctic Science Experts Working Transnationally

Chair: Dr. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon, Distinguished Senior Fellow, Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History; and Professor Emerita of Political Science, University of Western Ontario
Panelists: Dr. Heidemarie Kassens, Research Scientist, GEOMAR Helmholtz Centre for Ocean Research Kiel
Dr. Harald Brekke, Project Coordinator/Senior Geologist, Norwegian Petroleum Directorate; and Commissioner, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
Dr. David Mosher, Commissioner, Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf; Senior Research Scientist (Emeritus), Geological Survey of Canada; and Professor, Department of Earth Sciences, University of New Hampshire

Chair's Introduction
Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon

The panel focused on a set of actors who are rarely the focus at political science and international law conferences on the Arctic. Yet empirical studies show that networks of scientists working transnationally play important roles in global governance.[35] They are obviously vital to the advancement of scientific knowledge, but they also bring problems to the attention of policy makers, thereby getting issues on domestic and international agendas, and they propose policy solutions to problems. The patterns of cooperation they develop and the institutional arrangements they create to facilitate cooperation can have spill-over effects—

[35] This discussion draws from the literature on epistemic communities, of which networks of scientists are a prime example. See Mai'a Davis Cross, "Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later", *Review of International Studies* 23(2013): 137-160. "An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area". Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and Internal Policy Coordination", *International Organization* 46(1)(1992), p. 3. That 1992 issue of *International Organization,* entitled "Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination", *was* devoted to epistemic communities**.** Recent articles examining the role of scientists in global governance include Bentley B. Allan, "Producing the Climate: States, Scientists, and the Constitution of Global Governance Objects", *International Organization* 71(2017): 131-162.

increasing pressure for cooperation at the political level. Furthermore, these patterns and institutions can provide frameworks to facilitate cooperation in other policy areas when political tensions ease.

The ability of scientists to influence not only governments but also international organizations, multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) stems from their recognized, professional expertise. Of course, the ability of networks of scientists to exercise this kind of influence will depend on a range of factors, such as the extent to which their professional credentials are recognized; they present a unified voice; they pursue shared policy goals; their objectives coincide with those of other policy makers; and other policy makers are eager to find a solution. Yet overall, they not only influence policy decisions but they also shape governance more broadly.[36]

Scientists are not separate from the political process, and politicians and scientists are not two solitudes. Many scientists work within governments and multilateral organizations. They can influence, cooperate with, or compete with other actors to influence policy decisions.

So many of the challenges facing the Arctic, including climate change, pollution, biodiversity, sustainable resource development, and delineating coastal state jurisdiction, all transcend national borders and all require scientific expertise. This trend will only increase.

Panel 3 was fortunate to have three world-class scientists, Dr. Heidemarie Kassens, Dr. Harald Brekke, and Dr. David Mosher, share lessons learned from their extensive experience working transnationally with other Arctic scientists. Each has lead bilateral and multilateral Arctic survey missions. All are involved with multilateral programs and major international scientific bodies. For example, among their other responsibilities, Dr. Brekke and Dr. Mosher currently serve on the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and Dr. Kassens chairs the Marine Working Group of the International Arctic Science Committee. All have impressive publication records. Publications in major, international journals are vital both to the dissemination of knowledge and to the development of consensus that can serve as the impetus for political action. The abstracts of their talks below exemplify the extensive collaboration taking place among Arctic scientists on various levels; the fabulous advances made to Arctic scientific knowledge in recent decades; the importance of government support and institutional funding given the logistical challenges and financial costs of Arctic research; and, especially now that formal relations between the Arctic 7 and Russia have been cut, the importance of personal contacts to continue scientific collaboration that is so important to the future of the Arctic and its inhabitants.

[36] Cross, p. 139.

Navigating the Ice: Collaborative Strategies and Dilemmas in Pan-Arctic Climate Research

Heidemarie Kassens

Arctic research demands unprecedented collaboration across disciplines and borders, necessitating international cooperation to overcome the logistical challenges inherent in extreme polar environments. This presentation underscores the imperative to strengthen the global commitment of polar researchers, advocating for expansive international programs and projects to address complex research goals and respond to pressing global challenges. Using the example of the large-scale international project "System Laptev Sea" with a focus on the Eurasian Arctic, research work will be presented as part of international expeditions between 1993 and 2021 (TRANSDRIFT, TRANSARKTIKA, Arctic Century; www.transdrift.info). The expeditions have generated sea-ice, ocean, and atmosphere datasets based on satellites, shipboard expeditions and autonomous sampling techniques by use of, for instance, year-round multidisciplinary ocean observatories that were operated in the Russian Arctic.

The backdrop of the UN Decade of Ocean Science for Sustainable Development, initiated in 2017, sets the stage for transformative initiatives in ocean science aligned with the 2030 UN Sustainable Development Goals. The Arctic marine research community responds with the Ocean Decade - Arctic Action Plan, addressing challenges in research, organization, and follow-on activities (www.oceandecade.dk/decade-actions/arctic-action-plan). The plan's custodianship was initially proposed for the Marine Working Group (MWG) of the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), but feedback from the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO (IOC/UNESCO) advocates a more ambitious approach—a proposal for an Arctic Regional Programme to house endorsed UN Decade projects and actions. The US delegates of the MWG have therefore submitted the proposal "Global Centres Track 2: A Decadal Collaborative Center for Arctic Marine Observations" to the NSF. If the proposal is funded, the MWG can provide a wide consensus from the countries participating in IASC to build capacity and work with UNESCO-IOC to help identify and develop follow-on funding that would allow the establishment of a Decadal Collaborative Centre to meet UN Decade needs for coordination of endorsed actions and support for them in the Arctic Ocean, as well as collaborate on work that will support UN Decade goals.

The IASC-MWG (https://iasc.info/our-work/working-groups/marine), recognizing the need for a strategic framework, presents a comprehensive plan aligned with international science goals. Emphasizing practical areas for collaboration, the plan integrates Indigenous knowledge and considers transdisciplinary approaches. The five identified themes—Marine Life, Sea Ice and Stratification, Disturbances, Biogeochemical Cycles, and Connectivity and Borealization—address current research problems (https://iasc.info/news/iasc-news/1102-report-from-the-arctic-action-plan-marine-working-group-workshop-copenhagen-denmark-november-15-17-2022). The MWG's strategic plan facilitates understanding the Arctic System, ecosystem-based management, and climate change impacts on the Arctic marine system.

In the light of the current challenging geopolitical situation, “The Dilemma of Pan-Arctic Climate Research” also looks at strategies for the Arctic within the IASC, such as those being pursued at the Fourth International Conference on Arctic Research Planning (https://icarp.iasc.info). IASC is currently inviting to the engagement process to ensure that the scientific priorities for the next decade are firmly grounded on the advice and needs of Arctic scientists and science organizations, Indigenous Peoples and Arctic residents, stakeholders, and rights-holders.

In navigating the complex landscape of pan-Arctic climate research amidst geopolitical challenges, it is imperative to recognise the dual goals of fostering cooperation while holding nations accountable for their actions. The conference focus on enhancing cooperation despite geopolitical tensions requires a nuanced approach. For Arctic countries, including Russia, common interests in avoiding military encounters, providing mutual assistance in emergencies, and addressing environmental challenges underscore the potential for cooperation. As we pursue region-wide imperatives, the question remains: How can nations collectively strengthen Arctic security and stability while addressing Russia's foreign policy actions? The strategies presented in this discussion, from international collaborations such as the Laptev Sea System project to the MWG's strategic plan, serve as examples of the possibilities for cooperative efforts. The engagement process initiated by IASC, particularly through the Fourth International Conference on Arctic Research Planning, is providing a platform for inclusive dialogue to ground scientific priorities in the advice and needs of diverse stakeholders. Despite the complexities, the conclusion is clear: the immediate challenge is to maintain the international exchange of the latest scientific data in pan-Arctic climate research, at least at the working level, in order to improve understanding, address the unknown and manage the complexity of climate research in the Arctic. By continuing the dialogue, we can advance both scientific knowledge and regional stability in the Arctic.

Dynamics of Transnational Science Activity – Experiences from the Polar Regions

Harald Brekke

During the Cold War, the world experienced an increase in marine data acquisition and research, basically driven by a quest to acquire new, first-hand knowledge of the water column, the seabed, and its subsoil. Most of these data and research results were directly useful for military purposes and for the assessment of biological and geological resources. However, the spin-off of this activity was a revolution in the scientific insight into the natural processes that form the oceans and drives ecosystems. The military and resource aspects led to a sort of competition in gathering more data—no major player wanted to lose out. In many ways this was to benefit the scientific community who, through publishing, to a large degree was able to share the results transnationally. This seems to have been the situation for the large oceans (i.e., the Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian Oceans) where the major players found ways for pragmatic coexistence. The so-called Reciprocating States Regime in the Pacific in the 1970s to 1990s is a prime example. However, scientific research in the Arctic region was much less transparent because of its sensitive military status. Nevertheless, in this regime Norwegian and Russian scientists were able to carry out joint research programs on transboundary polar bear

populations. The authorities seemed to have an interest in encouraging communication and cooperation at the level of scientists in this field. It may have been with a view to make it easier also to communicate in other fields, like on the question of assessing the common fish stocks in the Barents Sea.

In the beginning of the 1990s, two things happened that changed the dynamics in Arctic marine research: the *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (the Convention) entered into force, and the Russian system opened up, allowing direct communication with scientists and scientific institutions abroad. The latter has had the effect that after a couple of decades both the old and new generations of Russian scientists now master today's lingua franca (English) and publish accordingly. The Convention had the effect that coastal states around the Arctic Ocean realized that they were facing an unprecedented scientific and technical marine mapping project to establish the outer limits of their jurisdiction beyond 200 nautical miles in that ocean. The requirements of the Convention prompted all the five coastal states around the Arctic Ocean to establish national research programs to acquire the necessary data and associated results and information; all to be compiled and submitted to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to support and verify their outer limits.

It was clear and accepted by the five coastal states bordering on the Arctic Ocean, that such limits would be a combination of delineation lines based on science, and delimitation lines based on negotiations. Instead of allowing for a regime of conflict, the five states met at Ilulissat in Greenland in May 2008 and made the declaration that: "Notably, the law of the sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims."[37] The world's press was taken totally aback; suddenly the Arctic Ocean stood out as an ocean of peace, not one of high tensions and conflicts over jurisdiction.

By 2008, Russia and Norway had already made their first submissions (in 2001 and 2006, respectively) after having engaged in joint mapping activities for that purpose since 1996. The two states realized that a coordinated mapping program in the relevant areas beyond 200 nautical miles would benefit both. So, the relevant government agencies established a framework for cooperative work: the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) on the Norwegian side, and the GRAMBERG All-Russia Scientific Research Institute for Geology and Mineral Resources of the Ocean (VNIIOkeangeologia) on the Russian side. Both agencies were able to draw support from other agencies and academia (including the Russian Academy of Science) on their sides.

[37] Arctic Ocean Conference, *Ilulissat Declaration* (Ilulissat, Greenland, May 28, 2008), https://arcticportal.org/images/stories/pdf/Ilulissat-declaration.pdf.

At that time, Russia was the major holder of relevant data in the Arctic Ocean. The Russian data holders were not allowed to sell these data or make them freely available. However, the institutions were allowed to make data available to partners in contracted agreements on specified scientific research projects. Therefore, the joint Norwegian-Russian overall mapping program became a series of separate, specified research projects within relevant parts of the Arctic Ocean. In each project, the parties agreed on a plan of work, a specified database, the participation of other institutions, and plans for covering costs. From the beginning, scientists from the Universities of Oslo, Bergen, and St. Petersburg were drawn into these projects. As part of the program, Norway started to acquire its own, modern geophysical data in the Arctic Ocean in cooperation with the universities, the University of Bergen in particular. In parallel with the Arctic activities, Norway and Russia also initiated a research program in the Antarctic. This program involved annual marine data acquisition cruises by Russian research vessels in the areas between Dronning Maud Land and the Bouvet Island. This was a joint research project between the University of Bergen and Russian institutions, funded by the NPD. All the data were released into the international SCAR database. Both the Arctic and Antarctic programs resulted in scientific publications, and Master and PhD projects.

In the same period the other states around the Arctic Ocean, including Russia, launched national programs for acquiring marine data in the Arctic Ocean. In less than ten years, the marine seismic database tripled, supplementing and replacing the old ice drift seismic with modern icebreaker seismic. Due to this increase and the ongoing proliferation of data acquisition and research activities related to their outer limits, the five states surrounding the Arctic Ocean in 2006 established an annual technical workshop to exchange progress of work and present data and scientific results. This process has made an unprecedented volume of new data available for transnational scientific research in the Arctic, with the results being extensively disseminated in publications and at conferences.

All the Norwegian-Russian projects built an invaluable positive relationship and trust at both the institutional and personal level, which led to a continuation of transboundary research projects between Norway and Russia even after Norway had made its final submissions on the outer limits. At the institutional level, this cooperation is now put on hold due to the current sanction policy, while scientists may still communicate at the personal level. Some conclusions that may be drawn from the experience described above are that successful transnational science cooperation activities are driven by the access to new data and a common interest in the results, as well as by personal relationships between the scientists involved. There must be economic funding of these activities, especially the data acquisition. Such funding must be made available at the level of the institutions and agencies. Because of the current sanctions, the Norwegian-Russian model with formal, joint projects funded at the level of the institutions is no longer applicable. However, the network between the scientists still exists and may be exploited at the informal level. This implies that the scientists from east and west in the Arctic must find transnational informal fora in which they may exchange and discuss their scientific results and views. This seems to take us back to the time where this conversation mainly took place at conferences. In the Arctic, the International Conference on Arctic Margins (ICAM), which is a science community driven conference not owned by any institution, is an example of

such a forum. To keep this and similar conferences alive may be an avenue to continue a transnational communication between Arctic scientists.

Continental Shelf Mapping in the Arctic: An Exercise in International Cooperation

David Cole Mosher

The *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (Convention) allows for States to exercise sovereignty over the seafloor beyond their 200 nautical mile (M) limit, if their continental shelf extends that far. The continental shelf is defined in Article 76 of the Convention, which also provides the prescriptions for its delineation. These prescriptions largely consist of scientific criteria. In order to assess the validity of the scientific evidence that a State puts forward, Annex II of the Convention called for the creation of a Commission of 21 scientific experts, known as the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (Commission).

Because delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf depends upon scientific criteria and not just political considerations, it is logical and indeed common that continental shelf areas of adjacent and opposite States overlap. Despite, or perhaps because of this potential for overlap, Article 76 (paragraph 10) specifies that its provisions are without prejudice to the question of delimitation between States. This clause illustrates that there is no harm in collaboration between States and in fact emphasizes the need for both scientific and political cooperation in delineation of continental shelf areas. Furthermore, in its rules of procedure (Annex 1, paragraph 5a), the Commission indicates it will not consider and qualify submissions of States that are involved in land or maritime disputes. In order to move forward with delimitation of its continental shelf, therefore, a State must cooperate, at least to the point of not objecting, with its neighbours.

Continental shelf delineation and ultimately delimitation in the Arctic underscores the aforementioned issues. Five coastal States border the Arctic Ocean and because of its more-or-less circular geography, their continental shelves all extend towards each other. At the outset of the delineation exercise, Arctic States realized the potential for overlap. Perennial sea ice cover and the remoteness of the Arctic further demanded collaboration between States as there existed precious few data in the Arctic prior to the early 2000s that could be applied to Article 76. Furthermore, the logistics and costs of operating in these remote and ice-covered seas encouraged cooperation between States. Formal cooperation in the Arctic was penned in 2008 with the *Ilulissat Declaration*. While more encompassing, this agreement clearly had continental shelf issues front and centre.

Canada conducted sea trials in the Arctic in 2007, and it was immediately apparent that Canada would not be able to conduct its data acquisition phase without assistance. While driven by scientific needs, international collaboration was struck at high levels of relevant State governments. Canada, for example, stuck formal memoranda of understanding with departments and institutions of at least four other countries. These agreements led to many years of active collaboration with the U.S., Denmark/Greenland, Sweden, and Germany in the

form of joint field programs and data sharing. Also in 2007, the first of annual meetings between the five Arctic coastal States (A5) took place in St. Petersburg, Russia. These meetings brought together scientists and diplomats from each State, with the intent to share plans for upcoming field seasons, share data and knowledge gained from previous field seasons, and to seek opportunities for future collaboration. Eventually these meetings became a venue to share submission plans and they continue today as a forum for discussing scientific outcomes and advancements.

After the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Government of Canada forbade federal employees from any interaction with Russia and the meetings ceased. Unfortunately, this is the same period when Denmark and Russia filed their submissions with the United Nations. The consequences of the absence of dialogue at this time continue to reverberate today. The "A5" meetings recommenced in Copenhagen in 2016, but with the invasion of the Ukraine, the 2023 gathering in Stavanger was limited to an A4 without Russia. It is worthy to note that, while Canada, the U.S., and Denmark have shared all of their data including with Russia in accordance with the Illulissat agreement, Russian scientists have been unable to share their data with other Arctic coastal States or with international organizations that produce charts and maps of the world's oceans. To their credit, Russian scientists have been highly productive at releasing information through institutional publications and international peer-reviewed literature. Peer-reviewed publication lends significant credibility to scientific arguments for the Commission; thus, is viewed as an important component of presentation of material to the Commission. Scientific publication, and in particular joint publication, is one mechanism that can transcend political differences and government policies. Publication, however, is not the same as releasing data, and information within publications is of limited use to other coastal States.

With regard to continental shelf areas of the Arctic, all five Arctic coastal States have submitted documents to the United Nations to establish their outer limits. Additionally, all five States have issued "non-objection" notes to the United Nations indicating they have no dispute with each other that would prevent Commission consideration of their respective submissions. Norway submitted in 2006 and received recommendations from the Commission in 2009. Russia first submitted in 2001 and revised in 2015 and again in 2021. Russia received recommendations in 2023. Denmark/Greenland submitted for the area north of Greenland in 2014. They are presently 19th in the queue awaiting consideration. Canada submitted in 2019 with an addendum in 2022. Canada is currently 34th in the queue. The U.S. is not party to the Convention, although it has prepared documentation following the prescriptions of Article 76. These documents are not yet public. With recommendations published this year (2023) by the Commission, Russia has a continental shelf area, prior to delimitation with neighbours, that reaches ~775 kilometres east of the US/Russia Treaty line and extends for ~715 kilometres along Canada's 200 M limit seaward of Ellesmere Island. With Canada's addendum of 2022, Russia and Canada have overlapping continental shelf areas totalling ~1.4 million square kilometres—a tenth of the entire Arctic Ocean. Additionally, Canada has an overlapping area of ~743,000 square kilometres with Denmark/Greenland, including much of the same area with Russia. Denmark/Greenland's area also overlaps by ~8,800 square kilometres with Norway's (Norway's total area beyond 200 M is only ~10,300 square kilometres). Overlapping areas with

the U.S. are not yet known. At some point in the future, there will clearly need to be dialogue between these States to delimit their continental shelf areas.

Concluding Remarks

Dr. Jennifer Spence, Arctic Initiative Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

This event explored a range of themes—from classic Arctic governance and defence issues to scientific cooperation and a broader suite of less conventional security issues. In these discussions, we heard a spectrum of views, and discussions regularly acknowledged the interconnections between the many issues being discussed. It is not possible to comprehensively summarize these rich and nuanced discussions. Instead, I would like to highlight some observations about the presentations and discussions that speak to the topics of Arctic cooperation, stability, and security.

What we knew

To fully understand the current situation in the Arctic, it must be contrasted with what was there before. As one speaker pointed out, the Arctic was commonly summed up by the phase "high north, low tension." Discussions also focused on the idea of "Arctic exceptionalism" that emerged because of the peace and cooperation sustained by the 8 Arctic states following the Cold War; however, this moniker can also refer to the region's unique environments, the Arctic's distinctive role in global climate systems, and the impressive examples of scientific cooperation in the Arctic. But perhaps most importantly, the Arctic's exceptionalism is acknowledged and made possible because of the important role played by the region's Indigenous Peoples. Arctic Indigenous Peoples have worked hard for decades to be included in the governance of the region and their involvement has fundamentally shaped the inclusive, consensus-based, and holistic governance approach that has been adopted by so many of its institutions. By extension, it is through the inclusion of Indigenous Peoples that the Arctic has gained credibility and legitimacy as a unique governance space.

Where we are

It is against this historical backdrop that we can begin to appreciate the shock (and even sense of loss) that those passionate about the governance of the Arctic have experienced with Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the spillover effects in the region. Presenters described a time of risk, uncertainty, and instability, including to the safety of the region's peoples and environments. Despite the desire to define a clear path forward, the diverse issues and perspectives that were shared at this event highlight that the current situation is messy, complex, evolving, and dynamic. No one has the full picture.

What did appear clear from the discussions was that this can no longer be treated as a short-term conflict where we can expect a return to "business as usual." We can expect that the

tensions that now exist in the region will be prolonged and chronic. This means that we will need to adapt, evolve, and find new modes of cooperation. What the discussions also exposed is that these tensions are different at different levels (e.g. local, national, sub-regional, regional, and global), and we need to understand that this, in fact, creates competing imperatives. Furthermore, it is unclear what priority will be placed on resolving tensions at the circumpolar level that might conflict with national or global interests.

Lastly, the discussions at this event highlighted that we need to be careful to differentiate between the narratives and the reality of cooperation in the Arctic. There is a common narrative that treats cooperation between the West and Russia as impossible in the current context, yet we know that there are situations where cooperation has continued (e.g. fisheries, Coast Guards, the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement, the International Maritime Organization, the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*, and UNCLOS). There is also a narrative that assures us that Arctic cooperation is alive and well through the Arctic Council, but while the Council may be intact, we do not have to dig very deeply to see that Arctic cooperation within the Council and beyond is severely weakened. We also must acknowledge that the decision to cooperate or define the shape of that cooperation with Russia is not completely up to us. In recent months, Russia has increasingly constrained opportunities for scientific cooperation. Ultimately, we need to have honest and frank conversations about the future of Arctic cooperation, stability and security that acknowledge that there are consequences of both engaging and not engaging with Russia. As one speaker pointed out, "geography will always make us neighbours, that doesn't mean we have to be friends."

Where we would like to be

When it comes to questions about where we would like cooperation with Russia in the Arctic to be, the discussions at this event diverged significantly. There were differing perspectives on what issues warranted or would benefit from cooperation with Russia, who to cooperate with, under what conditions cooperation should even be considered, and even whether cooperation was desirable. These different perspectives illustrate the diversity of views that we have heard in the public discourse over the last two years and demonstrate that there is no "right" answer. The path(s) forward that we can envision are based on different understandings, assumptions, and values. It will be a difficult balancing act that will require course corrections as circumstances evolve. However, perhaps, if we accept that there is no "return" to business as usual, we are freed to envision a future based on historical experience, but not constrained by it.

Strategies for moving forward

With a vision for Arctic cooperation, stability, and security still fuzzy and contested, I want to highlight three core strategies for moving forward that I drew from these discussions:

1. **Make space for bottom-up cooperation:** These can be opportunities to sustain and/or build relationships and trust on both sides. This includes 1) people-to-people

connections, where Arctic Indigenous Peoples have played and can continue to play a leadership role in defining the approach and setting the agendas; and 2) research and science linkages, whether through direct collaboration or (perhaps more realistically at this point) making information and data publicly available.

2. **Invest in and leverage Arctic Institutions**: The Arctic Council has served as a central node in a rich network of institutions – from formal issue-specific agreements and broad scientific associations to conferences and informal partnerships. These institutions and the connections between them require attention to survive and (hopefully) thrive. Without this investment, this network, that took decades of work to build, risks atrophy and the loss of expertise, good will and social capital that these relationships represent. Similarly, we need to invest in sustaining the culture and spirit of Arctic governance, which includes efforts to maintain an inclusive, consensus-based, and holistic approach. The Arctic Council set a bar for other institutions both within and outside the Arctic that does not need to be a casualty of current or future geopolitical tensions.

3. **Continue dialogue about Arctic cooperation during times of uncertainty:** Now more than ever, we need to continue to have open, informed discussions about the future of Arctic cooperation – something this event offered. We need to consider the purpose(s) of Arctic cooperation, the continually evolving and dynamic circumstances, and the path(s) forward. We need to listen to and consider the diverse ideas and perspectives of knowledge holders, experts, leaders and officials, who understand and care about the Arctic and its governance.

Conference Speakers and Panelists

EVAN T. BLOOM

Senior Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC, which he joined in January 2021. He is a lawyer and former senior diplomat at the U.S. Department of State who had leadership roles with respect to Arctic and Antarctic governance and foreign policy, as well as oceans policy. During his thirty years at the U.S. Department of State he served, inter alia, as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries and Director of the Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs. He helped establish the Arctic Council, negotiating its initial rules and documents in 1996. He also supervised U.S. representation in the Council from 2006 to 2020 and co-chaired the Arctic Council task force that produced the eight-party Agreement on Arctic Science Cooperation.

Bloom led the U.S. delegation to the high seas treaty negotiations (biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction) at the UN from 2016 to 2020. He led U.S. delegations to numerous law of the sea bilateral and multilateral dialogues and served as the State Department's representative to the White House Ocean Policy Committee and chaired the Executive Committee of the federal Extended Continental Shelf Task Force. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a fellow of the Explorers Club. He attended Princeton University (A.B.) and Columbia Law School (J.D.). Prior to his government service, he was in private practice in Tokyo and Washington, DC.

DR. HARALD BREKKE

Holds a degree in geology from the University of Bergen, 1984. He is currently project coordinator and senior geologist in the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD). After more than 10 years as an exploration geologist he became the project coordinator for the technical part of establishing the outer limits of the continental shelf of Norway, which involved extensive cooperation with the other Arctic coastal states. He was a member of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) in New York from 1997 to 2012 including half a year as acting Chair, and re-joined as a member from 2022. He was a member of the Legal and Technical Commission (LTC) of the International Seabed Authority from 2012 to 2022, holding the position as Chair of the LTC 2021 to 2022. In parallel with his work in the CLCS and the LTC, he has been the NPD coordinator for joint bilateral and multilateral international Arctic research, and is currently heavily involved in the NPD deep sea minerals program.

DR. ANDREW CHATER

Assistant Professor of Political Science, School of Humanities at Brescia University College in London, Ontario and a Fellow at Polar Research and Policy Initiative in London, England. He formerly was a Postdoctoral Fellow with the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network (NAADSN) at Trent University. He was the 2019 Fulbright Visiting Research Chair in Arctic Studies at the University of Washington in Seattle. As a Fulbright scholar, he completed a research project about the influence of Indigenous Peoples in Arctic

politics. He co-authored *Governing Complexity in the Arctic Region* (Routledge Press, 2020), with Mathieu Landriault, Elana Wilson Rowe and P. Whitney Lackenbauer, and co-edited *North America's Arctic Borders: A World of Change?* (University of Ottawa Press, 2021), with Heather Nicol. Andrew completed his doctorate at the University of Western Ontario and was previously a graduate resident at the Rotman Institute of Philosophy.

His dissertation examined the evolution of the Arctic Council. He holds a master's degree from the University of Waterloo. His research interests include Arctic governance, Canadian foreign policy and communication. His publications have appeared in such journals as *International Journal* and *Strategic Analysis*. Outside of academic life, Andrew plays music and has taught guitar in Iqaluit, Nunavut, as part of Iqaluit Music Camp.

DR. HEATHER EXNER-PIROT

Senior Fellow and Director of the Natural Resources, Energy and Environment Program at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute; and Special Adviser to the Business Council of Canada. She is a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center in Washington DC; the Research Advisor for the Indigenous Resource Network; and the Managing Editor of the Arctic Yearbook. Exner-Pirot is also a Coordinator at the North American and Arctic Defense and Security Network and sits on the Boards of the Saskatchewan Indigenous Economic Development Network and Canadian Rural Revitalization Foundation. Dr. Exner-Pirot obtained a PhD in Political Science from the University of Calgary in 2011.

DR. HEIDEMARIE KASSENS

Marine geologist with thirty years of experience in Arctic research. She has led twenty-two expeditions to the Arctic Ocean, initiated and conducted several international research projects, and published over fifty scientific articles. Dr. Kassens has also co-edited three books on land-ocean systems in the Siberian Arctic. To encourage participation from young scientists and students in research, Dr. Kassens played a key role in establishing both the Otto Schmidt Laboratory for Polar and Marine Research at the State Research Center for Arctic and Antarctic Research in St. Petersburg, which she subsequently headed for more than two decades, and the International Polar and Marine Sciences Master's program (POMOR). Dr. Kassens also chairs the Marine Working Group of the International Arctic Science Committee and the Scientific Advisory Board of the German Society for Polar Research. She additionally represents Germany in other international polar committees, such as the International Science Initiative in the Russian Arctic (IASC-ISIRA). In December 2017, she was honoured with the Federal Cross of Merit on Ribbon of the Federal Republic of Germany in recognition of her exceptional scientific accomplishments and her contributions to the promotion of students and young scientists.

DR. MARC LANTEIGNE

Associate Professor of Political Science at UiT – The Arctic University of Norway (Tromsø), specializing in Chinese and East Asian politics and foreign policy, as well as politics of the Polar Regions. His current research examines the actual and virtual strategies of the Belt and Road, including China's Arctic and Antarctic policies. He has taught frequently in Canada, China, Iceland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, and has written extensively on various aspects of Chinese politics, security, and economic policies. He is a director of the Geopolitics Network at UiT, the UiT liaison for the Arctic Academy for Social and Environmental Leadership / ARCADE project with the University of Iceland, and the editor of Over the Circle, an Arctic news and current events blog.

BRIDGET LAROCQUE

Indigenous Métis scholar of the Northwest Territories; Co-lead of the North American and Arctic Defence and Security Network; and Chair of the Northern Advisory Board. She has extensive knowledge of the Northwest Territories and the broader circumpolar world, brings a distinct worldview from that region, and also shares comprehensive knowledge of research methods on Indigenous and gender issues.

She serves as a policy advisor and researcher with the Arctic Athabaskan Council (ACC) and was executive director of Gwich'in Council International (GCI) from 2007 to 12, so she has tremendous expertise on the Arctic Council and Arctic governance issues. Her other recent work includes managing self-government negotiations for the Gwich'in Tribal Council, serving as land claim implementation coordinator and project analyst with Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, as assistant negotiator with Executive and Indigenous Affairs in the Government of the Northwest Territories, and as former Executive Director of the Fort Norman Métis Community in the Northwest Territories.

DR. DAVID MOSHER

Marine geoscientist with 40+ years of international research experience in collecting, analyzing and interpreting marine geoscientific data from continental margins around the world. He spent a number of years living in camps on the Arctic ice at the beginning of his career, and at the end of his career led international icebreaker expeditions to the Arctic for mapping Canadian and U.S. extended continental shelf regions. This work included formal partnerships with American, Danish, German, Swedish, Norwegian, and Russian colleagues.

He is the author of 120 refereed publications and editor of five books. He has carried out 51 seagoing expeditions, 28 of these as chief scientist, including as co-chief scientist of an Ocean Drilling Program leg. He is presently a Commissioner on the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf at United Nations Headquarters in New York, since 2017. In this role, he is one of 20 scientific experts from around the World elected by State Parties to the UN Convention on

the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to assesses and make recommendations on extended continental shelf submissions of coastal States.

SARA OLSVIG
International Chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council. Olsvig served as member of the Parliament of Denmark (2011 to 2015) and the Parliament of Greenland (2013 to 2018). Olsvig has been leader of the political party Inuit Ataqatigiit and was Vice Premier and Minister of Social Affairs, Families, Gender Equality and Justice in the Government of Greenland from 2016 to 2018. Olsvig was a member (2011 to 2014) and Chairperson of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region from 2013 to 2014. Sara Olsvig was an appointed member of the Constitutional Commission of Greenland, and is today a member of the Human Rights Council of Greenland. Olsvig holds a Master of Science in Anthropology and is currently a Ph.D.-candidate at Ilisimatusarfik, the University of Greenland (2020 to 2023).

ERNIE REGEHR
Senior Fellow in Defence Policy and Arctic Security with The Simons Foundation Canada, and Research Fellow at the Centre for Peace Advancement, Conrad Grebel University College, University of Waterloo. He is co-founder and former Executive Director of Project Ploughshares. His publications include books, monographs, journal articles, policy papers, parliamentary briefs, and op-eds. He is an Officer of the Order of Canada.

DR. ELIZABETH RIDDELL-DIXON
Distinguished Senior Fellow at the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History (University of Toronto); Senior Fellow at Massey College; and Professor Emerita of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario, where she taught graduate and undergraduate courses in international relations. Her Arctic publications include *Breaking the Ice: Canada, Sovereignty, and the Arctic Extended Continental Shelf*; and *Canada and the Maritime Arctic: Boundaries, Shelves, and Waters* (co-authored with Whitney Lackenbauer and Suzanne Lalonde) as well as numerous articles and chapters. She has served as Chair of the Department of Political Science (Western), Vice President of the Academic Council on the United Nations System; Vice President of the Board of Directors of the Museum of Ontario Archaeology; Executive Member of the Board of the Canadian Political Science Association; Chair of the Academic Committee of the Board of Directors of the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre; member of the Executive Committee of the Victoria University Senate; and member of the Board of Directors of Massey College.

DR. KARI ROBERTS

Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Department of Economics, Justice, and Policy Studies at Mount Royal University in Calgary. She is also a Coordinator of the North American and Arctic Defense and Security Network (NAADSN); and a Fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI).

Dr. Roberts' research concerns Russian foreign policy toward the United States specifically and the West more broadly, and she also studies Russia's interests in the Arctic, and the implications for Canada and NATO. She is co-editor of *The Ascendancy of Regional Powers in Contemporary US-China Relations: Rethinking the Great Power Rivalry*, available in October 2023 from Palgrave.

DR. JENNIFER SPENCE

Jennifer Spence is an Arctic Initiative Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs with expertise related to sustainable development, international governance, institutional effectiveness, and public policy. Spence has a particular passion for working with Northerners to understand and respond to the opportunities and challenges facing the Arctic region.

Spence is also an Adjunct Professor with Carleton University's Northern Studies Graduate Program and was the Executive Secretary of the Arctic Council's Sustainable Development Working Group until 2023. Previously, she worked for 18 years with the Government of Canada in senior positions related to resource management, conflict and change management, strategic planning, and leadership development.

Spence holds a Ph.D. in public policy from Carleton University, a Master of Arts from Royal Roads University in conflict management and analysis, and a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in political science from the University of British Columbia.

DR. SERGEY SUKHANKIN

A Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation (Washington, D.C.) and a Fellow at NAADSN. His areas of interest include Kaliningrad and the Baltic Sea region; Russia`s policies in the Arctic region; and the development of Russian private military companies since the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War. He has consulted with or briefed CSIS (Canada), DIA (USA), and the European Parliament. His project discussing the activities of Russian PMCs, "War by Other Means" informed the United Nations General Assembly report entitled "Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination."