

**International Conference**

**June 26<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup>, 2014**

**National Assembly**

**Paris**

**Forward to a  
nuclear-  
weapon-free  
world**



# Why this conference ?

In the mid-1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union maintained an arsenal of 70 000 nuclear weapons.

Deterrence calculations resulted in the absurd situation of a world living under the ongoing threat of annihilation.

At first, only certain world powers (UK, France, China), following the lead of the USA and the URSS, made the decision to base their security on nuclear deterrence by establishing the capacity to inflict disproportional and unbearable human damage potential enemies.

Once Israel followed suit, India and Pakistan openly took this approach after the end of the Cold War.

North Korea also claims to have nuclear weapons.

Despite the near-universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the strengthening of its monitoring systems, the risk of the appearance of new nuclear actors remains high.

That is what is at stake with the negotiations with Iran.

Thankfully, South Africa showed it was possible to ensure international security through other means.

While it had inherited a clandestine nuclear weapon from the Apartheid Regime, this country made the choice to renounce the nuclear weapon and to actively participate in international efforts fighting against proliferation and for disarmament.

The 21st Century began with a clear decrease of the global nuclear arsenal (approximately 16 300 warheads today) thanks, notably, to important international agreements which initiated substantial disarmament, guaranteed by a constraining verification system. But it is undeniable that nuclear disarmament is stagnant: roadblocks to the banning of trials and the fabrication of fissile matter for military use, refusal to engage in negotiations on a “nuclear weapon free zone” in the Middle East or again the elimination of NATO’s European Tactical Nuclear Weapons which currently make this region a possible nuclear battlefield.

Contrary to popular belief regarding nuclear deterrence, this strategy is not a guarantee of peace, and nothing ensures that nuclear weapons won’t be employed. Besides the dangers of nuclear proliferation, there is still the danger of an accidental launch. Simply by the increase of Nuclear Actors, the risk of failure of deterrence is multiplied. The instabilities of Post-Cold War, as witnessed by the Ukrainian crisis, create a new strategic universe, where the possibility of a nuclear launch by a power, estimating that its vital interests are menaced, could once again become a credible hypothesis. Yet the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear explosion, even of relatively limited energy, would be extreme.

It is time to restart the process of disarmament, which is an explicit obligation of the Non-proliferation Treaty, to eventually reach a world without nuclear weapons, which is now accepted and called for by all Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Numerous Civil Society Organizations, millions of citizens and thousands of Mayors, Parliamentarians and Statesmen all support this process.

France, its diplomacy, its political elites, its universities and its researchers must be stakeholders in this process of disarmament and contribute with concrete propositions. This current conference lies within this perspective.

## **1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON SINCE 1945**

- Bernard NORLAIN, Air Force General (2 S), France
- Marc FINAUD, Former Diplomat, Principal Counsellor for the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and Scientific Collaborator for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), France
- Louis GAUTIER, Chief Counsellor at the “Court des comptes” (Court of Auditors), France
- Steward DAVE, Executive Director for the Klerk Foundation, former Counsellor under President W. de Klerk, South Africa

## 2 IMPEDIMENTS TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT



- Michel ROCARD, Former Prime Minister, France
- Hubert VEDRINE, Former Foreign Affairs Minister, France
- Shlomo BEN-AMI, Former Foreign Affairs Minister, Israel
- Ian KEARNS, Director the European Leadership Network (ELN), United Kingdom

# 3 POPULAR BELIEFS ABOUT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

- Ward WILSON, International Expert, Researcher at BASIC Think tank, United States
- Jean-Marie COLLIN, Research Associate at GRIP, French Director of PNND, France
- Lou MARESCA, International Law Counsellor, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Switzerland
- Paul QUILES, Former Minister of Defense, President of ALB, France
- Oliver MEIER, Research Associate for the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Germany
- Hervé MORIN, Former Minister of Defense, Member of Parliament, France
- Jean-Pierre MAULNY, Assistant Director of the Institute of International and Strategic Relations (IRIS), France

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## **FORWARD TO A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS**

- Paolo COTTA-RAMUSINO, Secretary General of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, Italy
- Yasuyoshi KOMIZO, Secretary General of Mayors for Peace, Director of Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation, former Ambassador of Japan
- Jennifer SIMONS, President of The Simons Foundation, Canada
- Alyn WARE, International Director of PNND, New Zealand
- Ursula PLASSNIK, Austrian Ambassador in France, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Austria
- Des BROWN, former Defense Secretary of the State, United Kingdom
- Paul QUILES, Bernard NORLAIN, Jean-Marie COLLIN.

# Paul QUILES

In this year, when we commemorate the memory of the First World War, it is to be expected that we reflect on conflicts, the causes of conflicts, and the ways to avoid them.

I have the pleasure of finding myself in the company of my friend, and the President of this Assembly, Claude Bartolone. Just a week ago, I was in my department of Tarn, where Claude Bartolone came to celebrate several events concerning the great man, the great humanist, the great pacifist, the great patriot: Jean Jaurès. I am perhaps more connected to him than others, since I was the deputy of the riding that was his during 14 years. In terms of the topic that we are addressing today, I remember that Jean Jaurès was, amongst other things, in favour of what he called “International Arbitration”.

If, during these two days, we are going to discuss nuclear weapons, it's because we are considering, at least for those that have organized this international conference, that we must go towards a world free from these weapons of mass destruction, these terrifying weapons, which have already been used and that we hope will never be the cause of destruction of a part of humanity.

We want to leave behind pre-made ideas and false evidence. To this end, we must talk, listen, exchange and debate. And where is a better place than in Parliament?

I thank, on behalf of the ALB association, the organizers of this conference, the National Assembly and their President Claude Bartolone, for the opportunity to advance this debate, which exists in the entire world and which is, unfortunately, a little less developed in France. If over the next two days we can, thanks to several French and International speakers who have graciously agreed to participate, advance this debate, these exchanges, and move towards a world without nuclear weapons, we would be truly grateful.

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*Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IAf3x5fIPMw>*

*Paul Quilès was Deputy from 1978-1983, from 1986 to 1988 and from 1993-2007. He is the mayor of Cordes-sur-Ciel (Tarn) since 1995. He was a Minister from 1983-1986 (notably Minister of the Defense from 1985-1986) and again from 1988-1993. At the National Assembly he was President of the Defense Committee and the Armed Forces from 1997-2002 and later Vice-President of the committee on International Affairs from 2004-2007. He is one of the principle founders and facilitators of the club Gauche Avenir (<http://www.gaucheavenir.org/>). He is member of the association Mayors for Peace, and signed Global Zero's petition. He published, on the issue of nuclear disarmament, “Un mensonge français” (A French Lie) (Charles Léopold Mayer Editions, 2012). He is equally co-author with Bernard Norlain and Jean-Marie Collin of the book “Arrêtez la bombe!” (Stop the bomb!) (Le Cherche Midi, February 2013). <http://paul.quiles.over-blog.com/>*

# Claude BARTOLONE

It's a great pleasure for me to welcome you to the National Assembly and I would like to sincerely thank Paul Quilès for choosing this location to debate this important topic that unites us today.

Indeed, I wish it to be in the French National Assembly, in its committees, in its fact-finding missions, in its conference halls, that great political, economic, social, societal, strategic and environmental debates take place.

I am greatly attached to this calling of our institution, because it is here, in this temple of Democracy and of Freedom of expression that new ideas must hatch as well as concepts that will change the future world. Here we meet people who by their experience, their culture and their reflections, at first often solitary, bring future elements of our Nation, the fulfillment of people, the organization of the world.

You are these actors, and thank you to each and every one of you for being here.

You have perhaps not chosen the simplest theme, but when Paul Quilès is responsible for something, it is never simple. This theme touches on global security, death, and the balance of the world.

Our Defense committee, under the chairmanship of Patricia Adam, held twelve plenary meetings on the theme of deterrence. They heard from more than twenty experts, researchers, philosophers, representatives of religions, soldiers, manufacturers, diplomats, and representatives of think tanks. I would like to recognize this remarkable effort, which has had no precedent in our legislative history.

The complex relationship between the atomic weapon and peace began mid-twentieth century. Due to the written will of Albert Einstein, the means granted to the great physicist Robert Oppenheimer, and the political will of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the first nuclear bomb of history exploded on the 16<sup>th</sup> of July, 1945 near Los Alamos. All three of them were resolved pacifists. When President Truman learned of the success of the Los Alamos experimentation via a piece of paper, he was seated in front of Stalin, in a preparatory meeting for the Potsdam Conference. Historians maintain that Stalin only understood the weight of this strategic revolution a few days later.

On August 6<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup>, the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki paid their heavy tribute to History and we entered into a period of non-world war, uninterrupted until today.

We are here today in France, where we commemorate the end of the two World Wars, one being but a prolongation of the other. To a large extent, they took place on our land. One resulted in the destruction of our youth, the other, the Occupation, from which came the daily trauma of knocks on the door in the morning, or entire families disappearing who knows where; it didn't take long to find out where, and even worse, we discovered how they disappeared. Because of this, the political leaders of the Fourth Republic wanted "never again", never again to be occupied or attacked, and so they decided to construct the bomb. You know what happened next. This program mobilized France in the common resolve, from Mendès-France to De Gaulle, and included all the leaders of the following Republics. It was developed in the greatest secrecy, since it was financed by the secret service budget. In 1960 it was tested thanks to the

secret portion of the Evian Agreements. Military Charles Ailleret, Scientist Yves Rocard, and Conceptual Pierre-Marie Gallois, thus acquired a nuclear deterrence force for France. Is this weapon still useful? This is the question you will ask yourselves, and which you are going to debate, with particular difficulty, since it is not only a strategic weapon, but a political tool, and an element of identity. In any case, there is a consensus that it has served a purpose.

What retained the 55 000 tanks of the Warsaw Pact faced with the 7000 of NATO countries in Western Europe?

Why were China and India on the verge of war without taking the plunge? Why are India and Pakistan engaging in some skirmishes in the Mountains of Cachemire? Why do Arab countries no longer attack Israel and have even signed peace agreements? There is no doubt that the deterrence element has worked.

With respect to the debate concerning the future of the bomb, I will listen with great interest to your contributions. The answer to each question is complex. Do we need to emphasize the moral aspect? Was the bombing of Dresden more ethical than that of Hiroshima? Is Napalm more acceptable than nuclear weapons? Should we point out the financial aspect? Countries that have only conventional arms have budgets comparable to ours. Do we need to validate the price-quality relationship in security? Do we need to enter into a discussion of the concept of use, while the fuzziness of the concept, the variety and the power of the weapons, and of their holders, are all an integral part of deterrence; the unpredictability of which must be taken into account.

Must we envision a world where there are only conventional forces? Do not the discrepancies of power, technology and budgets force us to align ourselves quickly, and finally, to entrust our security to America who is certainly not asking for that.

Have not specialized committees in the United States Congress concluded anti-missile defenses are technologically inefficient decoys, very costly and counter-effective politically?

When we see the incredible increase in the power of military forces, and the multiplication of strategic issues in the Pacific zone, we can but think that the USA and China won't go to war; that it is impossible due to the existence of strategic weapons.

These examples demonstrate clearly that atomic weapons don't impose peace, but that they ensure no global war between large powers, which was the history of the world wars of the twentieth century. Proliferation comes from the belief, by countries that are equipped with nuclear weapons, that it ensures they won't be invaded.

It is a rule of global peace and pre-requisite that alone would allow non-proliferation and then disarmament.

I demand the right to Utopia: why give up this hope, even if it is most likely our successors who will achieve it?

The nuclear weapon is an asymmetric weapon. There is another: terrorism. September 11th showed that strategic arsenal does not save us from everything, nor does it provide a solution for this type of attack. Intelligence and police forces will also be necessary as long as the world is what it is: unable to make

political negotiations precede forceful actions. Here also, I refuse to lose hope in Man, and I am not a believer in the inexorably tragic nature of History.

But mustn't we ask ourselves what is the minimal threshold of credibility? North Korea without doubt has 8 weapons, Israel 80, India and Pakistan 100, China and Great-Britain 250, France 300, the United States 7,000 and Russia 8,000. This implies that these last two countries have to themselves 95% of the world's nuclear weapons. The numbers speak for themselves.

I am listing my principal questions as a political leader. I must remind us not to point the finger at France: we have destroyed our Sol-sol strategic missiles and their underground silos of the Plateau of Albion, we have destroyed all our short-range Pluton missiles, and mid-range Hadès, we have ended our production of fissile material; finally we are the only permanent member country of the Council of Security to have not only dismantled, but to have truly destroyed our Pacific nuclear test site.

The way paved by the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the right one: each must return to, as have France and Great Britain, their apparatus to the credible minimum. We must call all nations to make this effort, so that NPT'S spirit represents a hope.

The arrival of new actors, Israel, Pakistan, India and North Korea, without mentioning countries capable of possessing nuclear arms, doesn't help the spirit of de-escalation. History, in this domain, has not evolved in the direction we had hoped. Each day we discover new conflicts, new countries at war, new tragedies. This situation is unrivalled since May 1945. Our duty of vigilance is therefore imperative as is our duty to hope in humanity.

Now it is time for the discussions. There are no taboo subjects, there is no forbidden doubt, and there is no sacred doctrine. There must be an extensive debate between men and women smitten by peace, humanism and freedom. I know that this is true for you, and that you will take advantage of this time to discuss and provide answers to all of these questions.

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*Watch the video of this speech (in French): [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lol9X\\_uS2sq](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lol9X_uS2sq)*

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*Claude Bartolone is the President of the French National Assembly since 2012. He was the mayor of Pré-Saint-Gervais, Delegate Minister to the city, Deputy, President of the General Council of Seine-Saint-Denis. He was later Vice-President of the National Assembly from 1992-1993, President of the Cultural, Family and Social Affairs committee from 1997-1998 and President of the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee on risky loans and products taken by collective territories and local public actors, ending in 2009.*

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# THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPON SINCE 1945

# Bernard NORLAIN

I have the honour of speaking first at this conference, which is one of the rare international conferences on disarmament organized by a French association in a public building, the National Assembly.

I am going to focus on identifying the characteristics, the specificity, the singularity, and the originality of the French nuclear program's development. This originality strongly contributed to the shaping of the French consensus, which is generally evoked when we speak of adherence to French nuclear deterrence.

We have in practice dated the start of the French nuclear development program as 1939, the year where a team lead by Frédéric Joliot Curie registered a secret patent confirming the principle of fission and affirming the notion of critical mass. Then there was the meltdown of 1940 and the Second World War when research work in France was interrupted. Some found themselves in Canada, where incredibly the team lead by Bertrand Goldschmidt informed General De Gaulle, in 3 minutes, of the existence of the Manhattan program, which is the first atomic bomb program in the United States.

Two months after the Hiroshima explosion, General De Gaulle created the Atomic Energy Committee. He was then the true creator of the French nuclear strike force, and since this time, he has become a shadow guardian of nuclear deterrence in France, and the author of the associated concepts.

The Fourth Republic first deployed the nuclear program in the civilian sector. At the end of 1948, it is the first French atomic battery, Zoé, that emerges. Pierre Mendès-France made the decision to launch a secret military program with the objective of making the bomb. In this context, Pierre Guillaumat, general administrator of the CEA, created the General Studies Bureau, which became the manager of military applications. This Bureau was entrusted to General Albert Buchalet. We can find professor Rocard surrounded by his very restrained team.

It was General De Gaulle who made the public decision to create a nuclear strike force. After that, things happened very quickly. On February 1<sup>st</sup> 1960 "Gerboise Bleue" exploded, the first French experimental apparatus, followed by several other explosions. The seventh attempt resulted in the explosion of the first true French nuclear bomb called "Béryl".

The ensuing increase in power was rapid, with the accession of thermonuclear technology and simultaneously the establishment of three components: the strategic air force component with Mirages IV, the ground component with the SSBS and in 1973 tactical or strategic missiles, and the naval component with the SNLE.

At the end of the Cold War, France possessed approximately 600 nuclear warheads. We subsequently witnessed a relative decline, with the abandonment of the ground component, and the progressive reduction of the number of warheads to approximately 300, and the end of nuclear trials.

Currently, there is a renewal of our arsenal, with only two components, and now 300 nuclear warheads. There are three characteristics of the French nuclear program:

- The first is the autonomy of the project, the independence that presided the installation of the nuclear program
- The second is the originality of the concept, of the doctrine.
- The third is the accomplishment of a technological and industrial base that is adapted and efficient.

**Autonomy is speed of production.** This was possible due to a strong and clearly displayed political will, and by the building of a very structured managerial and industrial design. This independent production supports the central Gaullist concept of national independence that was, and remains a great source of national pride.

On several occasions, this technological development benefitted from precious support, not always official, from the United States, notably to ensure the safety of the weapons. This support, which remained limited wasn't decisive, even if it permitted the program to gain several years.

**An original concept.** General De Gaulle was little interested in the doctrinal aspects, which are often Byzantine. It was the French Strategic School that, according to the expression by Lucien Poirier, undertook "A theoretical investigation to endow France with a concept of nuclear deterrence that is unique and adapted to its situation".

This concept was essentially the work of four generals, referred to as "the four knights of the Apocalypse", André Beaufre, Pierre-Marie Gallois, Charles Ailleret, and Lucien Poirier. This theoretical work was strongly critiqued by Raymond Aron, who started to poke at what he called "logical delirium" by General Gallois. He later stated that he never spoke against the creation of a French nuclear program, but that he had never subscribed to the doctrine of deterrence of the weak to the strong, and more generally the sanctuarization of France, which is at the heart of the concept of nuclear deterrence.

At the time of the Cold War, France's concept was that of minimal deterrence, deterrence of the weak to the strong, and of the equalizing power of the atom; namely that a small country can deter a large country from attacking or invading it.

France, therefore, developed a very original theory, the theory of pure deterrence, qualified as "non-use", which rejects the American theory of graduated response. Simultaneously, the possession of atomic weapons became the condition of National Independence. The atom is considered like a new form of sovereignty, and it permitted General De Gaulle to declare that the possession of this weapon is legitimate for all countries, which opened the door to all proliferation. Furthermore, the notion of "all or nothing" united with technological development allowed the introduction of the notion of ultimate warning.

Subsequently, president Jacques Chirac's speech at l'île Longue, and Nicolas Sarkozy's speech at Cherbourg developed this doctrine towards a concept of selective hits, which allowed supporters of French nuclear deterrence to say that the doctrine had evolved and adapted. But it opens the door to the doctrine of use, to the contrary of the doctrine of non-use.

**A unique industrial policy.** The development of the program was made possible by the implementation of a dedicated and sustainable managerial and industrial structure: a public structure that regrouped the CEA-DAM, the ministerial delegation for armaments, which became the General Delegation for Armament and

the Chief of Defense. This public structure implemented an industrial base, which was able to cover all the necessary technologies, and mobilized for each technology a grand master accompanied by a very large number of second-rank enterprises. Thus a powerful scientific, military, industrial lobby was established throughout the whole development of the program, all the more attached to the continued and constant development of the French nuclear program, all independently, a closed market.

The three attributes that made the development of the French nuclear program unique contributed significantly to the consensus building, which took a relatively long time to establish. At the beginning of the nuclear program, once general De Gaulle made it public, there was very strong opposition from political parties, media and the military (which at the time were very much opposed), the Church, experts and also a large part of the public.

There was therefore a general hostility. Then progressively at the end of the seventies the political parties rallied to nuclear deterrence, starting with the Communist party and the Socialist party, followed by all the parties, except perhaps the Ecologists. The army had found new legitimacy in its nuclear program. The adherence of the media, the Church with a few nuances, and finally everyone, continued being reinforced, and strengthened to make this program an indestructible block. It is here that is found the true specificity of the French Consensus, which is characterized by its impermeability to any reconsideration.

France is therefore nearly void of all serious and open debate about nuclear arms, which is the difference between all other countries, nuclear or not. Here we touch a sore point, far beyond logical and rational reasoning, which no doubt resides in the French collective unconscious. Because the French atomic bomb became the symbol of national independence, this contributes to the perpetuation of the nostalgia of the power and prestige of France, the opposite of the current discourse, which often cultivates “declinism” and submission. A previous minister doesn’t hesitate to write: “deterrence is France”. Is there not a certain degree of sadness in reducing the heritage of France to a bomb, even an atomic one? We can fear that the public opinion of consensus is demotivating to the French, in terms of their spirit of defense.

The specificity of the French nuclear program, by its political, conceptual and technological independence, strongly contributed to the creation of a consensual block, characterized by its impermeability. We could rejoice, because unanimity on such a sensitive topic truly is rare. But can we be satisfied with a concept fitted to the Cold War, when totally different security issues confront us today? Can we gamble on immobility, withdrawal, and contortion, in an open world, multi-centered and in constant evolution? If General De Gaulle’s major political idea of Independence and Freedom of Action remains an ardent obligation, is today’s indispensable pillar the bomb? This is the question that we need to ask, and that this conference will cover.

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*Watch the video of this speech (In French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lwdcZnM8JFc>*

*Bernard Norlain is an Air Force General (2S). He was the Chief of the military cabinet of Prime Ministers Jacques Chirac and afterwards Michel Rocard. Former fighter pilot, he was at the head of the Combat Air Force, and afterwards appointed Director of the Institute of Advanced studies of National Defense. He is co-author with Paul Quilès and Jean-Marie Collin of the book “Arrêtez la bombe!” (Le Cherche Midi, February 2013).*

## Marc FINAUD

The initiative of this conference is timely in order to start a true debate, not only between the French, but also to provide an outside perspective.

Being myself a former diplomat and having had the experience of international negotiations on the subject of disarmament and non-proliferation, it seemed to me useful to show that sometimes we can be influenced by deceptive appearances. It is important to know how to read between the lines and know the cards in this domain where occasionally the doctrine, or even propaganda, often mask reality.

I would like to concentrate the essence of my speech on the interpretation of the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), since it represents the heart of this question, and I will touch lightly on nuclear testing agreements, and on the bilateral Russian-American accords.

It is common in the diplomatic milieu and in the disarmament community to focus on the three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which are: non-proliferation itself, disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It is interesting to note that in the NPT there are two categories of states, those equipped with nuclear weapons (the French expression is sometimes misleading; *“États dotés de l’arme nucléaire”*, compared to the English expression which is more realistic, they are “Nuclear Weapons States” who have themselves acquired these weapons) and those not possessing this weapon. These two categories, which are most often opposing each other, agree however on insisting on the preservation of this sacrosanct equilibrium between the three pillars.

Member countries mutually accuse each other of violating this balance, giving more importance to one aspect than to another. It’s clear that the states equipped with nuclear arms believe that these weapons are there to maintain their security, and that they couldn’t give them up unless there was no risk of proliferation.

In contrast, states that do not possess these weapons believe that they have done everything necessary to show their good faith and forgo these weapons, including following very strict obligations, however it is the Nuclear Weapon States that should move towards the NPT’s logic, which is nuclear disarmament.

When we look objectively at the obligations required of these two categories of states, it must be concluded that they are unequal. The states holding nuclear weapons have no obligations, no restrictions from transferring weapons between themselves (they are only forbidden from transferring weapons to Non-Nuclear States), they have no verification and nor are they are committed to time constraints: Article 6 of the NPT speaks of disarmament at “an early date”, and we are now 40 years after the Treaty’s signature. The only obligation is to negotiate in good faith; it is not a commitment to a result. Thankfully, in the meantime, in 1996, the verdict of the International Court of Justice specified that there is still an obligation of results, which requires the completion of nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, the Non-Nuclear States have a series of very strict obligations; they are submitted to verification by the AIEA, and true deadlines, specifically, 180 days to start negotiations after the treaty has been ratified and 18 months to enforce the guarantee agreement signed with the AIEA.

This dialectic between disarmament and non-proliferation has several dimensions.

Firstly, the history of the nuclear weapon is often confused with that of non-proliferation. One way or another all the nuclear powers of today were helped by another nuclear power. France itself received a certain amount of help from the United States, from Great Britain, but it helped Israel, India, South Africa and Pakistan to different degrees, in terms of technological cooperation.

The second dimension is that proliferation has continued even though the main powers' arsenals have started to decline. Historically, we see that the apparition of new nuclear powers parallels the increase of arsenal. As of the 70s and the end of the Cold War, the Russian and American arsenals started to decrease, while proliferation continued. This can be explained by the fact that this decrease of arsenal was not sufficient to weigh on the end of proliferation, and most of all the asymmetry, the disequilibrium, remains massive today between the two principal powers and the rest, even if these two major powers have diminished their arsenal by 75-80% since the peak of the Cold War.

When we look at the situation today, we see that the weapons deployed, or that could be used, represent a force 700 times equivalent to the total of all explosives used during the Second World War and that the high alert status weapons still represent 300 times this force. When we talk of fissile matter reserves to produce nuclear weapons, be it highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium, there is still an enormous difference between the reserves of the two principal powers and those of other countries, and in any case it is the reserves that allow them to see long-term, and even to accept a treaty today that forbids future production. Certain experts have calculated that the amount of available fissile matter, of military quality, is sufficient to produce another 155, 000 nuclear weapons.

The third dimension is the famous "Article 6" of the NPT, which is a masterpiece of diplomatic writing, and masterpiece of ambiguity because everyone can interpret it as they like. The Nuclear Weapon States can restrictively interpret it, because this article necessitates them to negotiate in favour of disarmament. But what are negotiations in favour of disarmament? Until now they have focused primarily on the two main powers. France has never negotiated nuclear disarmament, in violation of "article 6". France has indeed proceeded with unilateral reduction, but this is not in line with article 6. This "article 6" also contains a reference to a treaty of complete and general disarmament.

Today this seems completely ridiculous. It's true that it reflects the history of the Cold War; the NPT is itself a product of the Cold War. Another additional treaty was initially considered by the United Nations Charter, in addition to the NPT, which covered other weapons of mass destruction and the regulation of conventional weapons. We haven't yet reached this complete treaty because at the time, the Soviets refused any on-site inspection and we started by a series of specific treaties.

If today we make a list of these treaties, since the entry into force of the NPT, it is pretty impressive. Even if we don't have a complete and general disarmament treaty, we have still made considerable progress in other domains, which gives the armed states a pretext to keep their nuclear weapons. When we speak of classic weapons there is a kind of hypocrisy on behalf of the nuclear powers: they want to keep their nuclear weapons because emerging countries are in the process of multiplying their arsenal of conventional weapons, which increases insecurity, and which justifies the maintenance of nuclear weapons. But who is selling the classic weapons to emerging countries? It is the principal nuclear powers, plus Germany.

The final dimension is that proliferation crises are linked to regional conflicts, principally the Middle East, South Asia and the Korean peninsula where nuclear powers, and specifically the United States, have a major strategic role to play.

If these crises are not diffused, and negotiated solutions established, then we have a self-fulfilling prophecy. Consider North Korea, who threatens our interests; Iran, who may also threaten our interests, so we should keep our nuclear weapons.

Consider a second example in the Cold War period: the first attempt at limiting nuclear testing, the treaty of partial limitation, which France refused because it wanted to keep testing, like China. We were pleased at the time with the progress represented by this treaty, since it ended testing in the atmosphere, which was causing significant environmental damage. However, this treaty had no effect on vertical proliferation, and it did not prevent the two Greats from increasing their arsenal.

Subsequently the two principal powers agreed to a treaty on the testing threshold, limited to 100 kilotons. There again this set a very high threshold, while the efforts to miniaturize the loads had practically already excluded the usefulness of this threshold. Finally the total prohibition treaty, the famous (CTBT) was established, which banned all nuclear explosions including underground, but did not ban simulations. This meant continued testing without explosions, which allowed a modernization of the arsenal. This is one of the reasons why India and Pakistan refused to sign the treaty, because they feared being placed in a disadvantageous situation. This treaty is already a number of years old, but still isn't in effect, it has not been ratified by several nuclear powers.

The history of the US-Russian agreements is one of false appearances and after-thoughts. When the Americans began wanting to contain the armament race in the 1970s, they had a technological advantage, in terms of missile quality, they had developed multiple warheads. They wanted, in reality, to stop the Soviets from developing their anti-missile defence capacities. As a concession, they accepted the ABM treaty; they weren't bothered since they didn't have any advanced anti-missile defense projects. Several years later, the Bush administration completely changed this approach after Reagan's attempts, and completely pulled out of the ABM treaty. Closer to us, in the New Start treaty, this dialectic between defensive and offensive weapons is at the heart of this strategy, and this is recognized in the treaty's preamble.

As the American leader of anti-missile defense said, this treaty imposes no constraint on American anti-missile defenses. This is why the Russians are now very opposed to NATO's anti-missile program and they refuse to engage in the reduction of new strategic weapons until the totality of the elements of this strategic dimension are put on the table, that is anti-missile defense, space and the possibilities of conventional weapons on intercontinental missiles.

The media often stress key numbers, and it is true that the New Start Treaty decreased the limit of the number of deployed nuclear warheads to 1550 for each party. But there are no limits on the non-deployed weapons or on non-strategic weapons. It is therefore necessary to have a more precise vision of the number of weapons available to the two great powers.

When we review all of these non-proliferation agreements, we can say that they have considerably reduced the number of existing weapons on the planet. These agreements have been useful, especially as they are

combined with a set of non-proliferation regimes and export controls. They now cover the whole array of weapons of mass destruction, with a start of the regulation of classic weapons.

We must go further than appearances, which can be deceiving, and understand the influence on foreign policy and security choices by the military-industrial complex in many countries, starting with France. We can no longer disconnect disarmament and non-proliferation from the doctrine of Foreign Politics security. Is this doctrine more traditional to protect the State or is it now open to the concept of human security. We see today a movement in favour of taking the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in consideration, which could justify its banning. It is these same criteria that have been used to ban all other weapons of mass destruction.

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*Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnxQFcqgG5o>*

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<http://www.gcsp.ch/>*

## Louis Gautier

I want to align myself with the introductory speech by the President of the National Assembly, calling us to debate, clearly and thoroughly, on these difficult and challenging subjects.

You asked me to discuss the deterrence policy of France since the end of the Cold War. I will attempt to explain how our country finds itself in the quest of a balanced position between two objectives, which can seem contradictory, but which have, at their base, two necessities, two simultaneous imperatives. Mountain climbers know that it is not the designation of the objective that is important, but how to discover the way to reach it. We are in a still dangerous world, in which nuclear weapons continue to guarantee security.

To understand the evolution of the French position, we need to place it in a historical perspective of the development of nuclear weapons.

In terms of the Cold War we need to establish the facts: we must recognize that nuclear weapons prevented it from degrading into open conflict. Nothing proved irrefutably the efficiency of nuclear deterrence than the balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. However, we are obliged to acknowledge that this deterrence worked, that the States had a common interest in being deterred, and a common interest in preventing War from happening again. Ever since, we live under the double law of the banishment of war, and the fear of a nuclear apocalypse.

This is why during the Cold War the 1968 NPT built security architecture by defining the path of disarmament, including the nuclear domain.

The fall of the Berlin Wall challenges previous equilibriums and evokes hope in international leaders to go further towards disarmament. Practically all countries, Russia, the United States, but also France or the United Kingdom, are all in favour. But at the same time, this situation creates fear of the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Then there is 1998, when the Indian and Pakistani explosions occur. At the time, we didn't pay enough attention to the consequences this would have. Some estimate that these marked the beginning of a second nuclear age, the entry into a *polynuclear* world, with the appearance of other states, next to the five designated by the NPT.

Effectively, we are therefore in an equation that is more complex, because it entails by fact or by right at least nine nuclear actors, the United States, China, North Korea, France, India, Israel, Pakistan, Russia and the United Kingdom.

At the heart, we have the impression that this "nuclear express" that rattled in Germany in 1938, which then gained speed, to the point of getting carried away with the Hiroshima and Nagasaki explosions, continued its route during the Cold war, this time without ever derailing. Then, arrived at the Twentieth Century terminus, the convoy didn't stop; the train just slowed at the station, attached a few wagons, then this nuclear train continued its route without us knowing its destination.

In order to understand the evolution of French policy in regards to deterrence and disarmament, it is important to understand how the nuclear equation has changed.

Since the end of the Cold war, the runaway, the escalation and the hardening of conflicts have led to the emancipation of the conventional manoeuvre and a turning inward of states to their national interests. In these crises, nuclear weapons are no longer effective; they are no longer the alpha and omega of international security, even if they retain a certain role. We saw, for example, in the Ukrainian crises that the fact that Russia is a Nuclear State had some importance.

The large states have all reconsidered their nuclear policy depending on this context, limiting themselves to these elements of defense, essential to their survival. The dislocation of the URSS and the development of the anti-missile shield led Russia to re-center itself to national interests, as did the United States on their end, or China as well. France, despite its proposition that its nuclear weapons participate in Europe's defense, considers nuclear weapons first and foremost as an element of sovereignty and national security.

The great powers consider all nuclear weapons to be ultimate guarantees, within the Western world, and especially in France, with a rationale of retraction and consolidation of the arsenal.

The second evolution is noted after 1998. It is linked to the fact that the nuclear world is becoming more complex and composite, and in a certain sense more heterogeneous. What is there in common between countries that have only one nuclear component like the United Kingdom and Israel, what is there in common between France, with the rationale of concentrating its weapon (and not in development), and the rationales of China or India, who make of them elements of their power?

The emergence of other risks, such as terrorism, of cyber defense, or that of the emancipation of conventional manoeuvres and the multiplication of asymmetrical conflicts put the benefits of deterrence in perspective. The fear of nuclear danger can seem less tangible or immediate than other earthly risks, closer or day-to-day, such as industrial catastrophes (Chernobyl in the case of civil nuclear), or epidemics, natural catastrophes. The fear of the nuclear weapon, very strong during the Cold war, seems less clear now. We can worry about it, because this can undermine the principle of deterrence.

Nuclear weapons, if they don't automatically lead to a strategic worldwide equilibrium, define, or determine regional strategy balances. We can observe strong strategic differentiations according to zones. Certain denuclearized zones, by fact or by law, are out of nuclear scope; others have a strong nuclear concentration (I am thinking of Asia and the Middle East). In certain zones, the game of deterrence is not completely codified, although India, Pakistan and China are starting to adhere to the deterrence rationale. Finally in the zone of the Near and Middle East, security problems are accumulating and with terrorism, proliferation, and civil war, they risk ending with a fatal attraction for nuclear weapons.

Finally, it is important to reaffirm this, we must note that since the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons have organized a modus vivendi between all the great powers, China, the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia and probably India.

With these developments France adapted its position in several ways: both by concentrating conceptually and in capability, but also with a kind of normalization in terms of international rules. Re-dimensioning and normalizing, although France doesn't intend to renounce the advantage, and the strength that the Nuclear

Weapon gives its security, in a world where nuclear risk, and the risk of ballistic proliferation spread like wild fire, or risk spreading, as the current arms race in the Middle East, Asia and the Far East show us.

In the first decade France followed an exemplary unilateral disarmament: it abandoned all its pre-strategic weapons, Pluton and Hadès, abandoned its ground-to-ground component, reduced its number of 6 or 7 submarines at sea to 4 today, the suspension and afterwards definitive end to testing between 1994 and 1997, the dismantling of Pierrelatte and Marcoule factories, which means that France no longer makes military nuclear fissile matter, dismantling its testing centre, and progressively reducing, incrementally, its number of nuclear warheads to 300.

At the same time, France brought its doctrine closer to the international rules defined by the United Nations Charter's "Article 51", and its interpretation by the International Court of Justice, on the concept of ultimate defence. France did this with very little external visibility; we are more in the nuances, because it had adopted concepts that showed they had an incredibly flexibility in their theory.

The 2008 *Livre blanc* and the 2013 version clearly defined vital interests as sanctuarization, making the territory a safe haven, the protection of the population and the defense of sovereignty. This definition, even if it is not closed, is much clearer than the one in place at the time of the Cold War.

In terms of the notion of unacceptable damage, we moved from a doctrine that was definitely anti-demographic, to a doctrine that made key sectors and economic centers major targets.

The notion of *strict sufficiency* served at the time of the Cold War to evolve by the top of our arsenal, but now this *strict sufficiency* has led to a favouring of disarmament.

The "*tout azimuth*" (anywhere-everywhere) throughout the Cold War was mostly a political posture; today it is a reality, since today the French missiles have the possibility of hitting any nuclear state on the planet.

Finally, the ultimate warning, with the destruction of pre-strategic weapons, consists of warning an adversary to not cross a line that risks violating our vital interests.

I take issue with what General Norlain said: French policy is a policy of deterrence. I don't see us veering towards use in a battlefield; it's exactly the opposite. The goal of these doctrinal progressions is not to render the hypothesis or possibility of a strike non-credible. Deterrence wouldn't exist if we thought a strike was improbable or technologically unthinkable. But we must not infer from this argument the idea that we would escalate these weapons to battlefield weapons. The French doctrine on this perspective is very clear, it is a doctrine of deterrence. It has never been so canonically and orthodoxically expressed as it is today, to say that they are weapons of deterrence.

At the same time France followed a policy of international normalization. France, who did not participate in multilateral forums on disarmament, ratified practically all the treaties, and again the last, the additional protocol: Central Asia's denuclearization treaty. France ratified the treaties recognizing different zones free from nuclear arms (Rarotonga, Pelindaba, Tlatelolco, Bangkok). France even became a promoter of different tools: the TICEN, the FMCT.

With regard to nuclear disarmament, only the Nuclear States count. A State cannot work for disarmament if it is not a Nuclear State. France uses its nuclear status to weigh, in a positive way, in these multilateral forums, by being the promoter of a certain number of initiatives in favour of disarmament.

This disarmament has been conjointly lead with a modernization effort, in the sense of reducing one's arsenal. This effort is practically completed today, France having four submarines equipped with nuclear heads, the second component surrounding the Rafale and the ASMP-A, and finally the simulation tools, like the Megajoule laser, for which we have open co-operation with our British partners.

France's stance on disarmament is determined by this context. France, at the time of the renegotiation conference of the NPT next year, will be positioned to invite the other countries to ratify the treaties together, and to apply the decisions surrounding self-discipline and self-limitation of capacity, and to invite them to converge their doctrines of reinforcing deterrence, in the sense of concentrating deterrence on vital interests, to dissuade Nuclear States.

This context also determines deterrence, because France has made a certain number of irreversible choices: it is held by the choice made concerning the creation of fissile matter, it is held by the modernization of its future weapons and the stock from which it is made, it is held technologically by the simulation performances, and it is held by the posted numbers in terms of volume. It is also held by an evolution of its environment and by budgetary constraints.

For a country like France, who has been invaded throughout centuries, who has suffered the ravages of two World Wars that left enormous scars, in the collective conscience, in the lives of families, in the individual's memory, nuclear weapons achieved the virtual Maginot line which gives the French the impression of a guarantee of sanctuarization of their territory and their population. It is a reality that we must take into account, in terms of psychology.

The French political class has long-time been divided by several military quarrels, like at the time of Jaurès. Under the Fifth Republic, the political class found itself in agreement with nuclear deterrence, including its recent adaptation, concerning its size, its reduction, and its concentration. We must therefore avoid the rebirth, on this question or on others (we could say exactly the same thing of conscription), a new military quarrel; because this would impact its international credit, and would profoundly divide the public's opinion and the population.

Independent of the population's feelings, and of political perceptions, there is a reality of deterrence. After the terrible Crimean and Ukrainian affair, a certain number of our European partners are asking themselves what are the conditions of Europe's security? The United States have made Europeans understand that they should take greater control of their collective security, and that of their environment. But the question remains: with who, how, why, by what means, with what credit?

Today we must recognize the interest towards weapons of nuclear deterrence, which have brought peace in Europe, which have brought balance. And this with a cost that is finally manageable by our national collectivities, when we compare it to the anti-missile shield, or to conventional weapons which would have to be deployed to compensate for the lack of nuclear weapons, without being sure of a identical level of security. These questions lead certain European countries, a little weak due to recent events, to consider the advantage of nuclear deterrence.

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Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4bxPhRqvlIw>

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# Steward DAVE

It is a great honour for me to address this important conference on one of the seminal challenges of our time: whether mankind will be able to move forward to a nuclear weapons free world. Until now, South Africa – under the leadership of President FW de Klerk - is the only country that has ever dismantled an existing nuclear weapons capability. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus decided not to retain nuclear weapons after the dissolution of the Soviet Union – but so far South Africa is the only country that has ever divested itself of a nuclear capability that it had created.

The question is what can be learned from South Africa's experience – and is it relevant to the continuing search for a nuclear weapons free world?

South Africa took the decision in 1974 to build a small number of nuclear bombs against the background of expanding Soviet influence in Southern Africa.

With the collapse of the Portuguese empire in Africa in 1975 South Africa faced a new strategic threat. Its industrial heartland was suddenly vulnerable to air attack from the Soviet Union's new allies in southern Africa.

So, the first lesson from South Africa is that states with the necessary scientific ability are likely to develop nuclear weapons if they believe that they are confronted with existential threats and have no nuclear umbrella.

The build-up of Cuban forces in Angola from 1975 onwards reinforced the perception that a deterrent was necessary - as did South Africa's growing international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance, should it be attacked. White South Africans believed that they were facing an existential threat. As late as September 1987 South Africa's armed forces were involved in large scale conflict in southern Angola against Russian and Cuban-led Angolan forces in some of the biggest battles in Africa since World War II.

Following the decision, South Africa produced six fairly simple Hiroshima-type atom bombs (a seventh bomb was under construction – but was never completed). The strategy was that, if the situation in southern Africa were ever to deteriorate seriously, a confidential indication of the deterrent capability would be given to one or more of the major Western powers, in an attempt to persuade them to intervene. There was never any intention to use the devices - which were regarded purely as a deterrent. There was also the idea that the perception that one's country possessed an undisclosed number of nuclear weapons was in itself an important deterrent.

In retrospect, it is very difficult to see what strategic value South Africa's nuclear weapons could possibly have had. They were of no use in the kind of bush wars in which South Africa was involved and there were no strategic targets within the range of its delivery systems. So the second lesson of South Africa's experience is that, objectively, its nuclear weapons made very little sense at all.

When FW de Klerk became president in September 1989, South Africa's veteran Foreign Minister Pik Botha, urged him to take two key steps if we wished to improve our relationship with the world:

- the first was the release from prison of Nelson Mandela;
- the second was to dismantle our nuclear weapons and accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

President De Klerk had already decided to embark on a process of radical constitutional transformation – that would of necessity require the release of Mandela and the commencement of multiparty constitutional negotiations.

Dismantling South Africa's nuclear capability and signing the NPT also made sense.

The third lesson from South Africa's experience is that true security does not lie in more and more military power and nuclear weapons but in addressing the underlying political and social problems that cause division and alienation.

Also by the end of 1989 it had become clear that the world – and South Africa – had changed fundamentally since the mid '70s:

In December 1988 agreement had been reached between Angola, Cuba and the United States for the withdrawal of 50 000 Cuban troops from Angola. This was followed the next year by a cease-fire agreement in Angola.

The withdrawal of Cuban forces opened the way to the implementation of the United Nations independence plan for Namibia - which until then had been ruled by South Africa in terms of a disputed League of Nations mandate. The successful independence of Namibia in March, 1990, showed that positive outcomes could be achieved through negotiations - even with one's bitterest enemies - provided that the process would take place within the framework of democratic standards and that it would result in a genuine constitutional democracy.

Finally, the destruction of the Berlin wall in November, 1989 and the collapse of Soviet Communism created a completely new global strategic environment and removed one of South Africa's central concerns relating to democratic transformation. The only show in town was the 'Washington consensus' of free market economics and liberal democracy. History had opened a window of opportunity for South Africa. President De Klerk realised that there would never again be so favourable an opportunity for negotiations - so he did not hesitate: he jumped through the window as soon as he could.

However, South Africa did not want to take its leap of faith encumbered by the baggage of nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances, it no longer made any sense whatsoever to retain our limited nuclear weapons capability - if, indeed, it had ever made sense to possess such weapons, in the first place - which De Klerk had always seriously doubted.

Accordingly, soon after he became President De Klerk took the decision to dismantle South Africa's atom bombs. Toward the end of 1989 the Government gave instructions to close and decommission the pilot enrichment plant at Pelindaba. Early in 1990 South Africa dismantled all the nuclear devices. All the

nuclear material in Armscor's possession was recast and returned to the Atomic Energy Corporation where it was stored according to internationally accepted standards. Armscor's facilities were decontaminated and converted for non-nuclear commercial purposes.

These steps cleared the way for South Africa to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10 July 1991 and to conclude a Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 16 September 1991. All its nuclear materials and facilities were subjected to international safeguards and inspection. In September 1992, after numerous inspections, the IAEA reported that nothing had been found to suggest that South Africa's inventory of nuclear materials and facilities was not complete, nor was there anything to suggest that the list of facilities and materials submitted for controls were incomplete.

South Africa's accession to the NPT led to the lifting of nuclear sanctions by the United States. We also began to exchange nuclear information with other states. The dismantling of our nuclear weapons capability and our accession to the NPT were important and essential steps in South Africa's reintegration in the international community.

I believe that, in its own small way, South Africa has illustrated that long-term security can be far better assured by the abrogation of nuclear weapons than by their retention.

The core of the threat that confronted us before 1989 did not lie in military weakness, but in the escalating conflict between various groupings of South Africans. The solution to the problem was not the acquisition of greater military superiority but in confronting our fears and in reaching agreement on the fundamental issues that divided us.

The third lesson that South Africa's experience provides is that even the most difficult and intractable problems can be solved through genuine negotiations and compromise.

Unfortunately, there is no way that the genie of nuclear technology can be put back in its bottle. There is no way that we can return to the past. The correct approach should accordingly be to control, and finally eliminate, nuclear weapons as a thinkable option.

In particular, Nuclear Weapons States must move more rapidly toward the dismantling of their stockpiles. A multi-polar world cannot for long endure the idea that some states should continue to possess weapons of mass destruction that all the other states have agreed to forego. The international community should continue to take practical steps to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by smaller states. As South Africa has shown, the possession of such weapons does not enhance the security of the states involved and can, in fact, be counter-productive.

As Nelson Mandela said to the United Nations General Assembly in 1998 "We must ask the question, which might sound naive to those who have elaborated sophisticated arguments to justify their refusal to eliminate these terrible and terrifying weapons of mass destruction – why do they need them anyway!"

To sum up the lessons from South Africa's experience of dismantling its nuclear weapons I should like to repeat the following points:

- The international community should avoid placing states with nuclear capability in situations where they believe that their existence is threatened – particularly if they do not enjoy the protection of an existing nuclear umbrella.
- There is a strong element of irrationality and national pride in the development and retention of nuclear weapons. The fact is – for those of you who have read Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings – that nuclear weapons are like the Gollum’s ring. Once one has possession of them one finds it difficult to divest oneself of the dark an immense power that they represent.
- Finally, South Africa’s experience – and the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 – show that in human affairs nothing – including a nuclear weapons-free world – is impossible.

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*Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4bxPhRqvllw>*

*Dave Steward is Executive Director of the De Klerk Foundation, created in 1999. Dave Steward was a diplomat, a South African Ambassador to the United Nations, Chief of Communications and Councillor to President W. de Klerk who was then Vice-President of the South African Government. <http://www.fwdeklerk.org/index.php/en/>*

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# OBSTACLES TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

## Michel Rocard

Is the nuclear weapon still a synonym of power, security, sovereignty and place in the concert of the nations?

I don't believe so. France's current status in the concert of nations is dropping, due to internal governance difficulties and the weakening of our balance of payments. Japan and Germany weigh in more heavily than we do without having nuclear weapons.

I have had this opinion for years.

While in France all military, civil, technical, and diplomatic establishments have been, the whole time, unanimously supportive of the nuclear weapon model, I was absolutely the only one to contest it. I was subsequently joined by Paul Quilès and by Bernard Norlain, my former Military Cabinet Chief.

I salute two events: first, there is a group of French people that chose this topic. This is new. It's almost without precedent. Second, this conference is taking place at the National Assembly. This presents a snag in the airtight darkness of the establishment. The National Assembly welcomes us in order to discuss of the uselessness of the nuclear weapon. This is great.

This topic is grave, serious and very technical. We must treat it seriously, keeping in mind a clear awareness of the state of the world. We must also address it with as precise and pointed information as possible on the diplomatic and military positions of the multiple implicated nations, whether they officially have the weapon or not, or if they are in the process of trying to acquire it. This requires true competence. I claimed to have had it for a decade or so. I no longer have it.

What I can contribute, which is the most useful to your work, is to remind you of my personal intellectual journey concerning nuclear armament.

All my life I have been very proud to be French (we don't always have that opportunity). At my home this was constant, glorified in my family by the fact of having had an immensely resistant father, who was one of the co-inventors of the French nuclear bomb. I was born in 1930; I became an adult just after the war. My first discovery was that Hitler was a product of universal suffrage. It is very important to do politics so that we don't allow just anything to happen. War is the will of crazy civilians. And then Hiroshima, a horror. Of course we had to win. It is possible that the United States saved two or three thousand deaths from among their troops. No one can say how much time the war would have lasted, Japan was so determined, fanatic, outrageously xenophobic. It still remains a horror. Very quickly I realized that this bomb is a horror, but that that horror increases if others have it. Then I became a social democrat due to my anti-colonialism.

As a teenager I saw my beautiful country, of which I was so proud, self-destructing, ridiculing itself, rendering itself undignified before the international community, in the name of a colonial war to reconquer the empire. I was ashamed. This shame has not left me for 64 years. It was hereditarily impossible for me to be a communist. Before we knew what the Gulag was, this arrogance, this self-confidence, this violence, and this negation of doubt and of criticism, was unbearable. We discovered much worse afterwards. But there I was, a social democrat. Very early on I got involved in international subjects. It's the fifties. I

became a sort of Socialist Swedish lost in France. I still am. I became aware, in summer schools of the international, of the international dimension. It is there that I learned about the refusal of war, and of the policy of the search for negotiated disarmament. I brought to France this anger against the horror of the nuclear weapon. All the French Left at the time, were outraged and adopted this reasoning: if countries other than the United States have the bomb, we don't know where the world is going.

Then we grew up, we became a little more serious, colonial affairs ended, the PSU is killed by the Left-wing, we became Mitterandesque, we gained power, we tried to think in more or less responsible ways. The idea was that we were in no way to push for the proliferation of the nuclear weapon. Since Americans had the nuclear weapon, our defense consisted of being able to resist a potential invasion from the East for as many hours or days as to let the Americans intervene. This was our vision in the years 45-50. We were heirs of Mendès France, even if he was the first French Prime Minister who released research funding for the bomb.

Then the Gaullism wore out, and the perspective of a rise to power was drawn. Mendès, then Guy Mollet, and then, above all, De Gaulle consecrated the bulk of the defense budget, after the war of Algeria, to the creation of the bomb. From the beginning to the end of the seventies the conventional firepower of the French army was half that of the Bundeswehr. This lag was impossible to catch-up. The project, which was intended to be rational, became unbearable.

I was part of the teams, that organized the internal reflection at the PS on rallying to the nuclear weapon. Because there was no other choice. Conventional armed forces at a ridiculous level, there is no choice. This allowed François Mitterand, now President of the Republic to declare, after all these reflections with which he had been associated, and that he had probably created, to say "deterrence is me". This lovely phrase resumed fairly well the Gaullist concept: undisputed authority without resorting to the force of deterrence.

Chance does anything and everything, to the point of making me Prime Minister, it can happen to anyone. There I was, first authority of devolution. The hypothesis that we have to use the force of deterrence, to fire a warning shot as we say, is obviously a terrible hypothesis. Amongst terrible hypothesis, is that the President of the Republic may have been kidnapped or killed, or be unavailable. Therefore the role of the first authority of devolution is nothing ornamental or fun. This was worth one ceremony that I will never forget, that must still exist for all Prime Ministers. In the first two months of office, the High Army Chief of staff organized an introductory course, not of the nuclear weapon, but of the presentation of the tool that is in the hands of the authority of deterrence. I was on videoconference with the Chief of our strategic air Force, the Chief of our strategic naval forces, and the High Chief of Inter Arms, and they presented the totality of the targets on which the French forces were aimed. I never succeeded in understanding who was, and less still to condemn or hang, the idiot who risked the word « bombinette » (little bomb). Our targets had 900 million citizens submitted to sovietism in their range, covering the suburbs of Moscow, and all large soviet cities before Moscow, all of Eastern Germany, all of Poland, Czechoslovakia. It wasn't possible.

I was impressed, intimidated and proud of my country for its scientific capacities, because we must remember a detail here; that the construction of the French nuclear weapon was a victory for our scientists and the Secret Service, against the British and American wills to stop us. There were terrifying battles in the Secret Service about the conquest or recapture, or creation of scientific secrets necessary for this work. But even so, I left the meeting crazy with rage and sick with worry and I landed almost without appointment in the President of the Republic's office. I informed him that our submarines and our air forces had within their targets, notably, Eastern Germany. If ever the smallest leak made this information public, Eastern

Germany would absolutely never have forgiven us. Germany never supported its division. I immediately asked the President to remove Eastern Germany from our forces' targets. It was my first undisciplined act against the general dogma of the establishment. Secrecy hinders me from telling you if my request was granted. Even so, I have good reasons to think it was. It is possible, however, that the unique person to know this is Hubert Védrine, the Councillor of President Mitterrand at the time and who on this point continues to keep the defense secrecy.

We continued trials. 8 per year. With each test campaign, drama at the UN, world drama, and France denounced. It was notably difficult in the Pacific since our trials took place there, country that will become my brother country. Ten years later, I was made Commander of the order of Australia for the service rendered to the friendship between our two countries. But during this time, every year, Australia led a public campaign against France due to our nuclear folly. It weakened us, including our exports. The ostracism of the Pacific towards France didn't fare well for our national interests.

My second great initiative was to begin the conversation with President François Mitterrand. I told him that we still hadn't signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. De Gaulle didn't want to sign it. We can understand, we can even respect the historic reasons. This conversation with François Mitterrand started while the Cold War still wasn't over. Gorbachev was still the Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The President agreed that the world's situation had changed a little, and that things could be looked into. With the complicity of my friend, the Prime Minister of Australia (this friendship was born regarding New Caledonia), I tore away little by little, so that France asked to be an observer of the Treaty. There were two years before becoming full signatory. We made our request in 1990, and we became full members in 1992. Here are some services accomplished by the defender of nuclear deterrence, that I was, in an incomplete Cold War.

I even attempted another thing. Nuclear testing, it was provocation. I was able to obtain from President François Mitterrand permission to reduce the testing, one per year. I was able to announce this reduction.

I asked the President, with each diminution, to do an immense diplomatic campaign in the entire Pacific, explaining that progressively they would come to an end. I received the President's accord. Then I left power a little quickly; I didn't give sufficient follow-up to this affair. Circumstances evolved, and internal politics called me urgently to legislative elections in 1993. A political agreement intervened between the PS and the ecologists, and we went at it full strength, we announced the definitive and total end to all testing. I think it was a mistake. We should have had more respect for our scientific establishment of engineers, who were working on penetration, miniaturization, the reduction of calibers, and several details relating to the vectors, as well as on the explosives themselves. They worked thoroughly on the implementation of the tool, and as long as diplomatically and globally we weren't assured to get out of it, we needed to seriously continue the trials. To cut all trials without warning was unreasonable. It was this, moreover that pushed the chief of opposition, Jacques Chirac, to announce that he would restart nuclear testing. When Chirac was elected, he restarted nuclear testing, because he had promised so to the military establishment. One of the first things that I was able to do just after my return was a long Letter to the Editor in Le Monde, beseeching President Chirac not to do anything, warning him against the disqualification of France that could result in a world-wide campaign against it. No one believed it.

Everyone thought Australia and New Zealand wouldn't be happy, but no one had thought of other countries. Europe gave us the greatest surprise. Our condemnation was immediate, profound, lasting and terrible.

The trials ended but after the sixth, and no one knew if it was because the scientific program had been completed, or if they were interrupted because of global pressure. In his way, that is to say a little quickly and a little globally, the President of the Republic not only ended the nuclear testing a little quicker than planned, but also closed Mururoa, and had denuclearisation studies conducted. This reassured our partners. During this time the soviet system imploded. Boris Eltsine ended the Warsaw Pact. But no one responded to this gesture, no one spoke, no one moved. France no more than others. This went on for six months. NATO authorities didn't say anything either. Then one day the United States announced their satisfaction that the Russians had ended Communism and they dissolved the Warsaw pact, but that this did not suffice to establish confidence. NATO conceived as a response to the Warsaw Pact, including 20 or 21 nations, is maintained, and enlarged to the 3 Baltic countries and the border countries. This was a sort of insult towards the Russians. I think that we are still paying for this mistake. Putin is making us pay the gigantic humiliation he felt by his return to authoritarianism and to militarization.

Either way, my reasoning is that we no longer need nuclear deterrence. I never believed in the nonsense according to which it could be « tout azimuth » (anywhere-everywhere) (General De Gaulle's phrase aimed towards the United States, it's a joke in poor taste). And I didn't think we could attain far away countries that are in great poverty. This didn't make sense.

Once the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, what were our submarines going to target? This question still doesn't have an answer. Our Chiefs-of-Staff and our successive Heads of state still keep the secret. We don't know if these submarines are gathering information, or if there are still targeted weapons on board. This is strange.

Between 1945 and the year 2000, around fifteen wars, classic in type, exploded between nations: Korea, China and Vietnam, Peru and Ecuador, Iran and Iraq (8 years and 3 million deaths), 5 wars between Israel and the Arab countries, India and Pakistan (before they had the nuclear weapon), and others. In all of these situations the belligerents returned to their starting positions. The international community put pressure so that they stopped, localized, diminished, contained these conflicts. Strategic war is no longer a threat.

We are now under the threat of mafias, with powerful international gangs, like drug traffickers, and from the surfacing of identity-related terrorists who have been militarily conquered and that hide themselves in the mafias. They are numerous in the Middle East.

Furthermore, we are watching a reversal in the Arab world, where after domination by the Sunnites, the new power will be Chiite, supported by Russia. By throwing a punch to Turkey, we have sent it to alliances and consolidations to the East of its territory, with Iran. Rejecting Turkey was crazy and suicidal, and I believe it is irreversible. We have created a very grave danger. We have lost our security and our commercial positions.

The nuclear weapon is not the appropriate dimension for regional conflicts. It isn't pertinent for such conflicts, even in regards to the Nuclear Powers. We no longer know whom we are deterring. Who is threatening us? China? Brazil? The United States? Russia? No conflict on earth of this nature can be solved by the use of the nuclear weapon.

The real danger is proliferation; the nuclear bomb is now easier to make, it could fall into the hands of crazy people. And now, I will say something inappropriate. I worry that global diplomacy doesn't dare state the real problem. Because it is too horrible. There are now 9 countries that have the nuclear weapon. The probability that there are another twelve or so in the next twenty years is fairly large, and above all the probability is great that there are two or three religious type leaders completely deranged and dictatorial. And therefore it will be necessary to protect oneself, and therefore strike. Therefore strike. We don't dare say it. This is the heart of the diplomatic issue.

Is the nuclear weapon pertinent? Surely not. I don't understand why, in France, we are so against this clear truth.

Each State wants to keep its nuclear armaments without knowing why, without knowing for which conflict it would be useful.

This is why I have come to tell you again that this is an essential cause. Do not limit your vision to that of a great country that still has strategic interests and cultural responsibilities in many parts of the world. We are in a united world, in which we must have ways to control it, which requires that we get rid of the weapons that don't correspond to this dynamic.

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*Watch the video of this speech (In French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qO1DWLxehkM>*

*Michel Rocard, graduate of the National School of Administration, was the Prime Minister from 1988-1991, elected European Deputy from 1994-2009, First secretary of the Socialist Party from 1993-1994, French member of the Canberra Commission (1995-1996). He is currently the French ambassador tasked with international negotiations relating to the Arctic and Antarctic poles. He is equally a member of Global Zero and the author of a number of works.*

## Hubert Védrine

I hesitated to come to this conference because I am not fully in step with this process, being more or less sceptical on the subject. I have always mostly believed in nuclear deterrence, and I believe that had it not existed in the decades after the war, we would have witnessed a slip towards another war. I was very closely connected to these strategic questions for 14 years in the Elysée, by François Mitterrand. All the while staying with the fundamentals of nuclear deterrence, the French way. There was an effort to stay at the lowest possible level, and on the other hand to clarify the strategic concepts, notably in eliminating the concepts of pseudo “pre-strategic.” I am not a denuclearisation militant, civil or military. But I am not insensitive to the question of dissemination.

When we talk about barriers to the nuclear weapon, I suppose we think of obstacles, like those coming from the military-industrial lobby. But I think there are also objective barriers, obstacles of good faith. In the world as it is, with its inequalities, all kinds of clashes, the rising of tensions, I don't think that the world of 2014 would be any less dangerous without nuclear weapons. There would be lots more wars of great amplitude in the ten years to come, than presently. I don't believe we would create a safer world by removing nuclear weapons. I don't believe this on a philosophical level.

We have seen that, in the time after the war, the Military-Industrial lobby in the United States fudged information in order to push the accumulation of arms. But independent of this pressure, there are legitimate interests, industrial, technological, and scientific interests that we must take into account.

There is no chance of seeing the United States denuclearize any time soon. Russia even less. China, Israel, zero chance. The Indians, Pakistanis without doubt no. We don't know if the Iranians will give up on having the nuclear weapon. We are therefore not in the hypothesis of a denuclearized world, but of that in which a country, France or perhaps Great Britain, would be the example. If these two countries gave up the nuclear weapon, the rest of the world would think that they would no longer be capable of maintaining this effort. I don't believe for a second in the value of leading by example. In the end there would no longer be a European nuclear power outside of Russia. I don't believe in the exemplarity of suicide.

I believe, however, in the reduction of the level of the quantity of nuclear arms. There is a gigantic margin for manoeuvre, which begins obviously with the Americans and the Russians, who currently possess 80-90% of the nuclear warheads. The French concept of minimal deterrence was opposed to the American and Soviet concept of redundancy, which was opposed to the concept of graduated response (which was a complete aberration). There is a margin of manoeuvre in the reduction of the quantity of arms, the “START” Accords can go very far, until questions are asked of other countries like France, Great Britain, even Israel.

There is also flexibility in the clarification of the concept. The nuclear weapon has no meaning if it is a strategic weapon. All entering into the idea of any limited, punctual, tactical use with smaller weapons, presents a risk. This destroys the very concept of deterrence. The nuclear weapon is not made to be used. When all the Nuclear Powers of the world are at a minimal level, we can resume your idea of nuclear disarmament. In conclusion, if we manage to build a secure enough world to get rid of nuclear weapons, I would be delighted.

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Watch the video of this speech (In French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApFpnheskHQ>

Hubert Védrine was named Diplomatic Councillor by President Mitterand in 1981, Spokesperson for Élysée in 1988, General Secretary between 1991 and 1995 and then Foreign Affairs Minister in the government led by Lionel Jospin from 1997-2002. Since 2003 he presides the François Mitterand Institute. Author of several reports, Hubert Védrine submitted to President Hollande a report on “the consequences of the return of France to NATO, on transatlantic relations and on Europe of the Defense” in November 2012. He has written a number of works including *The Atlas of crises and public conflicts* published with Pascal Boniface in 2009. <http://www.hubertvedrine.net/>

## Shlomo BEN-AMI

Global Zero, the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, faces formidable challenges that have to do with the readiness of the two major nuclear powers, Russia and the U.S., to truly march beyond the reduction they agreed upon in the New START Treaty to elimination. Key questions are also whether other smaller nuclear powers would go along, and whether systems of inspection, verification and enforcement can reliably be put in place.

The current disturbing tensions between the West and Russia notwithstanding, the good news are that the U.S. and Russia have embarked on bilateral negotiations to achieve deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals, and this should hopefully be followed by multilateral talks involving every other country with nuclear weapons. Also, President Obama has passed a Nuclear Posture Review that does reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in America's overall security strategy. This is the first time since the dawn of the nuclear era that the United States has made a clear commitment not to use nuclear weapons to prevent or respond to an attack with chemical and biological weapons.

Still in the chapter of good news that need to be supported and enhanced is the growing number of civil society and parliamentarian initiatives pushing forward the case for a world without nuclear weapons. The ATOM Project exposing the experience of victims and survivors of nuclear tests needs to be disseminated worldwide, Mayors for Peace is shifting part of its campaign to the call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention to eliminate nuclear weapons, grass root student organizations that Global Zero has promoted need to become a worldwide cry of a the new generations for the abolition of this "totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization" weapon (Reagan).

Governments need to be put under pressure by their public opinion to allow national referendums on the issue of abolition, and worldwide campaigns need to be staged for this purpose. It is the collective conscience of humankind that should rise up against the inertia of governments and deprive of legitimacy the conduct of international relations based on the possession of nuclear weapons.

The good news of recent years is being accompanied, however, by sad, ominous signals. The big nuclear powers are still incapable of conveying unequivocal messages leading to Global Zero. President Obama fell short in his Nuclear Posture Review of declaring that the "sole purpose" of America's nuclear arsenal is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others. Nor is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty any closer to be ratified by the U.S. Senate.

Small nuclear powers and aspirants to a nuclear status might not be particularly impressed by the superpowers getting down from gross overkill to mild overkill. The objective conditions in regional, volatile trouble spots throughout the world where rival parties try to go nuclear in order to offset their relative conventional inferiority and their strategic vulnerability do not change even assuming that Russia and the U.S. preach by example.

It is this gap that is bound to affect negatively the processes of nuclear disarmament that are now being envisaged. Resolving regional conflicts by addressing their underlying security causes is therefore a prerequisite for the credibility of the vision of a world without nuclear weapons.

The Conference for the establishment of a “Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons and all other Weapons of mass Destruction” that was planned to take place in Helsinki in December 2012, was eventually called off when the U.S. itself understood that the conditions were simply not ripe for such an exercise. Israel’s perspective was that unworkable shortcuts, namely an Arab position that addresses Israel’s nuclear status outside the broader security context in the region, are a recipe for failure.

It is clearly the case that without wider-ranging efforts to resolve underlying security dilemmas and balance non-nuclear military capabilities, the U.S, Russia and China will be unable to agree on substantially minimizing, let alone eliminating, nuclear weapons. Similar considerations will weigh heavily in the regional contexts of South Asia and the Middle East.

The Israeli case is distinct; it is not about status or regional hegemony, not even about the assumption that its supposed bomb would make it immune to conventional attacks by its enemies, for it hasn’t. Its nuclear opacity has to do with a genuine, even if arguably exaggerated, existential anxiety.

Contrary to the existing notion about Israel’s strategy of nuclear opacity as being unnecessary given its conventional regional superiority, the prevailing perception in Jerusalem is that of a Jewish state threatened by formidable non-nuclear threats, and dangerously weakened by the poor capacity of its domestic front to sustain a long conventional war. A country that came to a state of sentimental collapse at the fate of one Israeli soldier at the hands of Hamas, and had to send a million of its citizens to underground shelters because of the massive ballistic warfare conducted by a non-state agent, Hizballah, is now facing a highly troubled and volatile Middle East. The strategic environment is more unpredictable than ever.

Nor can Israel ignore that the Middle East has the infamous record of being the only region of the world where chemical and biological weapons were used after World War II. Iraq used it in Iran, Egypt in Yemen, Iraq against its own Kurds, and now Syria against its own population. .

A stable security system arises when there is a balance of forces and interests between key players, and this should be the foundation of a Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons. To be successful, a conference that addresses ways of achieving a “Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other All Other Weapons of Mass Destruction” needs to open a process of dialogue among all the stake-holders in the region on the underlying security concerns of all. The lesson for the Middle East that lies in the example that has recently been set by the mutual reduction of nuclear stockpiles by the U.S. and Russia is that genuine disarmament and arms control are not possible unless preceded by deep political change and a sustained development of trust and confidence.

Israel needs to assume its own responsibilities of course; it cannot condition the idea of a Middle East Free of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the existence of peace and regional security, while at the same time stalling the chances of peace that were presented by the Arab Peace Initiative, and recently by Secretary Kerry’s efforts to broker a Palestinian settlement. Nor can Israel’s

nuclear strategy be sustained forever; Iran's challenge to its supposed nuclear monopoly is not Teheran's exclusive obsession. A zone free of nuclear weapons is definitely preferable to a region with two or more weapon states.

But, the Arabs need to assume that without normalizing their relations with the Jewish state it would be impossible to engage effectively on such vital issues. Peace and regional denuclearization must go hand in hand.

If a Helsinki-style conference is conceived as yet one more opportunity to pressure Israel to join the NPT – possibly in exchange for the Arabs joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention – the conference might soon reach an impasse. But the same outcome is assured if the US and Israel conceive the conference solely as a way to isolate and force NPT compliance on Iran and Syria. The NPT is not the place to resolve conflicts between regional rivals; it is the forum one joins after political rivalries are solved. Argentina and Brazil, for example, joined only in the late 1990's once they settled their political rivalry.

The nuclear deadlock in the Middle East can be resolved only if all of the regional players are ready to change old patterns of behaviour. The Arab position has traditionally been that Israel cannot be offered the fruits of peace, such as recognition and normal relations, before it has paid its full territorial price – that is, a complete withdrawal from occupied Arab lands and the creation of a Palestinian state. But the Arab states nonetheless insist that, even before the end of conflict, Israel unilaterally must give up its presumed nuclear capabilities.

This is a futile exercise, not only because Israel would never disarm outside of regional context based on a reliable system of peace and collective security, but also because without normal inter-state relations in the region it is impossible to engage seriously in an effective dialogue on such vital issues. Indeed, Israel's concept of "peace first and denuclearization last" was vindicated in the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty, which speaks of a WMDFZ as a goal "to be achieved in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace."

But, we need to learn from past failures. The Arabs interrupted the Arms Control and Regional Security Multilateral Working Group in the 1990's for two reasons; the failure of the peace track to produce tangible results, and a fundamental disagreement with Israel on the procedure of the Arms Control Track. They wanted to address first the nuclear issue even before peace was achieved, whereas Israel wanted to start with talks on conventional weapons.

The solution might lie in a model consisting of three tracks: peacemaking, conventional arms control, and the establishment of WMDFZ. The latter should start with a meeting of all the regional stakeholders for a discussion of the conditions required for a WMDFZ. The principle would be that nothing is agreed unless everything is agreed; no arms control and WMDFZ before peace and principles of a regional system of cooperation and security is agreed.

To work, the Arabs must accord to Israel key benefits of peace before peace has been formally achieved. The Arabs need to stop treating Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) as a reward to Israel at

the end of the process; they are in fact indispensable tools to actually start the process of disarmament. Peace and arms control are complementary concepts, not alternative ones. How can a meeting be convened Helsinki-style, as stipulated by the 2010 NPT conference's final document, "on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region," when many of those states are in turmoil, inter-state relations are strained, and the threat of conflict is mounting?

All the nuclear-weapon-free zones that were created in the last decades – for example, by the Tlatelolco Treaty for Latin America or the Treaty of Rarotonga for the South Pacific – were made possible by understandings that were reached freely by regional powers in an atmosphere of multilateral confidence. Conspicuously, the 1992 Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains to this day a dead letter simply because of the latent state of war between the two Koreas.

An idea that could start to be discussed in the context of a conference on WMDFZ in the Middle East, and one that could serve as a substantial confidence building and tension reduction measure on the way to WMDFZ, is that of a WMD no-first-use agreement in the Middle East. The parties would have to secure, however, that the no-first-use agreement is not compensated by a shoring conventional arms race.

Such an embrace of "no first use" doctrine is certainly also valid as a universal doctrine on the way to Global Zero. Pending the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, every nuclear-armed state should make a clear and unequivocal "no first use" commitment. Nuclear weapons should be used neither preventively nor preemptively, against any potential nuclear adversary, keeping them available only for use, or threat of use, by way of retaliation following nuclear strike against itself or its allies.

Peace and an end to the atom should go hand in hand. Prime Minister Shimon Peres was not exactly opaque when he declared in December 1995 that if given peace Israel "would give up the atom". But, Israel cannot have it both ways, condition nuclear disarmament on peace while doing everything it can to stall the peace process.

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*Watch the video of this speech (In French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C2rR-jWuqE>*

*Shlomo Ben-Ami, former Foreign Affairs Minister of Israel, is currently Vice-President and co-founder of the International Centre of Toledo for Peace. In 1987 he became Spain's first Israeli ambassador. He held this position until 1991. Furthermore, he was also the Internal Security Minister. He was a member of the administration council for International Crisis Group, of which he is now the Main Councillor. He was a member of the administration council on the Australian-Japanese Commission on Non-proliferation and disarmament. He is also a member of Global Zero.*

## Ian Kearns

Hubert Védrine told us that we need, above all, security, and that it is a peaceful world that will allow disarmament. A previous speaker explained that trust was necessary to engage the disarmament process.

It is important to reject the idea that the choice we have to make is between security and disarmament. Disarmament can contribute to security, and security to disarmament. The feeling of insecurity can be felt while states are armed, and it can also be felt in the absence of arms.

For me, there are two essential questions.

How do we progress towards a world where there is more security, more trust? We hear say in the debates on disarmament that we must first resolve the problems that create insecurity and then move on to disarmament. How can we progress in this way?

The incentive to move towards disarmament won't come from industrials; it is not their role. If we examine history, the decisive phases of disarmament were initiated by political leaders, and not by their administrations. The agreements signed between Michael Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan came from their personal wills, against the council of their administrations, or their Military Chiefs. In the United States, there wasn't a consensus to eliminate nuclear weapons, but it was Ronald Reagan who took the initiative to go in this direction, as did on his end, Michael Gorbachev for his own reasons. The United Kingdom considerably reduced the number of nuclear weapons it possessed, thanks to the repeated pressure by the Ministers of Defense and the Prime ministers on the experts to define the sufficient number of weapons required to ensure deterrence. Political leaders have a clear role in this debate. Yet, currently, there is a lack of political leadership on this subject.

The primary objective is not only to heighten the awareness of the general public, but also that of the political class, and that of the emerging political leaders.

Nuclear dangers didn't disappear at the end of the Cold war, and I am in complete disagreement with what Hubert Védrine said. Of course, during the years of the Cold War, the weapons of deterrence permitted the maintenance of peace. But I don't believe this is the appropriate method to respond to the challenges of the 21st century. There are less nuclear arms in the world than during the Cold war, but currently there are nuclear weapons in much less stable conflict zones. Russia and Pakistan have doctrines that prescribe early use of the nuclear weapon in the case of conflict. We can also ask ourselves about the reliability of the commanders of the regimes of states newly armed with the nuclear weapon. I wish to mention the terrorist groups that have attempted to design nuclear weapons. Henry Kissinger, who we can not count as naive, explained that it would be much more difficult to guarantee the stability previously obtained due to the bipolarisation of the world during the Cold war, now that the world has become polycentric. The complexity of the present situation should incite us to abandon these weapons.

We are faced with a great dilemma. We know that deterrence contributes in a certain measure to stability and peace, but we have a global structure that is difficult to manage. It is almost impossible to maintain

this stability throughout the decades. The probability that these weapons will be used is increasing and not decreasing. The consequences of their use would be catastrophic.

It is therefore not a choice between security and disarmament. It is not a case of knowing if weapons of deterrence work or not. We have a strategic dilemma today in the 21st century, based on the risk created by the identity of those who possess this weapon.

The previous speaker spoke of the Middle Eastern context; I will speak of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. In Europe 5 states have nuclear weapons based on their territories, Holland, Germany, Turkey, Italy and Belgium, while an enormous security crisis is developing in this zone, Ukraine who opposes Russia to Europe. This signifies that resolving this question is essential, not only for Ukrainians, not only for Russia, but also simply for the worldwide nuclear balance. The United States and Russia won't pursue the reduction of their weapons if this conflict is not handled efficiently, if the escalation is not halted.

We must seize disarmament opportunities, even in the context of the Atlantic alliance. Since it is in no case imaginable to use nuclear weapons in Europe, we must abandon them. The United States, the United Kingdom and France have strong reasons to co-ordinate their deterrence efforts, which would permit the reduction of nuclear warheads, and which would allow them to take a step in the right direction. Why isn't it the case? Our political leaders don't trust each other enough. They not only distrust their potential political adversaries, they don't have enough trust towards each other. There is still progress to be made to meet the long-term objective of eliminating nuclear weapons and it is up to our leaders to reinforce the process of developing trust.

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*Watch the video of this speech (In French): [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iq\\_n0CZpQpc](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iq_n0CZpQpc)*

*Ian Kearns is the co-founder and Director of European Leadership Network (ELN), based in London. He was previously interim Director and Vice- Director of the Institute for Public Policy research in the United Kingdom. For more than twenty years he has been working on foreign and security policy questions. He is the author of numerous works on these issues, notably on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the enlargement of the European Union. <http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org>*

3

# POPULAR BELIEFS REGARDING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

## Paul QUILES

We are going to move on to another phase of our reflection and our debates, entering deeper into the heart of what we call in France the “consensus”. I don’t know if this term is used in the same way in other countries, nor if all nuclear countries find themselves in this situation. I found a very old article, very scholarly, very intelligent, about consensus in regards to nuclear armament, which asked a very interesting question: Wouldn’t it be on the consensus that we have a consensus? There is a consensus in France on the fact that there must be a consensus. We move forward this way in the realms of religion, the mystical, we move even further from debate in geostrategic, technical and military domains.

Consensus on what? Consensus on Gaullien principles, which, even if the world and France have changed, seem to have left an imprint on the French spirit, consensus on the idea that nuclear deterrence, is the deterrence of the weak to the strong. This idea is good for France, but not as good for the United States and the Soviet Union, since they are both strong.

Adversely to what we heard this morning, and a little this afternoon, deterrence is not a doctrine fixed in stone that hasn’t evolved since its beginning. It hasn’t stopped evolving. Certain speakers said that it was very rigid but very flexible. It is therefore a very special concept that we can only understand through both a rigid and flexible spirit.

The second theme of consensus is that the power of decision, in regards to the nuclear weapon, is not shared, as Hubert Védrine well reminded us this morning. It rests but on one man. We must ask ourselves about the way information moves up to this man, so that he can push the button to trigger the weapon. I was listening to Michel Rocard raise the subject of Eastern Germany targeted by nuclear weapons. In fact, it wasn’t about deterrence, but about what we call tactical weapons, and then sub-strategic weapons, pre-strategic (a very fixed concept but one that evolved with time), that weren’t very far from employed weapons! Weapons of non-use that become weapons of use. It is not made to be used, but it must be used because several thousand American sites were targeted.

President Mitterrand asked one of the generals about the value of the weapons we had, Pluton or Hadès, that didn’t have the capacity to fire very far. The answer was given that it served to avoid going to extremes. It was therefore no longer deterrence, since it was a question of avoiding going to extremes. The weapons weren’t aimed at the adversary, Moscow or the Soviet Union, but on Czechoslovakia or Eastern Germany. Mitterrand’s reaction was to say “But are you aware that they are Germans?” It seems that this information hadn’t risen all the way to him, even though he had been President of the Republic already for several years, and he retained the unique right to push the button to set the nuclear fire. I remind you that he could have by this gesture sent the message to SNLE to set off not a strike attack, but a retaliatory strike. Which would have signified at that moment, half of France had already been levelled!

The doctrine was, in fact, a great mess, already mentioned this morning by Bernard Norlain. We didn’t know if it was super artillery, or if it was a warning weapon, ultimate warning, tactical, sub-strategic or strategic. It was to defend our vital interests, but we couldn’t say what they were, which didn’t hinder the President of the Republic from giving examples of what were or were not our vital interests.

In the history of the succession of the doctrines we must add the anti-missile shield of Reagan, which resulted in the enormous *Star Wars* project of the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative), and which was abandoned after useless colossal spending. But it came back under the form of NATO's anti-missile shield. If it is necessary to protect oneself by an anti-missile shield, it is that deterrence isn't working.

There is confusion in public opinion about the term nuclear. Certain people, hostile to civil nuclear energy, think themselves, for this reason, to be against the nuclear weapon, while this has no connection. This confusion also exists in the NPT.

What is the consensus resting on? Another explanation of the consensus is more of a political nature. We can think that during the time of the Cold War, a period of tensions, the nuclear weapon was felt to be an absolute guarantee of our security. The world has since changed and the threats are no longer of the same nature, but the official discourse stays the same.

In fact, the consensus is based on popular ideas. We could call these falsehoods or lies.

One popular belief is that the nuclear weapon could have permitted the end of the world war and ensured peace during 60 years. However there was Yugoslavia, and the wars in Africa, South-East Asia and Latin America. The two super powers didn't confront each other directly for fear of mutually destroying each other, so they did it by proxy.

A second popular belief, is that the nuclear weapon would be our life insurance, which, according to some, would also have the merit of not being expensive. We were told it was a non-use weapon, but that at the same time, involved tactical weapons, as a sub-strategic, ultimate warning.

Third, thanks to our nuclear arms, France could maintain its status as a great power and be heard in the world. This affirmation is presented as an indisputable premise. Certain people say that we are part of the Security Council because we possess the nuclear weapon.

This is completely false. In 1945, when the Security Council was created, there was only one country that had the nuclear weapon. When President Francois Hollande was in Japan, he proposed that this country be a member of the Security Council, while Japan does not have the nuclear weapon.

A Fourth popular belief, is that the nuclear weapon would ensure France's independence. But we don't know what independence consists of, or what it signifies. Independent of what, or from whom?

Fifth: Proliferation imposes we have the nuclear weapon. This remains to be proved. It is not by saying to other countries, notably to Iran, that in order to be a large independent power, you must have the nuclear weapon that we will persuade them to renounce it.

A final popular belief, the anti-missile shield would be a compliment to deterrence. But this is a major contradiction, because if deterrence is sufficient in itself, then the anti-missile shield becomes useless.

In our collective memory as fellow citizens, there remains the humiliating memory of the invasion of 1940. The peace between the two wars has abusively been assimilated to disarmament, and thus has been rendered responsible for the defeat of 1940.

There is another important reason for the pseudo consensus; it is the rallying of the left in the seventies to nuclear deterrence. Since all the political parties are partisan, no presidential candidate of the Republic until today has taken the risk of announcing himself favourable to the evolution of the world without nuclear weapons. Defending nuclear deterrence permits the placing of oneself in the wake of De Gaulle, to adopt a posture of seriousness and as defender of independence. As a previous socialist minister said, deterrence is France.

In France the possible use of the nuclear weapon is completely concentrated on the President of the Republic, this is what brought François Mitterand to say "Deterrence is me". The problem is the whole upwards process that leads to a decision, and the role of the Military-Industrial complex that rightly denounced Eisenhower.

In regards to the putting in place of this system, the President of the Republic Valéry Giscard d'Estaing explained during his seven-year term that nuclear armament was not only a weapon of deterrence, but also a weapon of battle and later, in his memoirs, he explained that, in any case, he never would have used the nuclear weapon. Which greatly weakens the credibility of deterrence...!

All of this sets up a haze of mystery and confusion around this subject, which dissuades citizens from having any interest in this topic. This is why there is no public debate, because the military do not wish us to divulge the decision process or are held to the duty of confidentiality, because the political leaders esteem the subject too dangerous, the media don't talk of it, or very little, because consensual subjects don't interest them much, and because industrial experts believe that the way to live peacefully is to hide, and because economists think that the nuclear bomb is good for industry and for jobs. Here, in Parliament, President Bartolone said that the Defense committee had said much and had proceeded with hearings. Amongst the interviewees, around 80% of them were favourable, and the rest weren't. But I fear that these debates will come to nothing.

When we make a White book to define the programming act, we discuss everything, except the nuclear issue. It is forbidden to discuss the taboo. It is like in a religion, we talk about everything except the existence of God. In the nuclear military system we don't talk about the principle of deterrence. Well then, if we have organized this conference, it is precisely so that this taboo will be lifted and so we can talk about it.

I would like to conclude with a survey published by the Minister of Defense, which is conducted every year. It indicates that 28% of people asked consider the French nuclear force as credible, 40% more or less credible (86% amongst executives), 17% not credible (26% of women); Women are therefore less confident than men in the nuclear force! Another question: 68% think that the nuclear military is a strong point of our defense (compared to 54% in 2012), 8% a weak point (19% amongst workers, 18% amongst youth), 12% neither one or the other (26% amongst those registered with Pôle emploi (unemployed), 17% amongst women). These numbers aim to give credence to the idea that it is amongst the less integrated in active life that we find the opponents to deterrence. The question that shocks me is the question where they ask if "the French nuclear force needs to be modernized to maintain its credibility". 44% think that it needs to be (it is better than last year 37%), 10% that it should be reduced (18% in 2012) (16% according to the poor idiots at Pole Emploi, 24% of youth, and 13% of women).

This questionnaire is grotesque, because the questions asked are strictly incomprehensible if we don't explain what credibility, modernization are, what are the needs and the costs. We should perhaps do a questionnaire to know how the questions were understood and how to interpret the responses. Instead of designing categories that work to build the consensus, it would be better to explain the facts of the matter. This is the role of this conference.

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*Watch the video of this speech (In French): [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YzMd2PPz\\_cY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YzMd2PPz_cY)*

## Ward WILSON

Those who believe in nuclear weapons, those who have a fervent faith in this weapon could be mistaken! They are confident and certain. The others, those who have doubts would be the idiots! However, we can question the existence of these certainties. The bomb's supporters arguments are fairly weak.

Let's start with the certainties. The first problem is the psychological nature of nuclear deterrence. You could think that what is important with nuclear weapons, is the fact that they produce large explosions. No, for the proponents of the bomb, what is important is nuclear deterrence. Deterrence uses threats to hinder and prevent all actions, and the threats operate within minds. The difficulty is that it is complicated to know precisely what is happening in someone's mind, whereas science rests on precise measurements, therefore truth is objective only if you can measure it, test it and others can reproduce the same results. But you cannot measure the psychological state of a mind.

Nuclear Weapons States have tested them more than two thousand times around the world during land, air and underground nuclear testing. The physical aspects of these weapons are well known but this is not the essential question. The important question is not to know how this explosion affects the ground, but to know what this detonation produces in the minds of the leaders: when I pulverize your life, does it make you capitulate? When I threaten to blow up your cities, does this make you surrender?

We have deep knowledge on the effects of nuclear weapons on buildings, factories and on humans. But we don't have certain proof, however, on the way they interact in the minds of leaders. Almost all of the claims made by nuclear deterrence's proponents cannot be proved.

The second problem is not only is the proof weak, but we have very little of it. We have two nuclear explosions on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and a variety of crises during the Cold War, less than twelve.

The proponents of the bomb have therefore built their theory on a very small data set, which presents a real danger. To understand this danger, let's take the example of medieval cosmology. Throughout thousands of year humans had the sky and 7 moving points of light: the Sun, the Moon and five visible planets. At the time of Christ, the astronomers developed Ptolemy's model of the Universe. A perfectly fair model corresponding to the existing data. There was the Earth in the centre and the Sun, the Moon and the other asters turning around our planet. This model prevailed throughout more than 1500 years as the reigning orthodoxy. In 1543 Copernicus used new more precise methods of measurement, to develop a new model. He put the Sun in the centre, and this new model integrated the data so well, that the dominant thinking was very simply swept aside. What this example shows is that when you create a model based on a small amount of data, the model can adjust itself to the data. There can be a commonly accepted opinion during several thousands of years, but it can then be revealed as fundamentally false.

The proponents of the bomb have created a model of security by placing nuclear weapons in the centre. But if Copernicus was with us, he could tell them, when you base your model on very little evidence, and on a small collection of data, then this model can be challenged.

The third problem comes from the new doubts that have appeared in regards to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Throughout 70 years no one questioned the fact that Japan had to surrender following the nuclear explosions. Yet these last twenty years of new, more detailed information, have been extracted bit by bit from Japan's, Russia's and the American archives and they clearly contradict the traditional narrative. The most troubling was found in "the importance of the city of Hiroshima". This city had no strategic importance. The experts, the researchers and the military personnel always grossly exaggerated the importance of this Japanese town. So why would Japan have surrendered on a non-important city?

People have always exaggerated the importance of this city. The United States bombarded 68 cities throughout the summer of 1945. We often imagine, because we stress the horror, the bombing of Hiroshima as the worst attack a city has ever experienced in history. We imagine that the number of people killed exceeds all the records. But if we compare, on a graph, the number of people killed in all the cities bombed during the summer of 1945, we discover that Hiroshima is second place in terms of civilians killed. The attack on Tokyo caused many more deaths than the city of Hiroshima. If we compare the number of square kilometers destroyed, we note that Hiroshima is in sixth place. In terms of the percentage of destruction Hiroshima is in seventeenth position. The attack on Hiroshima was very destructive, causing the death in one day of more than 90 000 people. But for the Japanese leaders this city didn't represent anything. It didn't change the strategic situation. On the Japanese beaches, after this nuclear explosion, the soldiers were waiting for the American invasion; they were still ready to fight.

The Japanese military were therefore not impressed. For example, on August 8, the Lieutenant General Kawabe wrote, in his journal having experienced a "serious hit" once he understood an atomic bomb destroyed Hiroshima. It is strange that the event supposed to have forced Japan to surrender didn't provoke in him greater commotion. More surprising still is what he wrote next in his journal. We must, he wrote, "be persistent and pursue the battle". Kawabe's words don't resonate with those of a man who is preparing to surrender the next day. On the 13th of August, the War Minister, General Anami, pointed out that atomic weapons didn't represent a more serious threat than incendiary bombing that had been pouring down on Japan for months.

However, another event of this second week of August coincides perfectly with the chronology of Japan's surrender. On August 8th at midnight, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and launched its invasion in the Japanese territories on the continent on half the island of Sakhaline as well as on other territories. Japan could have fought against one power attacking one region, but it was impossible for it to defend itself against two great powers attacking two different regions. Six hours after this news arrived to Tokyo, the Supreme Council gathered together to discuss unconditional surrender. The Soviet invasion therefore clearly set off a crisis, as opposed to the Hiroshima bombing, where only two days later there was a suggestion to gather in a meeting of the Supreme council; but the army declined this invitation. The arrival of the Soviets was therefore a primordial element in the Japanese surrender; Hiroshima was not.

When the Emperor of Japan indicated that the bomb forced his country to surrender, he did it with an interior political goal. The bomb was a perfect pretext as a cause for defeat and a way to save face: no one could blame an army for having lost faced with a miraculous weapon!

Far from achieving definite psychological shock, the impact the Hiroshima bombing had on Japanese leaders is not so clear. In a domain where there is so little data, and the main fact is potentially false, we must reconsider the global usefulness of the bomb.

Without doubt, the strongest reason to believe that the current thinking could be false is that the people who believe so strongly in these weapons have been wrong time and time again. The first standpoints were extremely strong. These weapons were to be decisive in war, prevent enemy attacks, bring an important prestige and transform the country into a great power. The American Secretary of State James Byrnes indicated that they ensured the success of negotiations at the end of the Second World War. Better, yet we predicted that history would be divided between pre and post-atomic times. Yet none of these predictions have come true.

The negotiations with the Soviets after the Second World War showed that nuclear weapons did not bestow unlimited diplomatic levers. The defeats in Vietnam for the United States, in Afghanistan for the URSS showed that nuclear weapons did not bring a guarantee of victory. The wars in the Middle East in 1973 and in the Falkland Islands (*les Îles Malouines*) in 1982 showed that these weapons did not prevent attacks from another State.

Finally no one divides history into pre and post-atomic eras. The results of these errors of evaluation are clear and unmistakable. It is therefore logical to doubt the current estimations of the value of these weapons. Proponents of the bomb have been wrong in the past, and they could be still be wrong today.

There are idealists that are opposed to nuclear weapons. But we need to see also that there are pragmatic objections, just as convincing: nuclear weapons are not reliable weapons, they pollute our environment and they are dangerous for our own troops, who can find themselves under radioactive fallout. A study made in 1976 by physicists F. Von Hippel and S. Drell shows that a "surgical" nuclear attack scenario by the URSS on the United States, on military targets, would cause more than 20 million deaths. Even if you tried to use them in a limited way, a considerable numbers of civilians would be killed. If you wanted to destroy a building, you would have to destroy  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the city.

Nuclear weapons have some very important limits. It is not surprising, therefore, that they haven't been used in 69 years. The general tendency of wars is to distance oneself from imprecise weapons, but to go towards precise, more intelligent and smaller weapons. The future of weapons looks like, for example, a small drone of a couple of square centimeters. By comparison, nuclear weapons remind us of old out-dated dinosaurs.

Proponents of the bomb are not realistic. They know that nuclear weapons are not very usable, but they insist that they have this magic quality, that they call nuclear deterrence. And this makes them useful all of a sudden!

I don't believe in magic. If you cannot prove that deterrence works, then it is not wise to rely on it. Nuclear deterrence is psychological, which signifies that it is intrinsically impossible to test, to verify and to demonstrate. There is so little data, that the ideas about these weapons could be fundamentally false. The most important piece of evidence, Hiroshima, seems to be erroneous. The overview of the nuclear bomb by proponents is a repeated failure and these weapons are imprecise at a time when the current tendency is the use of precision weapons.

It is not crazy to think about banning nuclear weapons, it is practical and prudent. How could anyone put the lives of millions of people in danger for a theory that hasn't, and cannot be proven?

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Watch the video of this speech (In French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WNRRdszavTk>

Ward Wilson is an American expert of international renown. He is a researcher at the BASIC think tank. His research is essentially on international relations, ways of thinking about nuclear weapons and theories surrounding them as well as international efforts in nuclear disarmament. He is the Director of the project "Rethinking Nuclear Weapons". Award-winning Author, he is notably the author of *Five Myths about Nuclear Weapons* (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013). <http://www.rethinkingnuclearweapons.org/> or <http://www.basicint.org/>

## Jean-Marie COLLIN

For the last two or three years, the political and intellectual debate on nuclear armament has truly begun to exist. It is still difficult and complicated, but to deny its existence would be inexact. This existence is the fruit of a long and labour-intensive work, which has principally been led by civil society organizations, through their informative actions on the environmental and medical consequences of nuclear testing, on the modernisation of French deterrence and again on the role of nuclear arms within NATO.

Today this debate and these reflections exist as well amongst certain parliamentarians. No, it is not that they have all of a sudden fully become aware of the importance of this subject, but an outside event, more or less unpredictable, has hit France and the Western world in its entirety: the economic crisis. It is certain that the obligation of reducing the states' budget spending, the fact that this economic crisis has permitted the raising of awareness, even a discovery for certain parliamentarians of the budget spending linked to nuclear arms.

This discovery was acted upon within the debate on the laws of military programming in November of 2013 by numerous questions on the costs of certain programs, like the airborne division or again the new generation of ballistic missile nuclear submarines. I quickly quote the questions of:

- M. Pierre Lellouche (UMP) mentions his concern that the budget leads: "straight to a choice between forces of deterrence and projection forces, which are starting to be reduced in significant ways."
- M Guy Tessier (UMP) is worried to see conventional forces sacrificed in favour of nuclear forces, transforming France into a "Nuclear Switzerland incapable of projecting itself beyond its borders."
- François de Rugy (EELV): "There is therefore substance to question on the necessity of maintaining a force that uses almost 15% of our defense budget. A reflection on the adjustment of our deterrence force is as even more urgent now that we are experiencing a budgetary crisis without precedent".
- Yves Fromion (UMP): "*In your LPM, the portion of credits dedicated to deterrence attains practically 50% of that destined to conventional materials; 23.3 billion Euros, on one hand, 49.2 billion Euros on the other hand.*"

Admittedly, the LPM was afterwards voted, consecrating notably the sum of 23.3 billion Euros for the period of 2014-2019 to nuclear deterrence; but this time, different from the past, parliamentarians from all political stripes - and it is very important to note it- asked questions and challenged the executive on the cost of the bomb.

Having budgetary elements is not only extremely important to follow the evolution of the cost of deterrence, but it is also simply the only access to understand and to learn France's political elements of deterrence. Now, these elements are supposed to be fully revealed, unlike in the 1960s, where De Gaulle's Army Minister, Pierre Messmer, publically indicated "*There are military secrets that translate into budgetary silences. Nowhere in the budget will you find the possibility of calculating exactly the cost of our atomic weapons. We have done this deliberately.*"

Logically, in a democracy like ours, parliamentarians have access to diverse reports and can therefore fully debate at the moment of the annual budget vote. It is even more important this nuclear accounting be fully clear, because understanding the true cost of the bomb is one of the most difficult tasks for a parliamentarian.

This observation can also be made in other countries that possess nuclear weapons. Thus, to obtain a greater transparency, there is today the requirement on the part of numerous parliamentarians to obtain the truth on the real costs of the bomb:

- In the United States, the Republican Earl Blumenauer introduced an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act, May 22, 2014. This amendment calls for the Congressional Budget Office to update each year its estimation of the cost over 10 years of maintaining the American nuclear forces.
- In Italy, Paolo Bolognesi, deputy member of the Defense Committee in the Chamber of Deputies, defended the May 14, 2014 bill n°1917 (filed December 22, 2013) which asked for the creation of an organisation to control military spending. This law calls for a greater transparency in the purchasing of weapons systems – and notably to know if future F35 Fighter-Bombers will have nuclear capacity-, thus breaking the taboo on NATO's stationing of nuclear weapons in Italy.

In 1999, a study called *Audit Atomique* enumerated, based on public documents, that between 1945 and 2010, France had spent more than 357 billion euros to construct, deploy, control, dismantle and fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This year, the military nuclear budget is 3.5 billion Euros. After the vote on the military programming law last November, which foresees committing 23.3 billion Euros, the annual average will increase to 3.88 billion Euros. These budgetary increases correspond to the process of modernizing submarine and aerial components and to the pursuit of the *Simulation* program of nuclear trials.

This agenda must attract all our attention. Let's remind ourselves: faced with the worldwide protests against the nuclear testing campaigns that happened in Polynesia, in 1995 France launched the PALEN program (*Preparation for the limiting of Nuclear Testing*). This program quickly changed its name, purely for communication reasons: Nuclear Testing program. The objective was to be able to reproduce the functioning of a thermonuclear weapon, step by step (pyrotechnic, nuclear, then thermonuclear) without having to resort to trials of real size, with three goals: to ensure safety, reliability and the credibility of the nuclear arsenal, and therefore its continuity...

This program is composed of 3 main parts:

- The Mega joule laser – LMJ is “the” system of the program Simulation. This gives access to thermonuclear physics, hence its strategic nature.
- The Airix machine (stands for Induction Accelerator for x-ray images) can photograph via X-ray the first millionth seconds of a chain reaction. This tool is essential to update new nuclear warheads.  
Thanks to this machine, France conceived and authorized the very first nuclear warhead, the TNA. Note this Airix machine was just replaced by the Epure machine, which is part of the (Franco-British) co-operative program Teutatès.
- The very powerful calculators (Bruyères-le-Châtel), with which the CEA holds the means to the most powerful calculations in the world. In 2010, the Tera 100 computer (conceived by Bull)

allowed for a calculation capacity of at least 1 Petaflop, that is one million billion operations per second!

In close to 20 years, the budget of this military program, which is public spending, has simply been multiplied by 2.5, which is incredible. Its official budget was less than 3 billion in 1995. Then it went:

- In 2000 to 4.6 billion euros
- In 2002 to 5 billion euros
- In 2005 to 5.5 billion euros
- In 2008 to 6.4 billion euros
- In 2009 to 6.6 billion euros
- In 2012 to 7.2 billion euros

The cost of this program has therefore literally exploded. At the same time, lags have accumulated. For example, the Mega joule Laser, which should have started operations in 2010 with 240 lasers, would only do its first experiment at the end of 2014 with 176 lasers. The question of this divergence remains. And two hypotheses can be made:

- Either the public organization that calculated this program is incompetent in estimating the costs, which leads it to underestimate its budget.
- or this program is knowingly underestimated, to facilitate its financing.

In these two cases, this increase in cost shows a disheartening lack of true control on the budgets linked to deterrence on the part of Parliament. This concern over the lack of budgetary control is increasingly strong. We can even read in a report published by the Senate in 2012 and reused word for word by the National Assembly in 2013: *“the nuclear weapons programs are always respectful of deadlines and costs”*...

Notice that the Court of Audit, in its public report in 2010 identified and mentioned a budgetary drift in the nuclear programs: *“too often, the nuclear programs, not yet officially launched, but for which the financing is nonetheless set-aside due to the Programming Act, have seen their costs significantly under-estimated.”*

This observation can be made over the entirety of the programs linked to nuclear deterrence. For example:

- The nuclear attack submarines (SNA) of Barracuda class: the first SNA will be operational in 2017 and not in 2010, as foreseen. In 1996, a senator estimated its provisional cost at 6.7 Million Euros. In 2010, the Court of Audit announced it would be 8.7 Million Euros.
- The new generation Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine program (SNLE-NG), of which the price per unit was supposed to be 2,698 Million Euros was raised to 4,282 Million Euros an increase of close to 58%.

These budgetary slips are therefore very real and approved by parliamentarians, allowing the executive to accomplish his defense policy.

But finally, is the issue of cost important in this debate? In spending, the cost can seem too large for some and shamefully low for another, regardless of what the spending is for.

- Take the case of the Ministry of Justice’s budget: 7.7 billion euros in 2014. This represents two times the deterrence budget. Is it too much or not enough?
- The deterrence budget, it presents only 0.17% of GDP. Is it too much or not enough?

In reality, what is important to know is if this public expense is useful, even before considering if there are budgetary discrepancies.

According to French doctrine, the nuclear weapon is a weapon said to be for “non-use”. Better, they say it is a political weapon, which permits the executive in power to exert pressure, threats, that is, of mass destruction. Here is all the importance of nuclear deterrence. To exist, “show one’s muscles” cause fear in a State in the hope of never using its strength. Because any use would sound the death knell of this concept and would engender a humanitarian, environmental and medical catastrophe, as the Oslo and Nayarit conferences on the humanitarian impact of these weapons showed.

Nuclear deterrence doesn’t admit the possibility of failure, since this implies the use of nuclear weapons. Take the concrete case of the Strategic Air Forces (FAS). They implement the ASMP-A Nuclear Cruise Missile, carrier of a 300 kilotons powered warhead, which is twenty times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. The Strategic Air Force is composed of two squads of 20 fighters plus around 10 planes, which make up the Air-Sea Task Force, which are found on aircraft carriers.

The Defense Committee’s hearings these last weeks allowed us to hear the General Charaix, commander of the Strategic Air Force (FAS). He justified the existence, and therefore usefulness, of this force as being the means to give the President of the Republic a choice, allowing him to avoid “the all or nothing”. He can, therefore, thanks to the FAS, authorize a ASMP-A Nuclear Missile Strike, and not have to immediately resort to a massive strike with intercontinental M-51 Missiles, each of them carrying 6 warheads of 100 Kilotons each.

The General Charaix explained the concept of the Strategic Air Force: it allows “the ultimate warning”. He described it as a helping hand given to the President of the Republic “to return deterrence in its place”. In short this signifies that this General envisions using a nuclear missile in order to achieve, for example:

- A limited attack
- A strike prioritizing the electromagnetic impulse effect, the IEM.

The use of a nuclear weapons system, of any kind and of any manner, in a limited or massive way, is the proof of its ineffectiveness to frighten our enemies. Therefore, it proves the failure of deterrence. This concept of ultimate warning is most strange, because it consists of using a weapon- as an ultimate warning- to re-establish a military and political concept of “nuclear deterrence”, even though this concept has failed, because normally it is to frighten the adversary!

The issue of the usefulness of the Strategic Air Force truly needs to be addressed. It should be further noted as such that several parliamentarians asked themselves during the LPM debate about the true future and relevance of this force; as Philippe Folliot’s (UDI) interpellation shows: *“Even if the second component was able to last until 2030, we already need to look at the issue of its suppression”*. It is therefore essential, from a democratic perspective, that parliamentarians know completely and without fault the reality of the cost of the totality of nuclear deterrence. With this knowledge it will be possible to establish the true cost of construction, use, dismantlement, recycling and storage of the different components of a nuclear weapon and its systems. Transparency and surveillance of the evolution of the costs must also permit political deciders to know the reality of the sums spent, but above all to dispose of a complete vision of this public policy over the next 50 years. In light of this debate on cost, it appears even more urgent to ask oneself about the usefulness and reality of concepts of use of nuclear weapons. For, whatever the cost is, if

the expense is useless and inappropriate, it is therefore mandatory to stop this spending, under the penalty of political irresponsibility.

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Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SP5Zhbceh4s>

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## Lou MARESCA

I have been asked to speak on the humanitarian dimensions of disarmament and their relationship to the non-use of nuclear weapons.

At the start it may be worth recognizing that this panel is discussing the misconceptions about nuclear deterrence. Yet, in discussing the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons and linking them with non-use or deterrence, we seem to be implicitly recognizing that deterrence can fail and that it may not be the securest of paradigms in today's world nor may it be in the future. And if that is true, then it is essential that the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons be discussed so that everyone, including young people who may not have grown up in the era of the cold war, has a full understanding of the impact of nuclear weapons. – An impact to that could nevertheless come to be a reality so long as the weapons exist.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is very pleased that a greater emphasis has been given to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons in recent years. This emphasis is, in our view, long overdue as no informed political or legal position on these weapons can be adopted without a detailed grasp of their consequences on human beings, civilian infrastructure and the environment. The Oslo and Nayarit conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that were convened in 2013 and 2014 respectively have certainly helped to further the international community's understanding of these potential consequences.

In speaking about the humanitarian dimensions supporting nuclear disarmament, the ICRC brings its first-hand testimony about the devastating impact of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and what we have learned in the decades since then. ICRC delegates were in Japan in August 1945 and upon arriving in Hiroshima, they came to face to face with the grim reality of a nuclear detonation. The scale of the devastation from a single atomic bomb, both in terms of human casualties and damage to infrastructure, was unimaginable and stunning as ICRC delegates later recalled. The atomic bomb had released a combination of heat and blast waves that spread over many square kilometres and the result was that many thousands of people were dead or unaccounted for and the civilian infrastructure had been obliterated as far as they could see. Also alarming, particularly for a humanitarian organization like the ICRC, was the near total destruction of the medical facilities and services to which the injured and sick would normally turn for treatment: 90% of Hiroshima's doctors were killed or injured by the explosion, as were 92% of the city's nurses and 80% of its pharmacists. There was a desperate need for blood but no possibility of blood transfusions as most potential donors were either dead or injured. Most medical materials were damaged or contaminated. To put it bluntly, the city's capacity to treat victims had been destroyed. As a result, there was little provision of health-care in the immediate aftermath of the explosion.

The ICRC learned many things from its work in Hiroshima. We learned that the consequences of nuclear weapons are catastrophic. We learned that when nuclear weapons are used, the normal systems and services for helping the victims are, in an instant, destroyed or severely damaged, making the provision of adequate assistance nearly impossible in the aftermath. We learned that many more people will die from radiation sickness in the weeks and months following an explosion than at the time of the detonation and that, as a result, civilian casualties and suffering are likely to continue for years to come, caused by the

development of cancers and leukaemia. Over time the death toll will rise and is likely to continue to rise after the conflict has ended.

This same catastrophic scenario – and more – will occur if nuclear weapons are ever used again. In addition, to what I have just outlined from the ICRC experience, the Oslo and Nayarit meetings identified broader regional and global consequences for food production, the environment and the world economy and that these effects will not be constrained by national borders.

An additional element for consideration is that while the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons increased dramatically during the Cold War and the current capacity remains near those levels, the ability of states and international agencies to assist the victims has not significantly improved. This is a conclusion that the ICRC arrived at several years ago after conducting an in-depth assessment of its own ability, and that of other agencies, to help the victims of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons.

This assessment showed that there would be significant challenges to providing humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of a nuclear detonation. These include the fact in the short term most of the local medical personnel would be dead or wounded and that most medical facilities would be destroyed or unable to function in the area affected by the explosion. Any medical supplies that were not destroyed or contaminated by the blast would quickly be used up. In addition, the delivery of external assistance is likely to be impeded by the sheer volume of casualties and the extent of the destruction. It is realistic to assume that sizeable areas will be inaccessible for personnel and supplies due to debris and damage to infrastructure. A further concern is the safety of assistance providers, especially the risk associated with exposure to ionizing radiation. Depending on the levels of radiation, protective measures will have to be implemented, which may simply mean that humanitarian assistance will not be provided.

In most instances, the national emergency response capacities—if they exist at all—are likely to be overwhelmed. It means that support from other states or from humanitarian assistance organizations would be necessary but from what the ICRC understands from its on-going analysis, most international entities have little capacity to deliver the breadth and type of aid that would be required.

In summary, these are the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons that have led the ICRC, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement more generally, to conclude the prevention is the only way forward. We have called on states to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used again and to pursue negotiations to prohibit and completely eliminate such weapons through a legally binding international agreement in accordance with their existing obligations.

The fact that nuclear weapons have not been used in nearly 70 years or that those that exist today are not meant to be used provides little comfort. With large numbers of nuclear weapons on high-alert launch ready status and the slow but steady increase in the number of states possessing nuclear weapons, there is only cause for grave concern. Along with these factors, the possibility of that more actors may seek to acquire nuclear weapons only increases the likelihood that such weapons may be used or accidentally detonated. Thus, there is little assurance that the horrific humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons won't be seen in the future. Thus to us it is essential that the humanitarian dimensions must be at the forefront of the debate.

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Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GEh1-dfV1pk>

*Lou Maresca is member of the Legal Division of the International Committee of the Red Cross since 1995. His main interests are related to the banning and restriction of weapons under the International Human Rights. He was especially active in regards to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the Convention on Cluster Munitions. He has been asked by the ICRC to help with the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement on the subject of nuclear weapons.*

## Oliver MEIER

I was asked to speak on the annexation of Crimea by Russia, on what Germans think of the tactical use of the nuclear weapon, and on nuclear disarmament.

For Germans, the issue of nuclear disarmament is linked to the presence of American weapons in Germany and in Europe. The subject is less prominent than it was five years ago when President Obama gave a speech in Prague on the Global Zero approach.

With regard to the Ukrainian crisis, German political circles are trying to analyse what happened. For now it is still too early in the crisis to understand all that has happened. The current and future motivations of President Putin are still uncertain. The control of nuclear weapons is therefore more complicated, but even more important with this news.

There hasn't been, in Berlin, any debate on nuclear deterrence in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, because well before that, the presence of American weapons was no longer a topic of public debate.

The Lisbon summit in November 2010 and the Chicago Summit in 2012 polarized experts to new strategic concepts and left behind the debate on the merit of deterrence.

The current German Government isn't as interested in this issue as the previous one. Thus the current Minister of Foreign Affairs has never mentioned the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons, contrary to its predecessor. The new Government's program clearly mentions the obligation of controlling Russian nuclear tactical weapons in a verifiable manner as a condition *sine qua non* for NATO's reduction of weapons.

The stance of the State Members of the Alliance varies, in function of the political interest, and military interests they have regarding the nuclear weapon and the place they take within the Alliance. The Ukrainian crisis has changed their perception of the subject.

Some thought that the abandonment of the nuclear menace would be felt by Russia as a sign of weakness, whereas others, notably the Baltic countries, or like Poland, insisted on the necessity of not deploying weapons an area close to Russia. For the moment, NATO has not at any instant threatened to use the nuclear weapon in the case of the Ukrainian crisis.

Concerning the deployment process of the ABM system, this continues and has no connection with the Ukrainian crisis.

Regarding the military use of the nuclear weapon, at NATO we had a debate on the right balance between nuclear and conventional weapons. Certain Generals hoped to reach a reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in favour of a reinforcement of conventional weapons. But this debate didn't happen, and to the contrary we observed increased investment in tactical weapons systems.

NATO does not foresee a nuclear conflict with Russia. The nuclear weapons possessed by the Alliance don't present added value for the United States, which signifies that from a military perspective they are totally useless. Things could change due to the Ukrainian Crisis. The situation is not clear. Some would see nuclear deterrence as a second resort. Others lean towards the use of conventional weapons.

As far as I know, there is an ongoing re-evaluation at NATO on the pertinence of the nuclear weapon, because the Cold War Scenarios are no longer possible. In the hypothesis where Russia would launch itself into a large-scale attack against the Baltic countries, the question asked is what means would be put in place to defend these countries.

In March 2012, I participated in a seminar in Paris which where NATO representatives attended. They reckon that nuclear deterrence is part of the DNA of the Alliance, whose principle is to share the nuclear responsibility amongst members. This perspective was reinforced due to a new strategic concept, which says that as long as the nuclear weapon exists, NATO remains a nuclear alliance. This is the first time NATO defines itself this way, and its members declare that they will be the last to abandon the nuclear weapon.

The Ukrainian crisis doesn't encourage NATO to move towards disarmament. Amongst its members, certain give more importance to the nuclear weapon than others. This signifies that there are some difficult budgetary choices to make, for example investing in new Fighter-Bomber planes, which would have nuclear capacity. This also signifies that the American load increases. The House of Representatives recently adopted a law that the Obama Administration indicates the financial percentage carried by the United States and each of its allies in the cost of the Nuclear Weapon. This too is new and it would be very interesting to see the numbers. The intention is clear and some wish that the Europeans would pay more to share the nuclear burden. Would they accept to pay for the modernization of American weapons? If this were the case, it would be a first.

This all shows that tactical nuclear weapons and the sharing of the responsibility and their usage is an issue that divides, more than unites, the Allies. The will to fight against proliferation is still very strong within NATO. The balance between the United States and Russia renders progress improbable on the topic in the near future, even if changes are not impossible. The Ukrainian crisis has had until now very little impact on the co-operation between the United States and Russia, for example on Iran or on the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria.

The United States have respected their defined obligations in the Budapest Memorandum, which is not the case for Russia who has not respected its commitment to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine. This has a great significance because it undermines the promises that Nuclear Powers could make to countries like Iran or North Korea. In summary, the Ukrainian crisis doesn't have for the moment a nuclear dimension. There could be an escalation of hostilities between the two stakeholders, but it is not certain. We can think that the two parties could be in agreement not to use nuclear weapons on the new European territories until the crisis is resolved.

I wish to highlight what we can expect of NATO, that it will strengthen itself politically faced with the Russian aggression. The debate on what the response could be, would probably be only behind closed doors. But NATO has tried at several occasions to engage European Parliamentarians. I believe that it would be good for France to take part in these debates, and I hope that this seminar will contribute to help France be much more active within the discussions happening at NATO.

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Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WVQe0kyxAfQ>

*Oliver Meier is an associate researcher for the German Institute of International and Security Affairs (SWP). His research is primarily on the control of Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction and their proliferation. He has contributed to several works and has written a number of articles on these topics. He is also the co-author of the book Arms Control in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Between Coercion and Cooperation (Routledge, 2013). <http://www.swp-berlin.org/>*

# Hervé MORIN

I would like to share my opinion through 4 observations.

The first is an anecdote. During a meeting with the Head of State in July 2012 at the Elysée, we addressed various defence topics. Obviously, I knew his position on the subjects, having read his declarations and notably his declaration about deterrence, which continued the usual discourse.

Nevertheless, I wanted to let him know that he would be obliged to make some difficult choices when it came to nuclear deterrence. For we cannot without end postpone arbitrations about the military model we have to build. We cannot stay in the obsolete myth of global military power, and of lead nation.

I therefore indicated that he would have to take strong measures concerning nuclear deterrence. I therefore evoked several actions France has carried out in the past, the last one being the reduction by a third of the Strategic Air Forces. But now the maintenance of two components with an inevitable reduction of the Defence Budget is necessary and obligatory.

Pursuing this discussion, I indicated that I understood his position, which was that which must be adopted by a Head of State. In effect, behind this notion of “Head” there hides a substantial theme, and it is the transcendental question of the nuclear. We are effectively in Zeus’ domain, the mystical nuclear, absolute symbol of the state and to dare to address the nuclear issue, for the President of the Republic, is an extremely difficult issue, because this touches the foundations of his power within the 5th Republic.

This mystical aspect renders the subject taboo, or even presents it as unable to evolve. If I take the issue of the Strategic Air Force (FAS), who can tell me today for what kind of major geostrategic crisis would we consider using France’s FAS? If we want to take into consideration on one hand the miniaturization of weapons embedded on the submarine component and if we wish to accept that nuclear doctrine rests on principles – the incertitude of what our vital interests are, the incertitude of the means used and the incertitude of the objectives to achieve; the “instant use”, of which translates into a permanent availability of the nuclear weapon, by its invulnerability and by the immediateness of the implementation of such an operation- then, based on these principles, who can consider that we actually need the FAS ?

My position on the subject, earned me virulent remarks from the Air Force’s Chief of staff, explaining that I was betraying the Air Force. We are therefore so deep in the realm of the mystical, as Ward Wilson mentioned, that for the President of the Republic, to change and to push forward the concept of deterrence is, unfortunately, extremely complex.

Another point on this is the lack of reconsideration of past schemes. France is equipped with the M51 Missile, carrier of the nuclear warhead Océanique, capable of striking continental China. This model corresponds to a crisis model in which our vital interests would be so threatened that our nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SNLE) should be able to attain this territory? There is a will; I would even say a ban, to not reconsider existing concepts. Thus, all discussion on the topic of deterrence is immediately closed by the military and nucleopaths, advocating to the Minister as to the President of the Republic the obligation of keeping this force.

My second observation focuses on our discourse, which is proliferating. Yes, our discourse is a discourse of proliferation, when we indicate we will miniaturize our weapons, translating thus into the idea of a useable force. What are we giving as a message to the world which is completely new, for example to Indonesia, who, here 10 years, will have a GDP superior to that of France's? We must keep in mind that these countries will, in several years, challenge us to know why we are depriving them of a nuclear arsenal due to a treaty (the NPT) from another time? Because it is certain that the 1945 construction will change and we must beware.

We must build a new model of global governance where the Europeans are inspirational, because we have built a model of cooperation between states and not a model of confrontation between states.

We are therefore ourselves favouring proliferation, by indicating the necessity of conserving this armament "of ultimate warning" to protect ourselves. When we will have much richer countries than those actually possessing the nuclear weapon, they will necessarily go towards acquiring this equipment; and therefore one day, there will be a crazy person who will use this weapon, it is certain.

Proliferation is a mortal danger, on the horizon, in a few decades.

My third observation pertains to the doubt that we have towards deterrence, and Ukraine provides us with evidence. We have our doubts, because we are not certain, for example, that deterrence would stop Russia from invading Poland. Thus, do we consider that deterrence could be the answer to a Russian invasion of the Baltic countries? Obviously no, deterrence wouldn't stop Putin from advancing as he wishes, like he demonstrated in Ukraine. Another point, which proves to what extent we doubt our strike force, is the implementation of the ballistic antimissile program (ABM). I have always been deeply opposed to this program- to the desperation of my American counterparts – because it is a program, which inevitably reduces the credibility of our deterrence. We therefore show doubt by the decisions we take.

Finally my last observation pertains to our role, for us, Europeans. For us, there is room for major action, even if I think the United States and Russia must take the greatest steps first, in terms of disarmament. But what better momentum for the European Political space than to carry the idea of the abolition of nuclear weapons! We are in the best position to talk about it, we who have known so much civil war, as Victor Hugo said. Europeans are in the best position to speak of the necessity of moving towards the abolition of nuclear weapons and to share this message with the whole world. What beautiful construction, what beautiful message of foreign policy we would display!

We can say it, because we have constructed this new organization of states, which is based on cooperation and not confrontation, resting on a legal system imposed on the states. This is the European construction. It is the model, which should inspire the world of tomorrow. The world of tomorrow is that of cooperation between states and in sight of the challenges that will confront the world: energy, ores, global warming, and the rising of sea levels, the poles issue. If we don't go towards cooperation between states, then we go to the ruin of planet Earth.

As Europeans, we could therefore resume leadership, we who have been the Continent of Wars, we could say there is a new face to show and in this, we would find a voice in foreign policy and be able to influence the world who ignores us, because it considers us to be the Old Continent. For this we must apply ourselves and take into consideration the fact that the great responsible politicians, both European and

French, such as Michel Rocard, Alain Juppé as high ranked military, be they American or Russian, carry the idea of a world without nuclear weapons.

Leadership, if there needs to be one, must be European. The idea that the world stays the world, that the world is unchanging and that nothing is moving is discouraging. To abandon this abolition of nuclear weapons, because we must gain the confidence of all, due to having resolved regional conflicts and the planet's problems before tackling disarmament, isn't possible. Yet, in politics, giving up is disappearing. I invite you, ladies and gentlemen, not to give up, so that the world will never know a nuclear winter.

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*Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9D-262wxKys>*

*Hervé Morin was Defence minister between 2007 and 2010. Eure's Deputy of the 3rd constituency in 1998, he was elected President of the group Union pour la Démocratie Française (UDF) at the National Assembly, up until 2007. That year he gained a third mandate as Deputy of Eure. Furthermore, he is presently Mayor of the community of Epaignes in the region of Haute-Normandie. He is also President of the Nouveau Centre and co-founder of the Union of independent Democrats (UDI).*

*He is the President of the National Council of the UDI. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/tribun/fiches\\_id/2236.asp](http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/tribun/fiches_id/2236.asp)*

## Jean-Pierre MAULNY

What is the status of the process of nuclear disarmament in general, and where does France lie on this topic?

The states in general, and notably France, do not have a specific posture for or against disarmament. It is the international geo-strategic context, which determines their position towards a policy of disarmament, or the contrary, towards a weapons producing policy.

Since 1945, different periods have followed one another. The period of 1945 to the end of the sixties was marked by the nuclear arms race. Then intervened a period of "arms control", that is to say control of weapons, which went from the end of the sixties until the middle of the eighties. The principle was not to disarm, but to try to limit the arms race; these were the first US-Soviet negotiations, in a context where the possibility of disarmament was stifled by the refusal of the Soviets to ratify the verification accords. Then came a period of 10 years of true nuclear disarmament, and not only nuclear. Several negotiations on disarmament were opened: treaties on intermediate forces in 1996 (the "START" treaties), treaties on conventional forces in Europe in 1990 (the treaty of 1993, which prohibited chemical weapons). It is therefore a question of strategic disarmament and not humanitarian disarmament.

In the middle of the 90s, we entered into a period where the process of disarmament of strategic weapons stopped, corresponding to the period where the United States became the only super power and when the Iraqi nuclear ability was discovered, in 1990. The Americans thought therefore that disarmament didn't help their security. They withdrew themselves from a certain number of disarmament negotiations, one of which was the ABM treaty, on anti-missile defences in 2001, and they refused to ratify the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. Nearly all disarmament negotiations stopped at that time.

Obama's speech in Prague in 2009 on nuclear disarmament seemed to be a commitment to resume negotiations, but in reality nothing came of it.

These issues of disarmament are linked to security issues: according to the period, we go towards disarmament or the arms race starts up again.

In regards to France, it proposed disarmament treaties at the beginning of the 90s, like the one in June 1991 (after the first Gulf War), which involved all kinds of weapons. Then we entered into France's timid period, in terms of disarmament, and notably on nuclear disarmament.

Strategic disarmament stopped around the year 1995, while several disarmament accords for other types of weapons occurred, which corresponded with humanitarian-type preoccupations. This was the convention on anti-personnel land mines and the Cluster-Munitions Treaty. This disarmament is supported by the NGOs and not by the states. France is relatively favourable towards disarmament in general; France is not taking initiative but always ends up joining in. France has played a slightly more active role during the negotiations on the Conventional Weapons Treaty (TCA) which was just adopted last year in New York, but which is more of an agreement on regulation, than a disarmament treaty.

France has a specific position on the nuclear weapon, because it offers a greater power in the international scene. The smaller a state is, the more the nuclear weapon is attractive in its eyes. It is the famous *equalizing power of the atom*. France has tried to maximize this advantage of the nuclear weapon, by having an independent deterrence policy, which allowed it to leave NATO's integrated military command in 1966.

What is France's position today in relation to the nuclear weapon, and what are the questions it needs to ask itself?

The general tendency of France and its leaders is to consider the nuclear weapon as the instrument of its power. Therefore it must be conserved. This is what explains the withdrawal reaction faced with Obama's speech in 2009 on the removal of nuclear weapons. The French position could have evolved after the 2012 elections, but this hasn't been the case. This position is perfectly justifiable in the short term. It is necessary, however, to project oneself into the future, and to ask if we will perpetually stay in a world with nuclear weapons. France must ask itself that question, and imagine how it could reposition itself as a power in a world without nuclear arms.

We can ask France 3 questions today.

The first is the total cost of deterrence applied to the total defence cost.

Since the construction of the deterrence force in France in the sixties until today, the priority of this force of deterrence was never questioned, because it corresponded to France's concern of independence. It is more a political choice, than a military one. Today, it is necessary to ask this question in relation to France's financial capacities. As a result of the diminution of the military budget, the weight of the nuclear is becoming heavier and heavier. This question will be necessary in 5 or 10 years, because we are faced with the renewing of the deterrence force (it is a question of renewing and not modernizing).

The second question concerns future scenarios. We are not in a disarmament phase; there is even the risk of accelerated proliferation, which comes from the fact that the International Security System isn't working. The United States no longer want to play the role of police in the world, which creates a worrying sentiment for all those who considered the American weapon a security element. Certain Asian countries are wondering, despite pivoting politics, on the guarantee of American Security.

The Iranian issue will be decisive in the months or weeks to come. The negotiations of the Iranian program will be in arbitrating between one side the authorization to give to Iran, concerning the civil enrichment, with the guarantee that there isn't a nuclear program behind it, and on the other side the role of Iran in the Near East as a regional security agent. With what is happening right now in Iraq, Iran's place in the International becomes even more important. It is obvious that the United States would like to have an agreement with Iran concerning nuclear, as a way to reintroduce Iran as a security factor, in regards to what is happening in Iraq. France main concern is proliferation and would find itself without doubt set back compared to the Americans, on this topic.

We are at a key moment, because if the international security system is not working, if the United States no longer wants to play the role of police of the world, we could have a true proliferation crisis. The risk of this proliferation could be so strong that, by backlash, it could generate the idea of the necessity of nuclear disarmament. And that day, it is the Americans that would push for this nuclear disarmament, because

they have the operational strategic superiority and because it is in their interest. Obama's speech in 2009 prepared this position.

France won't be able to eternally put their foot on the brake pedal. It will be necessary for it to envision how to situate itself in a world without nuclear weapons.

The third point is that France must ask itself if its influence doesn't risk suffering from seeming hostile to disarmament, while the majority of countries want the application of "Article 6" of the NPT, since the present system doesn't ensure their security.

Presently the maintenance of the nuclear weapon is still the best choice for France. The question to ask is what will happen tomorrow and how can France reposition itself in a world without nuclear weapons.

The question is not to be for or against the nuclear weapon, this debate doesn't exist because the question is not being asked in the short term, and furthermore it cannot be held in the public square.

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*Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BTz2GaisA5o>*

*Jean-Pierre Maulny is the Vice-Director of the Institute of Strategic International relations (IRIS). Auditor of the 31st session of CHEAR, he was entrusted with a mission alongside the president of the defence and armed forces committee of the National Assembly from 1997 to 2002. At IRIS he is the director of the research division, responsible for the studies related to defence policy, at the ESDP and NATO, to the armament industry. He is a member of the editorial committee of the International and Strategic Review and gives courses at IRIS Sup and a course « Armament and Disarmament » at the Political Science University of Bordeaux.*

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FORWARD  
TO A NUCLEAR-  
WEAPONS-  
FREE WORLD

## Paolo COTTA-RAMUSINO

We must think of the path to take to achieve the elimination of all nuclear weapons. I will share certain ideas and make some propositions.

We must first understand that the growing interest focused towards nuclear weapons is a mistake. These have two roles, one political, and the other military, which we must question.

I do not agree with my predecessor who said that France's situation is linked to the possession of the nuclear weapon, not more than France is linked to Camembert! There is no merit to having the nuclear weapon. What matters is what we do with it. The nuclear weapon does not bring any advantage to the five states that possess it; to the contrary this can only encourage other states to possess it. On the other hand, there is no sensible reason to use this weapon. Even during the Cold War, a period of tensions, it was not used.

Some see in the nuclear weapon a system of last resort for a country that would have to retaliate to a nuclear attack.

In this case, why not propose that nuclear weapons could only be used as a response to an attack? Non-use of the weapon first is an old idea, so why not resuscitate it? Yesterday, Shlomo Ben Ami told us that this could be a good approach.

We must contest the reality of the nuclear weapons' role in the political and military defended by strategy experts and by politicians.

Beyond the principle of not using the weapon first, we can suggest reaching an agreement on a minimum delay of reaction, between the attack and the retaliation. Because an immediate reaction can open the door to interpretation errors, to misunderstandings, or technical errors. We know today that numerous interpretation errors or missing information have led to crises that could have resulted in the initiation of a nuclear hit.

To lower the threshold of use of the nuclear weapon, we must contest its political usefulness, to explain that it is not a military tool, and we must disconnect the nuclear weapon from all circumstances other than suffering from a nuclear attack.

In the United States, the Nuclear Posture Review launched the idea that the United States couldn't use the nuclear weapon on member countries of the NPT, if they respect their international obligations. This formula is positive but raises an important question in regards to Iran who is currently in open diplomatic conflict with the United States and other Nuclear Powers specifically on the compliance of these international obligations.

In 1945, no one thought that two countries, the United States and Russia would acquire thousands of nuclear weapons. The NPT is an important and essential framework, even if the treaty is far from perfect. Unequal, it introduces a strong discrimination between Non-Nuclear Weapon States and Nuclear Weapon

States, but thankfully the number of Nuclear Powers is low, even if it does represent half the world's population. This treaty concentrates on three pillars: disarmament, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and non-proliferation.

But today, although we are at least than a year away from the ninth NPT Review Conference (May 2015), the NPT is in crisis, and strong pressure will be applied on its credibility, if none of the decisions made previously are executed.

Thus, in 1995, when the NPT was prorogued indefinitely, the possibility of a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East was evoked. This was not done, just as in 2000, and 2005. In 2010, we again talked about putting in place a conference to create a nuclear weapon free zone in that part of the world. The result was, unfortunately, exactly the same as in the past, because this conference, which should have taken place in Finland before the end of 2012, was cancelled once again. We are therefore staying uniquely in theoretical actions, and it is a dangerous path because countries could turn away from the NPT if no concrete action on the Middle East is taken.

Finally, there is the problem of Iran. We must reintegrate this country into the NPT, and we must recognize it's right to produce civil nuclear energy and separate this subject from the possession of nuclear weapons; otherwise the situation will become explosive. If Iran has the right to have and use this nuclear energy, then we must discuss with this State the type of technology they can have, with the objective of avoiding all risks of proliferation.

In an international situation where crises are multiplying in the Middle East and in Ukraine, where disarmament is weak and insecurity rising, we must stop highlighting the importance of possessing the nuclear weapon. We must work to demonstrate the non-pertinence of this weapon, for, in the opposite case, the NPT will quickly show its limits.

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*Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qHe5hVst0x0>*

*Paolo Cotta-Famusino is the General Secretary of Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs since 2002. He is also Professor of Mathematical Physics in Milan and a Chief Researcher at the National Italian Institute of Nuclear Physics. Furthermore, he is recognized as an expert on topics such as weapons control, conflict resolution and disarmament. In this respect, he is the co-founder of the Italian Union of Scientists for Disarmament (USPID). He is also a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and of the World Academy of Art and Science. <http://puqwash.org/>*

# Yasuyoshi KOMIZO

Before all else, I would like to congratulate and thank the organizers of this conference in favour of a world free from nuclear weapons. My organization "Mayors for Peace- Les Maires pour la paix" is grateful to be present at such a great event.

I would also like to thank the French Association of Communes, Departments and Regions for Peace (AFCDRP) created in 1985 and notably Madame the Mayor Catherine Margate of the city of Malakoff. With the leadership of the city of Malakoff, we have been able to set up several actions. I equally wish to thank the mayor of Aubagne, Monsieur Daniel Fontaine, previous president of the AFCDRP, Monsieur Michel Cibot, General Secretary of the AFCDRP and Philippe Rio who is the new president and the Mayor of Grigny. I must highlight that Paul Quilès, Mayor of Cordes sur Ciel, is member of our organisation. Without their efforts this French branch of Mayors for Peace wouldn't have been able to develop.

I will start my presentation by reading you this letter, which comes from Hiroshima:

*"The dome of the bomb stands alone and tells you the story, without saying a word. 1945, August 6th at 8:15 in the morning, a B29 bomber, the "Enola Gay", dropped a bomb from 9600 m altitude which contained 50 kg of enriched uranium, divided in two parts.*

*This bomb is dropped on a human population, and then the bomber continued its flight. Forty-three seconds later at an altitude of 600m, the critical mass of the bomb is achieved and it exploded in less than a millionth of a second. Sixteen Kilotons of destructive power were released; mortal radiation travelling at the speed of light fell on the city. The bomb had created such extreme energy and heat that it exploded. The bomb created an enormous ball of fire, releasing an enormous shock wave, destroying structures and inhabitants without any pity. The temperatures at land surface reached 4000 degrees. The mushroom cloud was formed less than three minutes after its explosion. Twenty minutes later, black rain fell, fires burst out everywhere and the inhabitants were burned alive. Hiroshima fell into ruin.*

*The Hibakusha's lives were transformed in an irrevocable way. They experienced horrible instances, shed innumerable tears, tortured by nightmares and social discrimination. The Hibakusha have gone through moments of atrocious grief and pain. They have arrived at the conclusion that no one should suffer as much as they have suffered. They call therefore from their wishes the implementation of a world without nuclear weapons.*

*Dear friends, precious artisans of peace, register in the bottom of your hearts Hiroshima's call and work to ensure a peaceful world so that future generations can live in a world in peace."*

It is on the basis of this conviction that the Hibakusha, the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with an average age, which is higher than 78 years, have launched an urgent call for the establishment of a world without nuclear weapons. This action is remarkable, because it is not a message of vengeance, but a unifying call. This powerful message must be shared all around our world, a world with 16 000 nuclear weapons. I think this must be a source of inspiration for the youth, who will be architects of the world of tomorrow.

Mr. President, the inhumanity of atomic weapons and this fervent call of the Hibakusha in favour of peace have been the compass of our organization. It is in effect in this spirit, that the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki decided in 1982 to found the non-partisan organization Mayors for Peace (Maires pour la paix). The current number of members is more than 6000 cities, representing more than a billion citizens in 158 countries and regions. Furthermore, Mayors for Peace benefits from a consulting status to the ECOSOC, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Mayors for Peace fixed the year 2020 as an objective for its campaign "Vision 2020", which aims for this date to eliminate all nuclear weapons. The city of Ypres in Belgium serves as the office for this campaign. During our annual conference in August 2013 we have adopted two documents ("The call of Hiroshima" and the "Plan of Action"), which explain the fundamental ideas of our campaign: the elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of solid bases for peace in the world. Evidently the call of the Hibakusha people is each time at the heart of our activities on these two subjects.

For the elimination of nuclear weapons, the principal focus of our campaign is the Convention on nuclear weapons, but we recognized the different approaches launched by different organizations. Moreover, we associated ourselves with them, for it is the accumulation of this kind of effort, which will permit us to achieve the accomplishment of our final objective. Dialogue and complementarity are important characteristics of our campaign.

It is equally necessary to build the basis of global peace. To succeed in eliminating these nuclear weapons, we must create a reliable security system, which can replace the current regime of international security, which is based on nuclear deterrence. Deterrence rests effectively on the notion of mutual defiance, which intends mass extermination and this is not acceptable. A framework of security which is based on the sense of community, at the global level, and which is supported on trust between human beings could, in our opinion, give a much more sustainable base for international security.

To ensure long-term world peace, it is necessary to cultivate a common sense of belonging to one unique and same human community. To make the situation evolve, we must establish a society where mutual distrust is replaced by an awareness that we all live in one same human society. In this society, diversity will be put forward and differences resolved peacefully, giving the possibility to leaders from the whole world to take audacious measures in favour of peace.

The path towards this objective can be long and difficult, but it is feasible and it is in this optic that we must communicate with the largest possible number of members of civil society. Thanks to its action, Mayors for Peace, has the means to reinforce this communication.

We are pleased to see that the global community is at last concerned with the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Traditionally, it was strategy and technology that was primarily discussed, important aspects, but it was necessary to ask this question: what is the security goal with this weapon? I think that the point of view of human security has, principally, cruelly been lacking until now. If we don't base the argument for security on the wish of peoples in favour of peace, all the debate will be outside the framework. Security should be for the protection of the people and needs to promote human values.

This return to the inhumanity of nuclear weapons is significant. This evolution could possibly become a motor for the elimination of nuclear weapons. To reinforce this dynamic we invite you to visit the sites of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to judge for yourselves the inhumane consequences of nuclear bombs. I hope that policy makers throughout the world will understand to what point these weapons are inhumane.

Mayors for Peace is a sounding board for the citizens' voices. Permit me to tell you about some of the activities we are carrying out in the world. 6084 members strong and with the objective that more and more cities become members; we just created the concept of "Leader Cities" across the continents. These cities will be the driving forces for our worldwide actions. We are currently meeting with Mayors (like Malakoff for France) who have accepted to take this leadership, taking certain measures, such as, in the United States, the city of Akron who has adopted a nuclear disarmament resolution, or the cities of Malakoff (France) and Granollers (Spain) who organized in September 2013 a conference for the Mediterranean cities. Furthermore, we are taking concrete action aiming to sensitize international public opinion through the production of atomic weapon expositions, through training sessions on Hiroshima's effect, or with the preparation conference of the Non-nuclear proliferation Treaty in April 2014. In the context of the Centenary celebrations of the First World War, I am invited to Sarajevo, to explain our interventions and to plant young Ginkgo Biloba trees, as symbols of peace. Finally, August 28th, I will equally represent Mayors for Peace on the Kazakhstan test site during the International Day against nuclear tests.

Mayors for Peace is therefore engaged worldwide and open to work with all the citizens of the planet.

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*To watch the video of this speech (in French):* <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iq5sE5TtTGM>

*Yasuyoshi Komizo, graduate from the faculty of law at Hosei University, entered the Japanese foreign Affairs Ministry in 1970. His career lead him to have several jobs with the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) between 1987 and 2002, then again within several different Japanese government organizations, where he developed an expertise in the domain of disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. From 2010-2012, he has been an extraordinary ambassador and plenipotentiary at the Japanese Embassy in Kuwait. In April 2013, he became the director of the Hiroshima Peace Culture Foundation and, with this title, the General Secretary of Mayors for Peace since August 2013.*

<http://www.mayorsforpeace.org/> <http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/hpcf/english/index.html>

# Jennifer SIMONS

Thank you for the invitation to speak. *To be talking about nuclear disarmament in the Assemblée Nationale has to be an historic event perhaps equal to that of the French Revolution because, with all due respect to our host country*, France has been the state most **adamant** about retaining its nuclear weapons - the possessor of 300 nuclear warheads, two hundred and ninety of these deployed. And France continues to **modernize** its arsenal with plans to maintain its full nuclear capabilities into the **2050s** - all in contravention of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which commits member states to the elimination of nuclear weapons, and to non-proliferation – both horizontal and **vertical**.

I have been asked to address the subject of the Future of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and I want to say at the outset that **a Treaty is only as good as the integrity of its signatories**. For this reason the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is under threat.

The NPT does have its weaknesses, such as:

- The ability of North Korea, to obtain nuclear technology, transforms it to weapons-manufacturing capability and withdraws from the Treaty with **impunity**. This is a grave weakness with grim portents for the future because there are some 30 nuclear capable states; some of whom may find it tempting to follow North Korea's path, especially if the commitment to a Middle-East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction is not fulfilled; and if the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China – the P-5 -continue to flagrantly deny the commitment to eliminate their nuclear arsenals **as their part** of the three-way bargain.

Other weaknesses include:

- The lack of an NPT Secretariat like that of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Treaty in order to monitor progress on a continuing basis.
- The underfunding of the IAEA and its lack of a mandate to verify and monitor military nuclear weapons facilities.
- Lack of universality. Although the Treaty is the most universal of all United Nations Treaties, with only four UN member states outside the treaty, these four states all possess nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup>

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the foundation document that has kept the world relatively safe from nuclear annihilation, primarily, because the great majority of the non-nuclear weapons states have honoured their part of the bargain. Of the 186 member states only North Korea has left the Treaty; and only Syria, Iraq, Libya, and allegedly, Iran have attempted to dishonour their commitments.

As a document, it is excellent treatise. It contains all the elements which could lead to a nuclear free world:

- The 1995 indefinite extension in which commitment was made to a Zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East
- The 2000 Article VI 13 Practical Steps

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<sup>1</sup> 189 NPT member states, 193 UN member states

- The 2010 Action Plan,
- The reference to the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion,
- The groundbreaking inclusion, in 2010, of the language on the Humanitarian consequences of nuclear detonation.

If honoured by the signatories, this document would enable the world to move forward to a nuclear free world within a reasonable time frame – by 2030, as in the Global Zero Action Plan.

However, the NPT will not bring us to *a nuclear weapon free world* unless nuclear weapons **cease** to be an integral part of P-5 military doctrines, postures and policies; unless the P-5 **cease** upgrading their nuclear arsenals; **cease** creating new capabilities for their nuclear weapons; and **cease** planning and budgeting for years ahead to continue to modernize their programmes for nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and the infrastructure required for their maintenance.

Governments of many of the non-nuclear weapons states, non-governmental organizations, and civil society are reaching the limit of their tolerance for the situation.

The failure to hold a conference on Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East, within the time-frame mandated in 2010 Action Plan, and ***unilaterally cancelled by the United States*** in support of Israel's reluctance to participate, is seen by Egypt as a flagrant breach of the 2010 Action Plan.

The Egyptian Delegation walked out of the 2013 NPT Preparatory Committee. His Excellency Ambassador Hisham Badr, though speaking only on Egypt's behalf - in two statements<sup>2</sup> –articulated the increasing dissatisfaction, and anger harboured by many non-nuclear weapons states because of the failure by the nuclear weapons states to act on their commitments made under the NPT. *“We cannot continue, he said, to attend meetings and agree on outcomes that do not get implemented, yet to be expected to abide by the concessions we gave for this outcome.”*<sup>3</sup>

For the most part, the increasing discontent is focused on the resistance of the nuclear weapons states to eliminating their weapons, and for their long-range plans for their retention. Though the weapons numbers have come down considerably since the end of the Cold War, the some 16,300 weapons that remain – many undergoing modernization for improved military capability - are still enough to destroy human life on the planet, and to subject the environment and any who survive to catastrophic consequences.

Concerns about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapon use are a legitimate focus in fulfilling the goals of the NPT and is part of language of the 2010 NPT Review Conference Outcome Document.<sup>4</sup>

Yet the NPT nuclear weapons states boycotted the two Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. And their recent negative votes - the first in April at the 2013 Prepcom; the second – though with China's abstention - at the UN General Assembly in October 12<sup>th</sup> of that year, demonstrate the resistance and a siege-like mentality on their part. This group, was proposed - with good intentions - and designated the P-5 by our colleague, Des Browne in 2008, as a “mutual confidence building” measure to

<sup>2</sup> the General Debate and Cluster II

<sup>3</sup> [www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-for-npt](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-for-npt) 2013/statements: Egypt, April 24 and 29/2013

<sup>4</sup> Article VI and eighth to twelfth preambular paragraphs, point 80,

resolve verification and transparency measures, and **appears** to have mutated into an opaque and cohesive bloc enforcing the status quo.<sup>5</sup>

The United Kingdom and France already cemented their relationship with an agreement for joint nuclear-testing. And the United States and the United Kingdom are in the process of renewing their 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement for new cooperative measures on nuclear warhead design and “exchange of material crucial in the manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.”<sup>6</sup> Both Agreements violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the NPT.<sup>7</sup>

The first Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear weapons, hosted by the Government of Norway and attended by 127 states, was criticized by the United Kingdom as abandonment of the Action Plan, as a diversion, an “alternate process” and as **divisive**<sup>8</sup>. Yet surely, it was an alternate process and divisive **only** because **of the refusal to participate** by the United Kingdom and other P-5 members!

At the NPT 2013 Prepcom, the five nuclear weapons states and some of the states under the US nuclear umbrella rejected a statement of deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, presented by the delegate from South Africa on behalf of eighty member states – 75% of the states participating in this Prepcom. Astonishingly, Japan – whose citizens continue to suffer from the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki – also refused to sign.<sup>9</sup>

Four of five nuclear weapons states (China abstained) were the **only** states to vote **against** the United Nations General Assembly October 2013, Resolution 67/56<sup>10</sup> The purpose of this Resolution was to form an Open-ended Working Group to “develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.”

France designated all of the above actions, as “parallel processes” referred to them as turning “away from concrete measures” and undermining the “Action Plan and the NPT review process.”<sup>11</sup> .

With all due respect to our host country, these statements are disingenuous! It is neither a *diversion*, nor a *parallel path*, but rather, supportive of Action 3, of the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

These activities on the Humanitarian Consequences and the Open-ended Working Group are all – to use the language of the Draft Recommendations to the 2015 NPT Review Conference – “fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons”<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Desmond Browne, “Laying the Foundations for Multilateral Disarmament”, speech to UN Geneva Conference on Disarmament, 5 February 2008

<sup>6</sup> “Exclusive: UK to step up collaboration with US over nuclear warheads” *The Guardian*, [www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/12/uk-us-mutual-defence](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/12/uk-us-mutual-defence)

<sup>7</sup> *Articles I and II* re technology transfer and *Article VI: Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.*

<sup>8</sup> [www.article36.org/nuclear-weapons/documents-suggest-uk-boycott](http://www.article36.org/nuclear-weapons/documents-suggest-uk-boycott). Documents suggest UK boycott of key nuclear weapons meeting was driven by P5 partners June 4, 2013

<sup>9</sup> Because the documents “stated that nuclear weapons should not be used under any circumstances. Ray Acheson, *A strategy for nuclear disarmament*, [www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-for a/npt/2013](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-for-a/npt/2013)

<sup>10</sup> *Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations.*

<sup>11</sup> [www.reachingcriticalwill.org](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org) M. Jean-Hugues Simon-Michel, Ambassador, Head of the French Delegation, Statement, Third Session of the Preparatory Committee *General Debate*, April 28<sup>th</sup>, 2013, *Cluster 1*. May 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2013

It is not my intention to mount an **unwarranted attack** on the P-5. Nevertheless, I **am** becoming concerned that their intransigence will **drive** the increasingly dissatisfied nuclear disarmament community, governments, NGOs and civil society to further weaken the NPT by **instituting a ban on nuclear weapons** similar to that of the landmines and cluster munitions.

These other indiscriminate weapons – landmines and cluster munitions - are peripheral weapons and the bans were successful in **encouraging** the cessation of manufacture, sale and also, **for some**, a moral inhibition, or prohibition on use. Non-signatories to the treaty, Myanmar and Syria, however, are still actively laying landmines – Syria with hundreds of thousands along its borders with Lebanon and Turkey.<sup>13</sup>

Nuclear weapons are not in the same category – they are central in the P-5 Defence policies - and for non-nuclear weapons states to ban them, cements them further into abiding by their commitment to forgo nuclear weapons while the five possessors of nuclear arsenals can remain non-signatories and ignore the ban.

I propose – as one outcome -that this conference places emphasis UN Secretary-General’s Five Point Plan, Point One for the Nuclear Weapons Convention or a Framework of Negotiated Agreements – the Global Zero Action Plan is a good start: and following the Conference, to promote this in order to support the ongoing viability of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

France justifies its nuclear arsenal and its policy of deterrence in the April 2013 Defence Ministry White Paper which states that France’s “employment of nuclear arms ... would only be conceivable in extreme circumstances of legitimate defence.”<sup>14</sup>

This language is closely tied to that of a paragraph in the 1996 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of Nuclear Weapons - “**the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.**”<sup>15</sup> - a paragraph which is actually **inconsistent** with the entirety of the Opinion.

Nevertheless, France and the other nuclear weapons states use this as their rationale for retention of nuclear weapons and in order to exemplify their compliance to International Law.

France’s contention, that is adhering to International Law, has been called into question by the Marshall Islands which, on April 24<sup>th</sup> of this year, filed nine lawsuits at the International Court of Justice against France and the eight other nuclear weapons states. The law suit contends that France is in **breach** of

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<sup>12</sup> NPT/CON.2015/PC.III/CRP.7.3/10

<sup>13</sup> <http://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/international-campaign-urges-no-use-antipersonnel-landmines-syria>

<sup>14</sup> Application Instituting Proceedings Against The French Republic by The Republic of the Marshall Islands, to the International Court of Justice, 24 April, 2014, Point #30. Original citing: The Main Thrust of the White Paper: Twelve Key Points and new orientations” *Ministere del la Defence*, 2013, p4. Summarizing “Live Blanc: Defense et Securite Nationale”, *Ministère de la Defense*, 29 April 2013, p.75, available at file:///Documents%20and%20Settings/palewis/My%20Documents/Downloads/LB-fiche%2012%20pt-UK.pdf

<sup>15</sup> “However, in view of the current state of international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”

Customary International Law, and in **breach** of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitment to “*pursue in good faith and to bring to conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, under strict and effective international control,*” as the International Court of Justice at the Hague confirmed in its Advisory Opinion dated 8 July 1996.<sup>16</sup>

I understand that France has no intention of using its nuclear weapons. In fact, their purpose from the beginning was to give France status of that equal to the other permanent members of United Nations Security Council. Their possession is more of a **deadly signifier of political power** than a weapon for military utility.

I understand also that France has no **current** intention of eliminating its nuclear weapons, nor is it prepared to enter multilateral negotiations for the reduction of all arsenals to zero. However, France is to be commended for its ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for the dismantlement of its fissile material production facilities.

France is, also, to be commended for its elimination of land-based weapons, and for its unilateral reduction of nuclear weapons from a high of 500 to its current 300.

Nevertheless, **possession** of these 300 deployed nuclear weapons poses grave dangers to humankind. The risks are high from nuclear accidents, from an accidental, malicious or mistaken launch; from hackers penetrating the command/control systems and the possibility of “spoofing” an attack that would set off an automated retaliatory response.

Even though France is reluctant to fulfill its NPT obligations to eliminate its nuclear weapons, the state can play a strong role in strengthening and furthering other aspects of the NPT.

It seems that France is exerting itself as a positive force in international relations, for example, in initiating a phone call to Mr. Putin and hosting the first meeting for Mr. Putin with a Western leader since Russia invaded the Ukraine and annexed Crimea. At the same time, President Francois Hollande, invited the President of the Ukraine, Mr. Poroshenko to France and hosted a meeting between him and Mr. Putin and is leading peace negotiations.

As well, President Francois Hollande has been a leading figure in expressing his outrage about Syria’s use of Chemical Weapons. France also submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council referring the situation in Syria to the International Criminal Court.

Surely - given the evidence from Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Marshall Islands<sup>17</sup> - the potential consequences of a nuclear detonation is a catastrophe of greater magnitude than the **admittedly horrific** crisis in Syria. Surely in calling for the criminal justice system to act for crime against humanity in Syria’s use of weapons of mass destruction **resonates** for **all** weapons of mass destruction – chemical, biological and nuclear.

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<sup>16</sup> International Court of Justice, Application instituting Proceedings Against The French Republic submitted on 24 April 2014 by The Republic of the Marshall Islands to The International Court of Justice

<sup>17</sup> See Appendix page 27, cut from text because of presentation length

So I raise the question in this regard - what else can France do? What steps can France take to protect and ensure the continuing viability of the NPT? How can France manifest its status as a global leader in furthering the complete elimination weapons of all mass destruction – chemical, biological and nuclear?

France proudly confirmed its signature on the Protocol to the Treaty of Semipalatinsk on the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in Central Asia; signed two parallel declarations with Mongolia on its nuclear-weapon-free status; and expressed its readiness “to sign the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty on the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South East Asia. It is also France’s objective that a Conference on the establishment of a Zone free of nuclear weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East be held at the earliest possible date.

Thus France, as **a champion of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones**, could consider taking the lead in Europe - building on its nuclear partnership with the United Kingdom - and together with the United Kingdom, call for a Conference on a European Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons.

The appropriate time for a call for such a conference would be when there is some assurance of a successful outcome of the Conference on a Weapons of Mass Destruction-free zone in the Middle East.

France is already most active – in fact appears to be taking a leading role - in the negotiations with Iran on Iran’s purported nuclear weapon aspirations, and is deeply committed to the creation of the Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

France could more actively engage in this process:  
In bi-lateral meetings:

- Encourage Egypt to sign and ratify the Chemical Weapons Treaty.
- Encourage Israel to sign and ratify the Biological Weapons Convention and Egypt, Syria and the United Arab Emirates to ratify this Treaty.
- Provide support and encouragement to Israel to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state and to eliminate its nuclear arsenal.

As well, France as a nuclear power - though not a member of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group - could **end its resistance** to the advocacy, on the part of the majority of NATO states, for the removal of NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons from Europe. France could support the Global Zero Plan to repatriate all tactical nuclear weapons in combat bases in Europe and on its borders to storage sites in their home countries.

Of course, because of the Crimea and Ukraine situation, this advocacy has, no doubt, been put on the back burner. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake for a renewal of Cold War nuclear gamesmanship on the part of NATO and Russia. This would jeopardize the NPT and the gains – slow and reluctant as they are – achieved under the NPT. Renewal of Cold War tensions may cause some states to reconsider their non-nuclear status. France, as an independent nuclear power, could take the lead to heal the breach between Russia and NATO.

Finally, the P-5’s UN Security Council veto power appears to have transmogrified into NPT veto power and wielded as a forceful instrument to obstruct any singular – unilateral - forward movement to zero nuclear weapons by P-5 members.

It is my understanding that the United Kingdom was considering participation in the Oslo meeting on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons; and both the United Kingdom and the United States considered participation in the Government of Mexico-hosted Nayarit Conference on the same subject, but consulted with its member-states of the P-5 **and were opposed**. France could at least refrain from its veto and support P-5 participation in the third conference hosted by the Government of Austria in early December.

Failure by France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China to fulfill their commitments and to escalate the reduction of their nuclear arsenals, bodes ill for the NPT.

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*Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wlje5jBh0cQ>*

*Jennifer Simons is the founder and the President of the Simons Foundation (Vancouver, Canada). She supports major international initiatives, by providing essential financial support, allowing international leaders to enter into dialogue and by stimulating University research. Her partnerships with other Non-Governmental Organizations, Academic Institutions, the Canadian Government, International Institutions and the United Nations have made her a major and efficient actor in the fight for peace and disarmament. She is equally one of the founding partners and the Canadian President of Global Zero. She received the Vancouver Citizens Peace Award in 2006. <http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca>*

# Alyn WARE

Several factors make the evolution towards a process of nuclear disarmament a necessity:

- Risk of use: the consecutive risks of international use, accidental or due to a calculation error of the nuclear weapon;
- Humanitarian consequences of any use
- Stimulus to proliferation: the possession of this weapon by certain states encourages others to possess it;
- Legal requirements and maintenance of law: the application of International Law, notably of International Humanitarian Law.

But, faced with this imperative, there are a few obstacles:

- Conflict between disarmament approaches: the divergences of opinion between partisans for actions of a quick and global nuclear disarmament, and those (principally the Nuclear Powers and their allies) who prescribe a longer process, “step by step”;
- Continuing reliance on nuclear deterrence and consecration of large budgets to this weapon;
- Political status given to nuclear powers which reinforce this stake of power;
- Vested interests: the industrial interests in armament.

Faced with the difficulty of putting a true process of nuclear disarmament in place, the UN’s General Assembly decided in October 2012 to create a new forum- a working group with unlimited composition- to discuss and develop different proposals with the goal of engaging multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

Three sessions happened in the year 2013, involving Civil Society, the states, International Experts and Parliamentarians. It was very positive that these sessions were organized based on experts, and not, as usual, in function of governmental representatives.

These discussions allowed new approaches to advance, that we regroup under the term of “building block” or brick. Among them we can quote the creation of a ban of use followed by an action of eliminating nuclear weapons. The idea of a Convention on Nuclear Weapons was raised explicitly. But it was recognized that the one-time negotiation of this Convention would be complicated, and that it would be better to negotiate it progressively. Finally, we reflected on the role of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. In the majority of the NWFZ, the states had put in place nuclear armament programs. Yet, today, all of these NWFZ show that they have been able to resolve their security problems without resorting to nuclear weapons, affirming that it is indeed possible to evolve towards a world without nuclear weapons.

This working group, based on a willingness to listen and to reflect, showed, with the support of the Allied Countries of NATO, that the steps to disarmament could be lead simultaneously. Thanks to New Zealand and Holland’s proposition, the specific security role that we attribute to nuclear weapons was examined in the goal of finding alternatives to these weapons. The five states equipped with Nuclear Weapons (NWS)

didn't want to participate in this working group. But we know that they followed the work very closely, thanks to states (Belarus and Russia for example) that informed them of the progress.

The OEWG adopted the conclusions that were presented at the General Assembly of the United Nations and at the Disarmament Conference. The UNGA must examine them to see how they can be reflected within the UN and to resume these workgroup meetings. It is very likely that following the 2015 Review Conference a decision will be made to pursue or not the work of the OEWG. It would be truly beneficial to see the NWS join this group's activity.

The Marshall Islands Affair could moreover spur the NWS to join the OEWG. The Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI) submitted a dispute before the International Court of Justice against nine Nuclear Weapon States. The RMI affirms that the Nuclear Weapon States have not respected their obligations concerning the pursuit and implementation of nuclear disarmament, affirming that their non-participation in this working group would be new evidence.

The network of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) – of which I am the global coordinator – includes 800 parliamentarians in more than 80 countries, including Nuclear Weapon States, Allied States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States. The members of the PNND include Heads of Government, Ministers, Leaders of important committees, and delegates of inter-parliamentary organizations. The work of the Parliamentarians is essential for advancing nuclear disarmament.

This work is notably achieved within the Inter-parliamentary Union which has voted on different resolutions these past years, and who argues in favour of a diminution of the role of Nuclear Weapons in the doctrines of the Nuclear Powers.

Other Parliamentary Assemblies such as that of NATO have accomplished surprising acts, for example sending a letter to President Obama asking him to decrease the American Nuclear Arsenal in Europe and more generally within NATO. Certain National Parliaments are also acting directly, such as the Japanese Parliament, who sent a protest letter to Obama, concerning the Nuclear Posture Review or again in conducting hearings with experts. The convergence between Parliamentarians is extremely important and positive for international diplomacy. Thus, Japanese and South-Korean Parliamentarians made a common declaration in 2011 on the denuclearization of North-East Asia, showing a will for common action, despite the weight of history between these two countries.

Parliamentarians are essential because they vote for laws. For example, that of Senator Ed Makey, which permits a greater transparency on Nuclear Budgets. Or in Norway the law on "Financial Divestment" was also voted so that pension funds would no longer be invested in the production of nuclear weapons. Parliamentarians thus represent civil society and it is therefore fundamental that this society can dialogue with its representatives.

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*Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ffXfRG945wU>*

*Alyn Ware, is a political scientist, expert in nuclear disarmament, peace educator and militant for Nuclear Abolition. He is the co-founder of numerous organizations and initiatives, such as Abolition 2000 Global Network to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons. He is also the International Director of Parliamentarians for*

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<http://www.baselpeaceoffice.org> or <http://www.pnnd.org>

## Ursula PLASSNIK

An Austrian tradition commits government members to meet, as often as possible, youth in their schools aged from 14 to 18. What struck me, in the personnel contact I had in that period where I had the responsibility of being the Foreign Affairs minister for Austria, is that, in all my discussions, the subject of nuclear armament and questions inherent to these weapons, like a good portion of the questions that were mentioned this morning, were often posed by this youth. I remember how it was sometimes difficult to give the answers, which couldn't be superficial, and also had to camouflage the cynicism and hypocrisy that exist on this subject.

Austria is a special country with regard to its attitude in relation to the nuclear and our French friends know it well! It is one of the great foundational differences that we have between our two countries. We are a country resolutely "non nuclear", the expression that I use consciously to avoid the expression "anti-nuclear". We have in our constitution, since 1999, a law that was accepted unanimously by the Austrian Parliament. This law put in place a total ban on production, storage, transport, trials and use of nuclear weapons as with the use of nuclear installations for civilian uses. We see there a fairly close connection between the civil aspect and military use of nuclear energy. We all know, that in the negotiations and discussions on the Iranian file, how it is complicated to establish a dividing line, between the use of this energy for civil purposes and for military purposes.

Austria conducts a foreign policy that is based on the principle of human security. We put at the centre of this policy, the human being, men, women, children and the consequences it can have on them. It is from this approach and beliefs that we organize in the month of December 2014 the next conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Outside this humanitarian approach and the policies of human security, it is necessary to understand that this policy falls within a larger approach in terms of weapons regulation and disarmament. We have also made contributions noted by the international community on what concerns antipersonnel mines and cluster munitions.

It is for all these reasons and in sight of the actual challenges that we have decided, since the beginning in 2013, to be part of this process of the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament; a process broached by the Oslo Conference and which was continued this year in Mexico. In this perspective, we invite you to come to this third Conference of Vienna, the 8th and 9th of December. Vienna is also the headquarters of several international institutions, which are important in the context of global cooperative security, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, the office of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but it has also, the headquarters of the Organisation for the Security and Cooperation in Europe. We have well seen lately, with the Ukrainian situation, all the importance of strengthening the non-proliferation system and the role of these agencies.

Furthermore, we address all these questions with the will to work in a close partnership between civil society, Parliament and Government. Moreover, I observe today the participation of a member of the Austrian civil society at this conference. I must admit, there have been hesitations at the start on this collaboration, I myself was not completely in favour, but I have learnt it and understood it through the Helenski process of OSCE. We find that this path is worthwhile. Certainly, it is not without difficulty, but it allows us to advance. Thus, I would like to thank Mr. Quilès, Mr. Collin and Mr. Norlain, for having

organized this conference within the National Assembly. This shows that it is possible to conduct such a debate within France, in an institution with civil society, which marks a visible progress to be able to enlarge everyone's opinions.

Finally, it is in this spirit that once again I renew my invitation for you to come to Vienna in December 2014, a conference that will not produce new divisions, because we are aware that there exists different strong approaches, but we are also ready to have patience in discussion and reflection, while at the same time making this dossier a priority.

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*Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-xi9FsBRat4>*

*Ursula Plassnik is the Austrian ambassador in France since 2011. A career diplomat, she has a vast experience of bilateral and multilateral affairs. From 1997-2004, she was the Director of the Wolfgang Schüssel cabinet, then Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice Chancellor, then Federal Chancellor. In 2004, she entered in politics as Minister of European and International Affairs of Austria and held this job until 2008. In 2008-2011 she sat in the Austrian Parliament as a Deputy of the ÖVP party (Austrian popular party). In parallel, she fights for women's rights as commissioned with the special mission as Austrian Minister of European and International Affairs. <http://www.bmeia.gv.at/fr/ambassade/paris.html>*

## Des BROWN

A large number of us who are working on this subject are former Ministers of Defence. If we examine the number of members of the European Leadership Network, that I created 4 years ago, you will see there is a significant group of people who have decided to act politically. Yes, Politics can be a force for good, but it can also lead to unfortunate decisions.

My own experience as Minister showed me that the positive developments were made when global leaders united and had the strength to make common decisions. And we know that it is this leadership that allowed the establishment of this peace during more than 50 years on the European Continent. We must build a leadership with political figures and citizens who will play important roles in the future.

I think that disarmament can be a way to strategically grow security. The observations that I have made on the French approach show me that France retains a very pragmatic approach, but that does not result in strategic decisions. This position is founded on the basis that we are not safer today than during the Cold War. However, we are in a world where there are less nuclear weapons, less or almost no chemical weapons, less cluster munitions, no more antipersonnel landmines, where biological weapons have been banned, and where finally a treaty bans the arms trade. Disarmament manifests itself in different ways, but there are positive effects on security.

We need to get away from the sterile perception of unilateral and multilateral disarmament. All the countries that have disarmed are countries that have done unilateral reductions. But even if decisions were made unilaterally, they necessarily have consequences on a multilateral level. In the United Kingdom, this is what we have done, just as in France. These decisions were criticized, while they had an echo on the multilateral level, and they reinforced all of our security.

We must assert that nuclear disarmament will allow us to live in a more secure world, and that it therefore increases our safety.

We know we will not abandon these weapons overnight. Thus, if we want to build a world free from nuclear weapons- and France has an important role to play- the only way to reach this is to follow the path open by Obama during his speech in Prague in April 2009, by adopting Kissinger's speech, which is to renounce our nuclear arsenal to ensure our own security.

A major undertaking was accomplished to reinforce the global disarmament initiatives, such as the initiative on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Admittedly, this created divisions, notably between the P5 (United States, Russia, France, China, United Kingdom) and globally with the entirety of the other states of the world. The first two conferences showed that there is a worldwide interest in disarmament. For this third conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons next December in Vienna, we must ensure that the United States is present. Because if Washington indicates its attendance, London will follow, as will Moscow, and finally Paris.

Nevertheless we must see that the future revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty only gives hope for a fragile advancement towards nuclear disarmament. The step-by-step approach of nuclear disarmament

requires the P5 states to be engaged, but this process is so slow that it is a non-event. We are going to enter into a process within which a crisis will prevail, it is the NPT crisis. Admittedly this treaty is not perfect, but we have it, and it has permitted us to curb proliferation, even if we have problems with certain states. We must remember that we are talking from the middle of the 1970s of more than 40 states susceptible of acquiring the nuclear weapon. We are arriving next May at the Review Conference of this Treaty, which will be very crucial.

When I spoke at the United Nations during the preparation conference of the NPT in 2008, we lived with this treaty, which mentioned a new step. I announced therefore a relationship between states with the nuclear weapon, and states that wished to defend disarmament. But since, the divisions have accelerated and the perspectives of supplementary negotiations are in complete decline. We have stepped back, and given the situation in the United States, President Obama could do nothing. The problem is that we risk entering into inertia. The states that want to go quickly towards disarmament could regret, once again, Russia's lack of will to go towards such a process.

We must address the issue of security in the Euro-Atlantic space. We must build a security that reflects the challenges of the 21st Century, and not continue to spend money on armament programs that no longer correspond to our reality. Security doesn't depend on Nuclear Weapon systems. It is essential that we know how to adapt to actual threats.

One of the ways we can advance is to make the debate public. We must break the culture of silence. The debate on nuclear weapons must not remain confidential. The example of the collision of the two SNLE in 2009, one British and the other French, showed to what point it is necessary to have information on the risks and dangers of Nuclear Weapons. Our desire to affirm our Nuclear Military capacities that we are ready to go through catastrophes, consequently neglecting our collective security.

Following this collision, we have thus learned that throughout the last decade, there have been 14 major nuclear accidents within the British Nuclear Forces, including a collision with an iceberg, a yacht, and also 250 fires which were reported as accidents. These systems, even in normal times, that is to say times outside periods of tension, are extremely dangerous.

We must therefore pursue this path of knowledge and disclosure of information. I challenge France to go in this direction, which would permit us to reach our final objective, to have greater security.

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*Watch the video of this speech (in French): <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7SU5N4QbWjo>*

*Des Browne, member of the British Labour Party, was a Deputy in the Chamber of Commons from 1997-2010, Presidential Cabinet Member with Tony Blair and Gordon Brown and Secretary of State for Scotland's Ministry of Defence in 2008. In March 2014, Des Browne was elected Vice-President of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. He is also the founder and member of the United Kingdom's Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and President of the Executive Council of the European Leadership Network (ELN).*

*<http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org>*

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The Pugwash movement and the abbreviated name of Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs was founded in 1957 by J. Rotblat and B. Russell at Pugwash (Canada), following the Russell-Einstein Manifesto in 1955. Pugwash obtained the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 for its efforts in nuclear disarmament. It conducts diplomatic informational missions by which it establishes dialogue and prevents the escalation of conflicts. Its principle projects are focused on the risks connected to Weapons of Mass Destruction and the implementation of their elimination. The Organization's work consists of holding conferences, seminars, putting inquiry groups in

place, offering counselling services, carrying out projects. The French association of the Pugwash Movement organizes regular meetings; Annick Suzor-Weiner is the President.

For More information: Web: [www.pugwash.org](http://www.pugwash.org) [www.pugwash.fr](http://www.pugwash.fr)  
Email: [pugwash@iol.it](mailto:pugwash@iol.it) [contact@pugwash.fr](mailto:contact@pugwash.fr)



The Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament network is an international non-partisan forum for legislators. This worldwide network (Australia, Germany, United States, Finland, France, Israel, Jordan, Japan, Kazakhstan, Norway, United-Kingdom, Pakistan...) unites more than 800 parliamentarians from more than 80 countries. The PNND was created to share perspectives and to develop collaborative initiatives with the goal to stop proliferation and to achieve nuclear disarmament.

The PNND network brings expertise, and works with interparliamentarian organizations (UIP, AP-OSCE,...) and gives the means to parliamentarians (through forums) to exchange and collaborate on national, regional and international actions. PNND France has 20 parliamentarians and has organized several conferences at Parliament and the United Nations. Its very active members have allowed the advancement of several subjects such as the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Arms. Its Parliamentarian newsletter, Disarmament and Non-Nuclear Proliferation takes a direct look at the legislative work in France and in the world, on this topic.

For more information: Web : [www.pnnd.org](http://www.pnnd.org) or [www.baselpeaceoffice.org](http://www.baselpeaceoffice.org)  
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Mayors for Peace was created in 1982 by the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with the goal of achieving sustainable world peace via cooperation between cities throughout the whole world in sensitizing public opinion to the necessity of abolishing nuclear weapons. They hold a special consulting status within the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) since 1991. Mayors for Peace benefits from international recognition. Today, it includes 6 084 cities from for than 151 countries (France: 147 members). Its objective is to educate the concrete realities of nuclear bombing, keeping in mind that nuclear weapons menace all the World's cities.

AFCDRP/Maires pour la Paix France is the French chapter of Mayors for Peace. They suggest local collectivities actively invest via events (Day of Peace), expositions (Bomb A and Humanity) or training for those elected locally entitled "Culture of Peace and Public Politics."

For more information: Web: [www.mayorsforpeace.org](http://www.mayorsforpeace.org) or [www.afcdrp.com](http://www.afcdrp.com)  
Email: The secretary of Mayors for Peace [mayorcon@pcf.city.hiroshima.jp](mailto:mayorcon@pcf.city.hiroshima.jp)  
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The Simons Foundation is a private foundation based in Vancouver, Canada, committed to advancing positive change through education in peace, disarmament, international law and human security.

Created in 1985 by Jennifer Simons, the foundation initiates and participates in major worldwide peace projects, convenes global leaders for high-level strategic and policy dialogues, and sponsors academic research through fellowships and chairs.

Jennifer Simons is a nuclear disarmament expert, thought leader, educator and policy advisor.

For More information: Web: [www.thesimonsfoundation.ca](http://www.thesimonsfoundation.ca)  
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### The Association's objectives

In Barack Obama's speech in Berlin, he made his will known to definitively turn the page on the Cold War, so that the world no longer lives with the fear of global annihilation. He called on Russia to pursue the Treaty's plans to reduce Strategic nuclear arsenal and to move towards the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons with its NATO allies.

As a result of this strong announcement, we cannot limit the weight of the global responsibility of nuclear disarmament solely to Russia and the United States. This is what France has done traditionally, by continuing to modernize its nuclear arsenal.

In this context, **Paul Quilès, Bernard Norlain and Jean-Marie Collin** decided to create the association "**Arrêtez la Bombe**" (ALB- Stop the Bomb) based on the title of their last work (Le Cherche-Midi Editions) with the objectives of:

- showing that Nuclear Weapons and the concept of deterrence are no longer relevant to the world's current challenges;
- denouncing misinformation surrounding the subject and to encourage the debates on this subject;
- acting for nuclear disarmament.

The association organizes debates, distributes information and publications on the themes of disarmament and non-nuclear proliferation in France and in the world.

Arrêtez La Bombe is a non-for profit organization (law of 1901) registered with Paris City Hall under the number W75122003

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