

*European Security and Nuclear Disarmament*

**Simons Symposium on  
European Security and Nuclear Disarmament**

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*European Contributions to Nuclear Disarmament  
& Conflict Resolution***

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Good Morning!

I appreciate the opportunity to introduce the second Simons Symposium. And I would like to add my welcome to that of the gentlemen who have come before me.

I want to thank the European Leadership Network and Pugwash Conferences for co-sponsoring the second Simons Symposium, this time on European Security and Nuclear Disarmament. And to welcome to the nuclear disarmament sphere, the newly-formed European Leadership Network - today united with the most venerable of disarmament organizations, 59-year-old Pugwash Conferences. I would like to thank the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs for their contribution to this Symposium.

This is my first visit to Berlin – the site of Berlin Wall whose fall led to the re-unification of Europe and heralded the end of the Cold War. I am concerned, however, that the end has not yet been accomplished. There are some further steps to be taken - some issues to be resolved – for example, renegotiation of the CFE Treaty; NATO nuclear weapons, and missile defence – in order to attain a more cohesive relationship between Russia and the West, in order to forge a truly Atlantic-European Security Alliance – from Vancouver to Vladivostok - a security alliance more suited to the multitude of heterogeneous threats which have emerged, or are emerging, in the 21st Century.

American President, Barack Obama, chose Europe as the venue for his historic speech committing himself to the future of a world without nuclear weapons. Europe has the opportunity to lead the way. And this why, *perhaps*, President Obama chose to make his declaration in Prague, in the centre of Europe.

Many of us have realized that nuclear weapons will not be eliminated until the nuclear weapons states themselves, make the decision. Seven member states of the European Union and European NATO countries either possess, or host, a significant number of weapons. The United Kingdom and France possess a total of 525 nuclear weapons - 450 of them deployed - and five European countries host some 200 US tactical nuclear weapons. This is significant number of weapons and a significant number of countries.

Clearly, there are several European governments demonstrating a willingness to lead - at least to the elimination of weapons on their soil. Mr. Guido Westerwelle , Foreign Minister for Germany, and Keynote Speaker today, has called for the removal of the US tactical nuclear weapons from his country. And Germany, with the governments of Belgium, The Netherlands, Norway and Luxembourg, has called for the tactical nuclear weapons to be withdrawn from Europe. While removal of these weapons from Europe would not de-nuclearize Europe and NATO, it would be a first step.

Positive measures are being taken by other European states. The United Kingdom and Norway are partnering in a project to develop confidence building, transparency measures and verification for the projected nuclear warhead dismantlement – critical measures in preparation for the movement towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons.

The government of Austria has established the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation to promote dialogue, research and analysis on issues of nuclear security.

In the influential non-governmental sphere, we have the European Leadership Network - and like Global Zero which, however, spans the world - is comprised of former high level government persons, many of whom, like our colleague Lord Des Browne of Ladyton, were in positions with responsibility for nuclear policy and nuclear arsenals. These former government ministers, military personnel and diplomats can be a driving force in influencing governments, in all the nuclear weapons states, to eliminate their nuclear arsenals; and to reinforce the reality that nuclear weapons are a security risk - that nuclear weapons are, indeed, neither viable as a useable weapon **nor** as a deterrent, in the contemporary world of proliferating nuclear weapons, potential nuclear terrorism, changing power dynamics and newly developing power alliances.

Two years have passed since President Obama's Prague speech, and since then, we have seen some incremental measures - though to date mostly *declaratory* steps - which may lead to nuclear disarmament.

*The US Nuclear Posture Review* is disappointing because the US will maintain its nuclear policies and arsenals. However, there will be modest reductions. And there are guarantees to neither threaten nor use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, which are in compliance with their NPT obligations. As well, there is a new statement that **deterrence** is the fundamental role of the U.S. nuclear weapons. The U.S. nuclear weapons though - as are Russia's - are poised on dangerous high-alert status.

*START* has entered into force. The cuts are minimal but a positive move is that the delivery vehicles - launchers and missiles - for either nuclear or **conventional** warheads, are included. The most important feature is that verification measures are in place after they lapsed with the former treaty.

*The 2010 NPT Review Conference* was considered a success, primarily because it did not fail. The *status quo* was essentially preserved. There was significant support for a nuclear weapons convention. And as well, the introduction of language on International Humanitarian Law. The problem with International Humanitarian Law, however, is that it is war law - an oxymoronic concept of **humane** ways to **kill** people. And, moreover, has no utility until a nuclear weapon is used - until a nuclear war is fought, and by then it is too late.

The major success - and a most welcome one - was with regard to the Resolution on the Middle East nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction free zone. However, the long threatened tinderbox in the Middle East finally ignited and it is uncertain how the commitment on the Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone will move forward; and whether the proposed 2012 Conference to consider the practical steps will take place. To date no information is forthcoming.

*The NATO New Strategic Concept* is disappointing. The NATO Alliance committed to the “goal of *creating conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.*” This is not the same as commitment to a *world free* of nuclear weapons. The Strategic Concept maintains NATO’s nuclear policies and adversarial stance. And maintains ambiguity on the role of nuclear weapons and use for non-nuclear threats - a step backward from the US Nuclear Posture Review. There **is** language, which may provide an opening to removal of the US tactical nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup> Disturbingly though, this position is linked to Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons. The Cold War nuclear adversarial stance is maintained. I suppose a military alliance must have an adversary in order to retain its relevance.

And in the global picture, the negatives, of course, deserve a mention: North Korea is said to possess enough material for several nuclear weapons. Pakistan continues to build its nuclear arsenal, and India is testing long-range ballistic missiles. And we have the uncertainty with regard to the nuclear weapons intentions of Iran, possibly Syria, Burma and others.

Experts at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute predict that there will be little to no movement in nuclear disarmament in the near future. The task for civil society is to prove them wrong and to work to generate the political will to accomplish this task within a reasonable time frame.

It would be useful today and for the remainder of the Pugwash Conference to re-examine European Security requirements for the twenty-first century.

Most of you will remember that in 1991 the Atlantic-Europe Alliance turned it back on the CSCE (now the OSCE) - the organization considered “best suited to address overall North Atlantic and European collective security”<sup>2</sup> in the new world order – a truly Euro-Atlantic security organization extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

And NATO, faced with irrelevance, sought to reinvent itself. And as well as adopting a mandate barely distinguishable from that of the CSCE, NATO increased the number of member countries, expanding its boundaries to Russia’s borders – *a provocative move* which has exacerbated tensions between NATO and Russia.

NATO retained its adversarial, bi-polar strategic war framework with US tactical nuclear weapons on European soil and the guaranteed nuclear arsenals of the United States and Great Britain to support the framework.

The current issue of Missile Defence is a major cause for concern. I understand that there are divisions *within NATO* on NATO’s recently announced Missile Defence plan – that some European member states have differing perspectives on the proposed plan. At the

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<sup>1</sup> To “seek a way to create the conditions for further reductions of tactical nuclear weapons”.

<sup>2</sup> Bauwens, Colson, De Haar, Feyter, Paye, Vertongen, *The CSCE and the Changing Role of Nato and the European Union*, NATO Review, No.3 June 1994, Vol 42, pp21-25

March 2010 Brussels Forum - NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen spoke of the need for a missile defence system for NATO and Russia – “one security roof”, he said - built together, supported together and operated together, and the “people from Vancouver to Vladivostok would know that they were part of one community.... One security roof would be a very strong political symbol that Russia is fully part of the Euro-Atlantic family, sharing the benefits and the costs – not outside, but very much inside. That would be real, new Euro-Atlantic security architecture”<sup>3</sup>

The NATO Secretary General’s recent proposal for the partnership between NATO and Russia is a retreat from his earlier position and is a *nominal* partnership at best. “Our idea,” **he now says**, “is to have two independent systems that co-operate – a NATO system and a Russia System – each responsible for protection of its territory but capable of co-operation and data exchange.”<sup>4</sup>

With the Obama presidency, relationships between Russia and NATO and the US, **were** warming. They are now disintegrating – predominantly around the issue of missile defence - and the prospects for disarmament are endangered. Perhaps European member states of NATO are in a position to heal the divisions.

I would like to end by raising some questions:

- \* Are the European member states of NATO on the same security path as their Atlantic partners?
- \* Is the NATO Security Alliance - as it stands -relevant for the security of Europe?
- \* What is the purpose of NATO in the post-Soviet era?
- \* Has it outlived its usefulness?
- \* If the answer is no, what changes to the NATO Alliance would be appropriate in order to deal with current and emerging threats?

With NATO members 450 deployed nuclear weapons the questions have to be asked:

- \* What are the threats to Europe, which would require a nuclear response?
- \* What agreement exists on what kind of threat *ought* to be opposed by nuclear weapons?
- \* Are nuclear weapons obstacles to European Security?

Europe is a strong proponent of a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone:

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<sup>3</sup> NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen *Building a Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture*, Brussels Forum March 27<sup>th</sup> 2010

<sup>4</sup> Defense News May /11

\* Why not Europe as a nuclear weapons free zone? Such a zone could begin in Central Europe and move west as the US nuclear weapons are repatriated until it reached the borders of France and Great Britain. Then we would have to see what happens next!

We need to be reflecting on issues such as these – and others in relation to the entire global picture – in order to move concretely towards a nuclear weapons free world. The time and opportunity has come and it is my hope that during this symposium and during the following days of the Pugwash Conference new areas will be identified where further progress is possible.

Thank you very much!

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