2018-2019
Graduate Research Awards
for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Global Affairs Canada
Lester B. Pearson Building
Ottawa, Canada
March 28, 2019

A joint project of:

The Simons Foundation

Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada

Executive Summary

The ***Graduate Research Awards for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation*** (GRA) programme was initiated in 2003 by Dr. Jennifer Allen Simons, President of The Simons Foundation Canada, in partnership with the International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (now Global Affairs Canada). The primary objective of the Awards is to enhance Canadian graduate level scholarship on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) issues.

Since its inception, the Graduate Research Awards programme has provided over $365,000.00 in scholarships to Canadian graduate students working on policy-relevant NACD issues and has helped to encourage a new generation of young Canadian scholars dedicated to further expanding their knowledge and expertise on these critical issues.

Originally, the programme offered three Doctoral Research Awards of $5,000.00 and four Master's Research Awards of $2,500.00 to support research, writing and fieldwork leading to the completion of a major research paper or dissertation proposal on an issue related to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.

In order to allow a greater number of students to participate, the GRA competition was later restructured to consist of a series of debates on timely issues. The eight students who made the strongest argument in support of their position, as determined by an expert review panel, were selected to receive a Graduate Research Award of $3,000.00 and required to defend their position in person at the GRA Debates held at the Department of Foreign Affairs headquarters in Ottawa.

The competition has since been revised to simplify the application process and increase the value of the cash awards. A total of four awards of CAD$5,000 are now available to Canadian Master's and/or Doctoral candidates to support the research and writing of an academic paper responding to a specific Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament (NACD) topic. The 2018-2019 Awards also included travel support to Ottawa where successful candidates presented their completed papers during the ***Global Affairs Canada 2019 Forum on Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, Disarmament and Space/Forum D'affaires Mondiales Canada 2019 Sur La Non-Prolifération, Le Contrôle Des Armements, Le Désarmement Et L'espace*** on March 28, 2019. This day-long event brought together civil society, academia, think tanks, and Government of Canada officials for an open exchange of views on current non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and space issues and initiatives. An awards ceremony was held for the GRA winners that evening where the keynote address was given by Dr. Jeffrey Lewis of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

This year, Master's and Doctoral candidates chose to address one of the following subjects:

1. The Secretary General has announced a new Agenda for Disarmament and its Implementation Plan. Will the Agenda and its Implementation Plan work? How should Canada engage with it?

2. Does attribution lead to accountability under international law? We encourage consideration of recent geopolitical events involving the use of prohibited weapons (chemical weapons), as well as ongoing discussions within the UN on the implications of increasing autonomy in military systems.

3. How can nuclear supplier states strike a balance between facilitating access by developing states to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology, while ensuring that nuclear embarking states uphold non-proliferation, safety and security obligations, especially those under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)?

4. What, in real terms, is the influence and impact of improving gender balance between men and women in broader disarmament discourse, debates, negotiations and other types of engagement? How would this apply in the field of nuclear disarmament?

We are pleased to congratulate the following 2018-2019 Graduate Research Award recipients who each received a cash award of CAD$5,000.00 from The Simons Foundation as well as travel support to Ottawa to participate in the *Global Affairs Canada 2019 Forum on Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, Disarmament and Space/Forum D'affaires Mondiales Canada 2019 Sur La Non-Prolifération, Le Contrôle Des Armements, Le Désarmement Et L'espace.*

- **Ramesh Balakrishnan**
  Ph.D., Political Science
  Carleton University
- **Emily Boytinck**
  Master of Public Administration, School of International and Public Affairs
  Columbia University
- **Nicholas Millot**
  Master's, Security and Defence Policy, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
  Carleton University
- **Louis-Philippe Morneau**
  Ph.D., Political Science
  Concordia University

We also wish to recognize Tristan G.Garcia, Senior Policy Officer (W.M.D and Nuclear NACD Policy) at Global Affairs Canada and Elaine Hynes of The Simons Foundation Canada for their work to coordinate and execute the programme this year.

The 2019-2020 Graduate Research Awards competition will be launched in fall 2019.

Recipients of the 2018-2019 Graduate Research Awards for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation with Jennifer Allen Simons, President of The Simons Foundation Canada, and Cindy Termorshuizen, Director General of the International Security Policy Bureau, Global Affairs Canada (photo credit: Global Affairs Canada)

Left to right: Louis-Philippe Morneau, Jennifer Allen Simons, Nicholas Millot, Ramesh Balakrishnan, Emily Boytinck, Cindy Termorshuizen

Disclaimer: The views and positions expressed in this report are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Simons Foundation or Global Affairs Canada. The report is in its original language.

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Reception – Cadieux Auditorium, Global Affairs Canada

March 28, 2019

Opening Remarks

CINDY TERMORSHUIZEN

Director General, International Security Policy Bureau

Global Affairs Canada

Good evening to all - representatives of the diplomatic community, members of civil society and industry, academia, experts, and colleagues from the Government of Canada.

I am also extremely pleased to see such an impressive turnout and expression of interest in these important issues by university students.

It is a real pleasure to welcome you to this award ceremony in honour of the recipients of the *2018-2019 Graduate Research Awards for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation*.

My name is Cindy Termorshuizen and I am the Director General of the International Security Policy Bureau here at Global Affairs Canada.

I'm thrilled to be sharing the stage with two experts on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament:

The first is Dr. Jennifer Simons, President and Founder of *The Simons Foundation Canada*.

Thanks to Dr. Simons' dedication and commitment to disarmament education, this evening we are celebrating the 16th year of the Graduate Research Awards.

Since 2003, the Graduate Research Awards programme has provided close to $350,000 in scholarships to Canadian graduate students, encouraging new generations of scholars to pursue research on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues.

I believe we also have with us tonight some former recipients. Could I have a show of hands? A special welcome to you.

Global Affairs Canada is proud to partner on this important endeavour with The Simons Foundation and I wish to extend our gratitude to the Foundation and Dr. Simons for their steadfast support.

And the second special guest joining us tonight is a well-known voice in the NACD field: Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, Director of the East Asia Non-proliferation Project at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, California. If you haven't yet read his fascinating and thought-provoking book, *The 2020 Commission Report on the North Korean Nuclear Attacks Against the United States* (a work of fiction, by the way), consider this a strong recommendation to do so!

Thank you to both for being with us.

I feel privileged to have the opportunity to hear from these eminent experts who, through their life's work, continue to influence and encourage the next generations of thinkers and activists.

We hope tonight to make even a modest contribution to the same goal.

There is much to be learned from examining the hard-won achievements made throughout the past few decades in non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament when it comes to dealing with the varied and complex challenges we are facing today.

I am thinking of the 1970s with, of course, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which will celebrate its 50th anniversary in 2020.

It is the only multilateral treaty that forces the nuclear-weapon States to pursue the goal of eliminating their nuclear arsenals.

The adoption of this treaty was possible thanks to collaboration between the United States and Russia. This demonstrates the importance of having constructive dialogues, which unfortunately are less present nowadays.

We must also not forget the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, which is the first multilateral disarmament treaty to ban an entire category of weapons.

In the 80s, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty opened for signature. Although not yet in force, the CTBT has succeeded in establishing a nuclear test detection system around the world.

In 1987, the then-Soviet Union and the US entered into the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty. By requiring the destruction of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5, 500 kilometers, their launchers and associated support structures and equipment, the INF was the first treaty to completely ban a whole class of nuclear and conventional weapons.

In the 1990s, the international community negotiated the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Since its entry into force in 1997, 96.80% of the world's declared stockpiles of chemical weapons have been eliminated.

I am, of course, very proud to mention the Ottawa Treaty on Landmines, which celebrated its 25th anniversary in 2017.

This Treaty is a prime example of the important role of non-governmental organizations and civil society on disarmament and security issues. They have contributed greatly to the establishment of this Treaty.

These examples show that, despite enormous security challenges and global tensions, successive generations have made advancements in disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.

These examples give us some hope that incremental progress can be made at a time when we, too, are facing enormous challenges:

North Korea is the only country to have tested nuclear weapons in this century. Its persistence seeking to develop its program of nuclear weapons and missiles continues to be of great concern.

The US and Russia have suspended their obligations under the INF Treaty, with serious implications for the security of Europe.

The Conference on Disarmament's inability to agree to a programme of work since 1998 has delayed the commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, despite over two decades of efforts by Canada and its allies.

Destabilizing technologies, such as lethal autonomous weapon systems, hypersonic weapon systems, and misuse of cyber instruments are reshaping the way we conceive threats.

In addition, we observe a decline of regular and honest dialogues between States on core security issues.

In the face of such challenges, Canada, which believes that non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament are critical to national and global security, will continue to build bridges and coalitions to facilitate progress in these areas.

This includes playing a leadership role in ensuring greater diversity and inclusivity in all aspects of non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

During the First Committee of the United Nations last fall, Canada achieved real success in advocating for the inclusion of gender considerations in several resolutions, more than ever before.

I am pleased to see three Canadian ambassadors occupying key positions on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.

Ambassador Rosemary McCarney in Geneva is Permanent Representative to the Office of the United Nations and to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament.

Ambassador Heidi Hulan in Vienna is Permanent Representative to International Organizations based in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency; and

Ambassador Sabine Nölke at The Hague is Permanent Representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Having Canadian representatives of this caliber is certainly a step in the right direction, but not an end in itself for gender issues.

We must continue to work tirelessly so that women are equitably represented at each level.

Canada is also a significant contributor to international efforts related to non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament issues.

Thanks to Global Affairs Canada's Weapons of Threat Reduction Program, Canada has contributed over $1.3B in funds to support efforts to constrain North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, destroy Russia's declared chemical weapons arsenal, and respond to infectious diseases in West Africa and Southeast Asia.

Last June, Canada participated in building the required coalition of countries to allow the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to positively identify those responsible for chemical attacks in Syria and in other incidents around the world.

This is an important step in the pursuit of justice for the victims of those terrible attacks.

We are also working with allies to amend, for the first time, the list of banned chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

These are just a few examples where Canada has demonstrated its qualifications as a convener that seeks to build coalitions to achieve tangible and concrete results.

Canada is actively seeking a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council in 2021-2022.

This is another opportunity for Canadians to think about what Canada can bring to the international scene to promote values of inclusivity, engagement and respect for the international rules-based order.

In the face of greater polarization and increased willingness to walk away from international norms and obligations, Canada will stand with its allies to defend the rules-based international order and to demonstrate to skeptics, in the words of Minister Freeland, that "the benefits of the rules-based system far outweigh the alternative – a world of zero sum calculations and beggar-thy-neighbour policies, a world where might makes right.

It is not a small task to show that only by working together will we be able to find solutions to the problems of today and tomorrow.

Every person in this room has a role to play in meeting these challenges.

There are numerous experts here who, as part of their life's work, continue to make meaningful contributions to advancing non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament.

I urge you to keep engaging with those of us in government to ensure that Canada's voice on these issues remains strong and relevant during these challenging times.

I also urge you to share your experiences and perspectives with new generations.

To those who are only just beginning to develop your interest in these fields, I urge you to get involved, to learn from the past with an open mind, and to apply bold and creative thinking for the future.

And to Dr. Simons who has been a tireless advocate for non-proliferation and disarmament.

Thank you for your continued partnership with us in empowering the voices of new generations in these fields.

The presence of so many students in the room shows that there is indeed an interest among the new generation in these international security issues, which makes me optimistic for the future.

Thank all of you for taking the time to join us this evening.

Opening Remarks

JENNIFER ALLEN SIMONS, C.M., PH.D., LL.D.
Founder and President
The Simons Foundation Canada

Thank you, Cindy,

Good Evening Ladies and Gentlemen,

Welcome to Canada, Jeffrey!

It is a pleasure to be here participating in the Award ceremony for this year's Graduate Research Scholars in Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, a programme in which the Department of Global Affairs and The Simons Foundation have partnered for fifteen years (2004).

We are very pleased with this programme – with this endeavour to further disarmament education and build a community of disarmament scholars.

I would like to thank Tristan Garcia of the Department of Global Affairs, and Elaine Hynes, from The Simons Foundation, for their excellent organization and management of the programme.

There are few initiatives in schools and universities dedicated to research and education in disarmament education. Yet, on a daily basis we are faced with gun violence in our communities. We are threatened by emerging technological weaponry. Chemical weapons are still in use despite a decades old global ban. And we live in fear of a nuclear Armageddon by accident, miscalculation or deliberate attack.

This programme is a contribution to essential education, to inform and to encourage legislation to counter the weapons trade, to inhibit arms racing; and it is an endeavour to replace policies and practices of threat, of war and violence with diplomacy, multilateralism, peace-building, peace-making and global cooperation.

I hope that the many students who have participated in the programme since 2004 have continued, and will continue, to focus on these issues and pursue careers in academia, in the Foreign Service, in politics, or the NGO sphere in civil society; in order to build a safer, more secure world.

I am pleased that we have returned to the original concept in which the Awardees present their papers during the Global Affairs Consultations with Civil Society – to this highly knowledgeable group - who in their turn, share their expertize, and as well, learn where the young people - whose future with which we are engaged in these discussions - are headed.

The Graduate Research Scholarship programme was in its initial stages in 2002 - in an era when the promise of global peace was high. With the end of the Cold War and with new Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty commitments - particularly the commitment to the thirteen Practical Steps to Disarmament in Article VI - we believed that the world was moving towards the total elimination of nuclear and other

weapons of mass destruction; and that international legal mechanisms would be in place to ensure their elimination for all time. We believed in the spread of democracy, of increasing multilateralism, in international law, in fulfilment of treaty obligations and global cooperation - all heralding a peaceful future.

Yet, here we are seventeen years later, in a crisis situation with potentially the most dire consequences for humanity. We are now facing a "deteriorating international security environment"[1] with attacks on multilateralism and on international institutions; with the growth of authoritarianism, of new strident nationalism, and the potential demise of democracy; with toxic relations between Russia and the US; with unacceptable and growing nuclear risks; the potential disintegration of the arms control treaty process; with a new arms racing more dangerous because of the increasingly blurred line between nuclear and conventional weapons; ambiguity created by dual-use missiles; and emerging military weapon-related technologies and cyber-capabilities.

The situation is "potentially more dangerous than at any point during the Cold War"[2] during which the Soviet Union and the United States– despite their policy of Mutually Assured Destruction - were intent on maintaining and ensuring strategic stability.

The Award Recipients – Ramesh Balakrishnam, Emily Boytinck, Nicholas Millot and Louis-Philippe Morneau presented their research at today's Forum on some of the most critical issues impeding progress to a safe secure world and contributed proposals to ameliorate this situation.

For those of you who did not participate in today's Forum: Louis-Philippe Morneau and Ramesh Balakrishnam address nuclear dangers, one of the most critical issues facing humanity today. Louis-Philippe Morneau's research deals with the risks associated with dual-use nuclear technology – available to non-nuclear weapons NPT signatories under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty - and controlled and monitored by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. He highlights the hazards posed by the NPT's lack of universality which limits the ability to monitor and control access to this dual-use technology; and is concerned that the push for non-NPT signatory India's admission to the NSG opens the door to other non-NPT states, also uncommitted to the obligations of the NPT, thus in a position to obtain, and potentially misuse, the technology.

Another risk he identifies is the danger posed by emerging technologies – such as the 3D printer – not constrained under the NPT. These hazards highlight "the limits of the current NPT and Nuclear Supplier's Group Structure" and need to be addressed.

Ramesh Balakrishnam concerns himself with the tripartite fragmentation of the nuclear disarmament agenda, and analyses the UN Secretary-General's Agenda for Disarmament. He proposes nine steps in which Canada could engage in order to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and further the UN disarmament agenda.

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[1] Randy Rydell, quoting Guterres, *The Guterres Disarmament Agenda, Arms Control Today, Vol. 49, p20*

[2] Wolfgang Ishinger, *Epochal breaks", The Security Times,* February 2019

Nicholas Millot's research focuses on Chemical Weapons Treaty violations by Russia, Syria, North Korea and ISIS. Russia and Syria are signatories to the Treaty yet, despite the Treaty's entry into force two decades ago, the international community has failed to respond to the violations. He is rightly concerned that this failure "risks normalizing the future use of chemical weapons."

Emily Boytinck addresses the issue of women in disarmament and confirms that though women have been in forefront of disarmament as activists - rejecting weapons of mass destruction - they have not played a large part in disarmament negotiations. She learned from her research that when women have participated in multilateral disarmament work, the negotiations have been more effective.

My own experience as a participant in the Women Political Leaders Global Forums in Reykjavik is that women leaders are primarily engaged in picking up the pieces, dealing with the aftermath of wars, of violence. They lead in ameliorating the conditions - lead in peace-making and healing. Women, have not been in the halls of power with the ability to make the decisions on whether or not to develop weapons, to use weapons, to go to war. And to date, they are still not in positions to prevent these negative outcomes.

The new global imperative on improving gender balance will slowly change the current situation as women, with ethical principles and practices, and concern for humanity, will at some point transform the political landscape in order to make a better world. And hopefully, we will have stateswomen/statesmen governing our countries. We are fortunate in Canada to have two such fine women in Parliament, Jody Wilson-Raybould and Dr. Jane Philpott who epitomize these values. So we continue our quest for a more humane, just and peaceful world.

The current challenge we face is to create the conditions conducive to a return to diplomacy, dialogue, and particularly a return to disarmament negotiations, in order to reduce, and eliminate, the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and to further peace and global cooperation.

And these students contributions to the Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agenda provide me with confidence that our work to rid the world of these massively destructive weapons will be carried on until one day – in the not too distant future - we will see the end, for all time, of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.

Congratulations to you and my very best wishes for your future!

Global Affairs Canada 2019 Forum on Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, Disarmament and Space

Robertson Room, Global Affairs Canada
March 28, 2019

The 2019 Global Affairs Canada Forum on Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, Disarmament and Space held in Ottawa on March 28, 2019, brought together civil society, academia, think tanks, and Government of Canada officials for an open exchange of views on current non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament and space issues and initiatives.

The Forum included the following presentations made by the winners of the ***2018-2019 Graduate Research Awards for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation***, a joint initiative of Global Affairs Canada and The Simons Foundation Canada.

2019 Global Affairs Canada Forum on Non-Proliferation, Arms Control, Disarmament and Space



Ramesh Balakrishnan; Sébastien Carrière. Director, Non-Proliferation, Disarmament and Space Issues, GAC; Louis-Philippe Morneau



Emily Boytinck; Jennifer Allen Simons, President, The Simons Foundation; Cindy Termorshuizen, Director General, International Security Policy, GAC



Nicholas Millot

Graduate Research Award Presentation 1

Topic: ***The UN Secretary-General has announced a new Agenda for Disarmament and its Implementation Plan. Will the Agenda and its Implementation Plan work? How should Canada engage with it?***

RAMESH BALAKRISHNAN
Ph.D., Political Science
Carleton University

Ramesh Balakrishnan *is a Graduate Student and Teaching Assistant in the Department of Political Science at Carleton University. His research interests span several topics within the field of IR/Strategic Studies - Nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, cyber and nuclear command and control, military innovation, global missile nonproliferation and the military ethics of AI and robotics. He holds a MSc (Strategic Studies) from the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore and a MRes (Contemporary India) from King's College London (KCL). He was the Baillie Gifford Fellow at the India Institute, King's College London (2014-15) and the Lee Foundation Scholar at RSIS, NTU (2016-17). He worked as a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), New Delhi, India's leading foreign policy think tank and a Junior Fellow at the NATO Association of Canada. In a previous career, he worked for several years in the communications service provider and software industry in the U.S. and Canada.*

UN'S NEW GLOBAL AGENDA FOR DISARMAMENT

In May 2018, the UN Secretary General announced a new global Agenda for Disarmament and implementation plan (UN, 2018c). The plan includes three main priority areas for disarmament action: Eliminating weapons of mass destruction (WMD) including chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, conventional weapons such as small arms, improvised explosive devices, light weapons and land mines and new emerging weapon technologies such as cyber and AI based autonomous weapon systems. Although the UN agenda discusses a comprehensive and wide-ranging plan for the total elimination of all forms of weapon systems that impact human security, this paper focuses specifically on the UN plan related to nuclear disarmament.

The UN agenda identifies several objectives with respect to nuclear disarmament: First, it calls for resuming dialogue among member states for nuclear arms control and disarmament. Second, it urges nuclear weapon states to ensure their non-use, a reduction in the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines and their operational readiness, states to refrain from developing new advanced nuclear weapons and be more transparent about their nuclear weapon programmes. Third, the UN also advises member states to hold expert level discussions in both informal and formal settings to generate new ideas and facilitate dialogue between states to return to a 'common vision and path' leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Fourth, it calls for extending the norms against use and testing of nuclear weapons and their proliferation, and finally, for preparing for a world free of nuclear weapons through the step-by-step approach and other individual steps towards disarmament. The implementation plan calls for reinvigorating UN disarmament institutions such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Disarmament Commission, the Advisory board on Disarmament and the UN Institute for Disarmament

Research (UNIDR), better coordination between the different institutions to clarify their roles and the increased participation of developing countries, regional organizations, the younger generation, women, civil society and the private sector on addressing disarmament issues (UN, 2018b).

The Emerging Global Nuclear Order

Nuclear Disarmament is one of the most vexing problems confronting international security. For more than five decades, the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament has been the Nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) and the obligations of nuclear weapon states that are explicitly specified in the treaty. As part of the grand bargain, Article 6 of the NPT affirms that nuclear weapons states that are recognized under the NPT will negotiate in 'good faith' to eliminate nuclear weapons and uphold their obligation towards nuclear disarmament and in return, non-nuclear weapon states will desist from building nuclear weapons of their own and pursue civilian nuclear energy through IAEA administered safeguard agreements (UN, 2010). Although the NPT has succeeded in limiting nuclear proliferation over the past five decades, its record on nuclear disarmament has been dismal.

The global nuclear order is fragmenting on the basis of three main groups – the **'humanitarian group'**, which is the so called 'moral majority' of nuclear non-weapon states. The group includes non-nuclear weapon states (non-NATO members) who have signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and who seek the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. In July 2017, the UN adopted the TPNW, a treaty that was largely supported by these states (UN, 2017). A total of 122 countries supported the treaty which would come into force after it is ratified by 50 states. Nine states that possess nuclear weapons (the P5, India, Pakistan, Israel, N. Korea), NATO (except for Netherlands which participated in the negotiations, but voted against the treaty) and Singapore (which participated but abstained from voting) were not a party to the negotiations. The treaty fills a critical 'legal gap' in the international nuclear order (Meyer, 2017). The problem with the treaty however is that it has left individual nuclear states to take voluntary action by designating their own international authority to move towards disarmament. States are given a few options for disarmament – either 'destroy and join' or 'join and destroy'. The ban treaty is both a 'prohibition and elimination' treaty and a 'framework agreement' which would require 'supplementary agreements to specify verification and other procedures' (Meyer & Sauer, 2018).

The second group is the **'step-by-step group'** which comprises of non-nuclear 'nuclear umbrella' states that belong to NATO, Canada, Australia, Japan and S. Korea. It also calls for the elimination of nuclear weapons, but through a step-by-step process that involves a ban on weapon tests, reduction in fissile material production and the adoption of robust verification mechanisms for eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. Canada's main objection to the ban treaty is that it is too premature and it would be ineffective without the ratification of the nuclear weapon states and it provides no effective pathway for monitoring and verification to ensure disarmament (GAC, 2017).

The final group are the **'nuclear enthusiasts'** of current NPT recognized nuclear weapon states, states such as India, Pakistan, North Korea and Israel that are not a party to the NPT, who pay 'lip service' to nuclear disarmament and endorse the 'realist' paradigm of nuclear deterrence as the ultimate guarantor of preventing a nuclear war between major powers.

This fragmentation is not a positive development for the future of the global nuclear order since these camps will eventually end up working at cross purposes and undermining existing treaties like the NPT.

Will the UN agenda and plan work?

Instead of making steady progress towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the world may be backsliding towards a renewal of cold-war style nuclear arms racing. The situation today is a far cry from almost a decade ago when the so called 'four horsemen' called for a world free of nuclear weapons

(Ogilvie-White & Santoro, 2012). There are several disturbing trends with regard to global nuclear and missile developments that are a cause for concern. Among them are the renewal of the nuclear rivalry between the U.S. and Russia, North Korea's reckless nuclear tests, the slow but steady nuclear build up in South Asia involving India and Pakistan and the growing confrontation between the U.S. and China. There is a lot of confusion that surrounds the future direction of arms control agreements such as the New START treaty which expires in 2021 and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) which are coming under increasing strain. The introduction of new missile and missile defence technologies such as hypersonic missiles, anti-satellite weapons and Ballistic missile defence and emerging technologies such as cyber and AI inject new uncertainty into states' calculations about strategic stability.

In such a gloomy environment, the UN agenda on nuclear disarmament is a breath a fresh air which seeks to instill renewed momentum for dialogue on nuclear disarmament in a bleak global security scenario. The UN Agenda is quite comprehensive and far reaching in its ambition for the world to gradually move towards nuclear disarmament. However, it lacks specific actions plans and time tables for accelerating the agenda. By sponsoring a parallel treaty initiative in the form of the TPNW, the UN hopes that weapon states would be subject to moral pressure and hence would voluntarily dismantle their nuclear warheads at some point in the future. However, the biggest contribution of this new agenda is to initiate more dialogue and provide adequate intellectual ballast for the nuclear weapon states to revive the stalled negotiations in the CD and make incremental progress towards ratifying the CTBT and concluding the FMCT.

Can Canada engage with the agenda and its implementation?

Canada should fully embrace the UN agenda on nuclear disarmament and endorse it at the highest levels. In many ways, the UN agenda dovetails well with Canada's many nuclear disarmament initiatives at the bilateral and multilateral levels. For example, Canada has clearly articulated the steps it has taken to realize the Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone through its involvement in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran and its funding to strengthen nuclear detection and physical protection/cybersecurity of nuclear facilities in countries like Jordan and Egypt respectively (UN, 2018a). Canada is chairing a working group on the development of a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) to curb the stockpiling of nuclear material and their conversion into weapons. It includes all five nuclear NPT states, India and 19 other non-nuclear weapon states (GAC, 2018). Canada is also rebuilding support for the signing and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by encouraging the Annex 2 CTBT hold out states to sign and ratify the treaty.

However, Canada's long-held policy of a 'step-by-step' approach to nuclear disarmament has come under increased scrutiny in the wake of the signing of the TPNW. Canada has a nuclear identity problem that stems from its self image of a country that relies on the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a steadfast ally of the United States since the second world war (Buford, 2016). Second, Canada's commitment to the NATO alliance is another compelling reason for it to uphold NATO's approach towards nuclear weapons which is predicated on nuclear deterrence. Thirdly, Canada's 'step-by-step' approach upholds a fundamental belief that it is impossible to eliminate nuclear weapons without the involvement of the P5 states and the other non-NPT nuclear weapon states in any future negotiations, whether it be the CTBT, FMCT or in developing effective monitoring and verification mechanisms.

Canada's position on nuclear disarmament

Canada's nuclear disarmament policy which is steeped in the so called 'step-by-step' approach to nuclear disarmament has not changed in many decades of disarmament advocacy at the UN. Critiques have argued that it has not yielded the results that were originally envisaged when Canada first adopted such an approach. Canada's approach rests on making progress on FMCT negotiations and bring into force the

CTBT and its continued reliance on the NPT as the torch bearer of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Some leading scholars of nuclear disarmament have criticized Canada's current approach to nuclear disarmament and have suggested a course correction that would lead to Canada signing the TPNW (Meyer & Thakur, 2017). Their main criticism of Canada's current approach to nuclear disarmament stems from the fact that negotiations on banning nuclear tests and curbing fissile material production have been stalled at the CD and the process is currently frozen. Moreover, it also allows nuclear states to dictate the pace of disarmament (Ramana & Borja, 2017). Since the CD works on a consensus, even a single nuclear weapon state could hold back 'good faith' negotiations. States like Pakistan want existing nuclear fissile material stock pile to be accounted for in future FMCT negotiations while the P5 have balked at such concessions. Nevertheless, Canada should continue to play a leading role in the pursuit of global nuclear disarmament under the auspices of the new UN agenda.

Below are some concrete steps that Canada should pursue in embracing the UN agenda.

1. As Canada's former disarmament ambassadors have argued, Canada needs to play the role of a 'bridge builder' between the two rival camps of 'humanitarians' and 'nuclear deterrence enthusiasts' (Roche, 2016). This will ensure that Canada gains enough credibility in executing its plans while shepherding its nuclear disarmament policy at the UN.

2. Canada should not shy away from initiating a dialogue with NATO members to make a fresh push for nuclear disarmament. NATO's unrelenting dependence on nuclear weapons and their deterrent power will remain a major obstacle to advancing the UN agenda on nuclear disarmament. In fact, the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence has made the so called 'Recommendation 21' in a report for initiating a dialogue with NATO (Commons, 2017). NATO's doctrine of nuclear weapons that serves the purpose of being the 'supreme guarantee of the security of allies' is no longer tenable (West, 2018).

3. The UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) has remained dormant for more than twenty years. After ensuring that the expert working groups it has sponsored have made enough progress, Canada should work with other member states to reinvigorate the moribund institution and work towards rebuilding the platform for renewed dialogue on the FMCT.

4. Canada should use its 2019 bid for UNSC membership in 2021 to bring its nuclear disarmament diplomacy to the forefront of its diplomatic engagements at the UN.

5. Canadian NGOs who work on nuclear disarmament including the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (CNANW, 2016), Canadians for a Nuclear Weapons Convention (CNWC) and Project Ploughshares should engage in more vigorous public diplomacy, coordinate lobbying efforts in Parliament and mobilize public opinion to advance the cause of nuclear disarmament.
6. Canada should further step up its current role in contributing to the U.S. led International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), a group of 25 states that was constituted to study the prospects for effective multilateral monitoring and verification mechanisms to dismantle nuclear warheads.

7. Canada should also refrain from providing too much oxygen to the latest U.S. position on nuclear disarmament which calls for assessing the current state of global security by addressing the 'negative factors in the security environment' through a multilateral dialogue process christened 'Conditions for Nuclear Disarmament (CCND)' and the establishment of a 'creating conditions working group' (Ford, 2018). The new U.S. nuclear disarmament strategy is a 'red herring' that is designed to run out the clock and disrupt the current momentum generated by the TPNW towards nuclear disarmament. As two leading disarmament scholars have argued, the

current discord between Canada and the U.S. might be a new opening for a break from the past and a step ahead (Ramana & Faye, 2018).

8. In the medium term, Canada should be prepared to revert to Pierre Trudeau's so called 'strategy of suffocation' of the late 1970s when Canada aimed to curb the nuclear arms racing between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union(Faye, Ghumman, Shashdevletov, & Shum, 2018). In short, the time is ripe for Canada to once again don its leadership mantle on nuclear disarmament, a role that has lost some sheen in recent years.

9. Canada should also closely study the TPNW and continue to engage with its proponents although it may be impractical for Canada to wholeheartedly embrace it, given its distinct nuclear identity as a western ally.

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Sujet : ***Le secrétaire général a annoncé un nouveau programme en matière de désarmement et le plan de mise en œuvre qui s'y rattache. Le programme et son plan de mise en œuvre seront-ils efficaces? Comment le Canada devrait-il y participer?***

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NOUVEAU PROGRAMME MONDIAL DE L'ONU POUR LE DÉSARMEMENT

En mai 2018, le secrétaire général de l'ONU a annoncé la mise sur pied d'un nouveau programme mondial pour le désarmement et un plan de mise en œuvre connexe (ONU, 2018c). Le plan comprend trois grands secteurs prioritaires pour les mesures liées au désarmement : éliminer les armes de destruction massive (ADM) dont les armes chimiques, biologiques et nucléaires, les armes conventionnelles comme les armes de petit calibre, les engins explosifs improvisés, les armes légères et les mines terrestres, et les nouvelles technologies en matière d'armes comme les systèmes d'armes autonomes fondés sur l'informatique et l'intelligence artificielle. Bien que le programme de l'ONU fasse état d'un plan vaste et global pour éliminer complètement tous les systèmes d'armes qui compromettent la sécurité des gens, le présent article porte précisément sur le plan de l'ONU ayant trait au désarmement nucléaire.

Le programme de l'ONU cerne plusieurs objectifs liés au désarmement nucléaire. Il demande d'abord aux États membres de reprendre le dialogue au sujet du contrôle des armements et du désarmement nucléaire. Ensuite, il exhorte les États possédant des armes nucléaires à s'assurer que ces armes ne sont pas utilisées, à réduire le rôle des armes nucléaires dans les doctrines militaires et la préparation opérationnelle, à s'abstenir de développer de nouvelles armes nucléaires sophistiquées et à faire preuve d'une plus grande transparence concernant leurs programmes d'armes nucléaires. Troisièmement, l'ONU conseille aux États membres de tenir des discussions spécialisées dans des contextes formels et informels pour générer de nouvelles idées et faciliter le dialogue entre les États afin de revenir à une « vision et une direction communes » visant à paver la voie à une élimination totale des armes nucléaires. Quatrièmement, il préconise l'élargissement des normes contre l'utilisation et la mise à l'essai d'armes nucléaires et leur prolifération, et finalement, il demande que les États membres se préparent à un monde exempt d'armes nucléaires en s'appuyant sur une approche progressive et d'autres mesures individuelles en vue du désarmement. Le plan de mise en œuvre vise aussi à redonner un nouvel élan à des institutions de l'ONU vouées au désarmement, comme la Conférence sur le désarmement (CD), la Commission pour le désarmement, le Conseil consultatif pour le désarmement et l'Institut des Nations Unies pour la recherche sur le désarmement, à assurer une meilleure coordination entre les différentes institutions pour clarifier les rôles et à accroître la participation des pays en développement, des organisations régionales, de la plus jeune génération, des femmes, de la société civile et du secteur privé pour s'attaquer aux questions de désarmement (ONU, 2018b).

Le nouvel ordre nucléaire mondial

Le désarmement nucléaire est l'un des problèmes les plus complexes auxquels se heurte la sécurité internationale. Pendant plus de cinq décennies, le Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP) et les obligations des États possédant des armes nucléaires décrites dans le Traité ont été la pierre angulaire du désarmement. Ayant fait partie de la grande négociation, l'article 6 du TNP stipule que les États dotés d'armes nucléaires et signataires du Traité poursuivront « de bonne foi » des négociations pour éliminer les armes nucléaires et respecter leurs obligations relatives au désarmement nucléaire et, en contrepartie, les États n'ayant pas d'armes nucléaires s'abstiendront de se doter d'armes nucléaires et obtiendront de l'énergie nucléaire civile au moyen d'accords de garanties administrés par l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (ONU, 2010). Bien que le TNP ait réussi à limiter la prolifération nucléaire au cours des cinq dernières décennies, ses résultats au chapitre du désarmement nucléaire ont été lamentables.

L'ordre nucléaire mondial est fragmenté en trois programmes parallèles exécutés par des camps rivaux. Le premier, le **« camp humanitaire »**, réunit la soi-disant « majorité morale » des États n'ayant pas d'armes nucléaires (le groupe comprend tous les États ne possédant pas d'armes nucléaires et qui ne font pas partie de l'OTAN) qui ont signé le Traité sur l'interdiction des armes nucléaires (TIAN) et qui visent à éliminer totalement toutes les armes nucléaires. En juillet 2017, l'ONU a adopté le TIAN, un traité jouissant d'un vaste soutien par ces États (ONU, 2017). En tout, 122 pays ont appuyé le traité qui devait entrer en vigueur après sa ratification par 50 États. Neuf États possédant des armes nucléaires (P5, Inde, Pakistan, Israël et Corée du Nord), l'OTAN (à l'exception des Pays-Bas qui ont participé aux négociations, mais qui ont voté contre le traité) et Singapour (qui a participé, mais qui s'est abstenu de voter) n'ont pas pris part aux négociations. Le Traité vient combler une grave « lacune sur le plan juridique » dans l'ordre nucléaire international (Meyer, 2017). Cependant, le Traité confie aux États possédant des armes nucléaires la responsabilité de prendre volontairement des mesures en employant leur propre autorité internationale pour agir en vue du désarmement. Les États ont peu de choix pour ce qui est du désarmement; ils peuvent soit « détruire et se joindre » ou « se joindre et détruire ». Le traité d'interdiction est un traité à la fois d'« interdiction et d'élimination » et une « entente-cadre » qui exige des « accords supplémentaires pour préciser les processus de vérification et autres » (Meyer et Sauer, 2018).

Le deuxième groupe est le « **camp étape par étape »,** qui réunit les États non dotés d'armes nucléaires sous le bouclier atomique de l'OTAN, le Canada, l'Australie, le Japon et la Corée du Sud. Il désire également éliminer les armes nucléaires, mais en utilisant un processus progressif faisant appel à une interdiction des essais d'armes, à une réduction de la production de matières fissiles et à l'adoption de mécanismes de vérification rigoureux pour l'élimination éventuelle de toutes les armes nucléaires. Le Canada s'oppose principalement au traité d'interdiction parce qu'il s'agit d'une mesure prématurée qui serait inefficace sans la ratification des États possédant des armes nucléaires. De plus, il ne fournit pas une voie efficace pour assurer une surveillance et une vérification au chapitre du désarmement (AMC, 2017).

Le dernier groupe rassemble les **« enthousiastes nucléaires »,** soit des États dotés d'armes nucléaires actuellement reconnus en vertu du TNP, comme l'Inde, le Pakistan, la Corée du Nord et Israël, mais qui ne sont pas signataires du TNP et qui ne se prononcent pas sur le désarmement nucléaire, mais qui approuvent le paradigme « réaliste » de la dissuasion nucléaire comme l'ultime garantie pour empêcher une guerre nucléaire entre les plus grandes puissances.

Cette fragmentation ne représente pas un développement positif pour l'avenir de l'ordre nucléaire mondial, puisque ces camps finiront par travailler en vue de l'atteinte d'objectifs contradictoires et les uns contre les autres, minant encore davantage l'efficacité des traités en vigueur comme le TNP.

Le programme et le plan de l'ONU seront-ils efficaces?

Plutôt que de réaliser des progrès constants en vue de l'élimination complète des armes nucléaires, le monde pourrait retomber dans une nouvelle course à l'armement nucléaire comme celle qui avait caractérisé la guerre froide. La situation actuelle est loin de ressembler à ce qui se passait il y a presque dix ans, alors que les soi-disant « quatre cavaliers » préconisaient un monde exempt d'armes nucléaires (Ogilvie-White et Santoro, 2012). La rivalité nucléaire renouvelée entre les États-Unis et la Russie, les essais nucléaires irresponsables de la Corée du Nord, la course lente, mais constante aux armements nucléaires en Asie du Sud impliquant l'Inde et le Pakistan ainsi que la confrontation croissante entre les États-Unis et la Chine ont mis à rude épreuve les ententes relatives au contrôle des armements et à la non-prolifération, notamment le nouveau Traité sur les armements stratégiques offensifs (traité START) qui vient à échéance en 2021, le Traité de limitation des armes nucléaires à moyenne portée et le TNP. Dans un contexte aussi morose, le programme de l'ONU sur le désarmement nucléaire est une bouffée d'air frais qui vise à tirer profit d'un élan renouvelé pour le dialogue sur le désarmement nucléaire dans

un scénario sombre de sécurité mondiale. Le programme de l'ONU est assez exhaustif et vaste dans ses ambitions pour que le monde agisse progressivement en vue du désarmement nucléaire. Cependant, il n'y a pas de plans d'action et de calendriers précis pour accélérer la mise en œuvre du programme. En parrainant un autre traité en parallèle, le TIAN, l'ONU espère que les États dotés d'armes nucléaires cèderont à une pression morale et démantèleront ultérieurement de leur propre chef leurs programmes nucléaires. Par contre, ce nouveau programme a d'abord et avant tout permis d'entamer un nouveau dialogue et de fournir suffisamment de matière pour que les États possédant des armes nucléaires reprennent les négociations qui avaient été suspendues concernant la CD et réalisent peu à peu des progrès en vue de la ratification du Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires (TICE) et la conclusion d'un traité sur l'interdiction de la production de matières fissiles (TIPMF).

Le Canada peut-il participer au programme et à sa mise en œuvre?

Le Canada devrait accueillir à bras ouverts le programme de l'ONU sur le désarmement nucléaire et l'approuver à ses plus hauts niveaux. À plusieurs égards, le programme de l'ONU s'harmonise bien aux diverses initiatives canadiennes pour le désarmement aux niveaux bilatéral et multilatéral. Par exemple, le Canada a clairement défini les mesures qu'il a prises pour parvenir à une zone exempte d'armes nucléaires au Moyen-Orient grâce à sa participation au Plan d'action global conjoint (PAGC) avec l'Iran et son financement versé à des pays comme la Jordanie et l'Égypte afin de renforcer leur détection nucléaire et la protection physique et la cybersécurité de leurs installations nucléaires, respectivement (ONU, 2018a). Le Canada préside un groupe de travail sur le développement d'un traité d'interdiction de la production de matières fissiles (TIPMF) afin d'empêcher le stockage de matériel nucléaire et sa conversion en armes. Le groupe est formé des cinq États possédant des armes nucléaires et signataires du TNP, de l'Inde et de 19 autres États non dotés d'armes nucléaires (AMC, 2018). Le Canada vise à obtenir de nouveau du soutien pour la signature et la ratification du Traité d'interdiction complète des essais nucléaires (TICE) en encourageant les États non signataires énoncés dans l'annexe 2 du Traité à signer et à ratifier le traité. Dernièrement, l'approche progressive visant le désarmement nucléaire que privilégie depuis longtemps le Canada a fait l'objet d'un examen plus scrupuleux. Le Canada, en tant qu'allié fidèle des États-Unis depuis la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, a un problème d'identité nucléaire qui découle de sa propre image d'un pays qui dépend du parapluie nucléaire américain (Buford, 2016). L'engagement du Canada envers l'OTAN représente par ailleurs une autre raison convaincante pour respecter l'approche de l'OTAN concernant les armes nucléaires, qui repose sur la dissuasion. Troisièmement, l'approche progressive du Canada réaffirme une croyance fondamentale selon laquelle il est impossible d'éliminer les armes nucléaires sans la participation des États P5 et des autres États possédant des armes nucléaires, mais qui ne sont pas signataires du TNP aux futures négociations, qu'elles concernent le TICE, le TIPMF ou l'élaboration d'autres mécanismes de surveillance et de vérification efficaces.

La position du Canada sur le désarmement nucléaire

La politique du Canada relative au désarmement nucléaire, qui est axée sur une approche progressive, n'a pas changé depuis plusieurs décennies de plaidoyer en faveur du désarmement au sein de l'ONU. Les critiques ont indiqué que cette politique n'a pas obtenu les résultats souhaités par le Canada lorsqu'il avait décidé d'adopter une telle approche. L'approche du Canada se fonde sur la réalisation de progrès relativement aux négociations du TIPMF et l'entrée en vigueur du TICE et sur sa dépendance continue au TNP en tant que pilier du système de non-prolifération nucléaire. Certains universitaires renommés en matière de désarmement nucléaire ont critiqué l'approche actuelle du Canada et ont suggéré des ajustements qui mèneraient à sa signature du TIAN (Meyer et Thakur, 2017). Leur plus grande critique concernant l'approche actuelle du Canada pour le désarmement nucléaire découle du fait que les négociations sur l'interdiction des essais nucléaires et de la production de matières fissiles ont été interrompues à la CD et le processus est actuellement en suspens. De plus, elle permet à des États dotés

d'armes nucléaires de dicter le rythme du désarmement (Ramana et Borja, 2017). Étant donné que la CD repose sur un consensus, un seul État possédant des armes nucléaires pourrait mettre un frein aux négociations « de bonne foi ». Des États comme le Pakistan désirent que leurs matières fissiles soient prises en considération dans les futures négociations du TIPMF alors que les États P5 refusent de faire de tels compromis. Ci-dessous sont présentées des mesures concrètes que pourrait prendre le Canada en lien avec le programme de l'ONU.

1. Comme l'ont mentionné les anciens ambassadeurs canadiens pour le désarmement, le Canada doit jouer le rôle de « bâtisseur de pont » entre les deux camps rivaux, soit le « camp humanitaire » et les « enthousiastes de la dissuasion nucléaire » (Roche, 2016). Ainsi, le Canada jouira d'une crédibilité suffisante pour exécuter ses plans tout en orientant sa politique de désarmement nucléaire au sein de l'ONU.

2. Le Canada ne devrait pas se gêner d'amorcer un dialogue avec les membres de l'OTAN pour promouvoir le désarmement nucléaire. La dépendance constante de l'OTAN sur les armes nucléaires et leur pouvoir de dissuasion demeurera un obstacle majeur à la progression du programme de l'ONU sur le désarmement nucléaire. En fait, le Comité permanent de la défense nationale de la Chambre des communes a formulé la « recommandation 21 » dans un rapport afin d'entamer un dialogue avec l'OTAN (Chambre des communes, 2017). La doctrine de l'OTAN sur les armes nucléaires, qui servent de « garantie ultime de la sécurité des alliés » (West, 2018), ne tient plus la route.

3. La Conférence sur le désarmement de l'ONU est demeurée en veilleuse pendant plus de 20 ans. Après s'être assuré que les groupes de travail formés d'experts qu'il avait mandatés ont fait suffisamment de progrès, le Canada devrait travailler avec d'autres États membres pour insuffler une nouvelle vie à l'institution moribonde et reconstruire la plateforme pour reprendre le dialogue au sujet du TIPMF.

4. Le Canada devrait miser sur sa candidature de 2019 au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies en 2021 afin de mettre les efforts diplomatiques pour le désarmement nucléaire à l'avant-plan des engagements diplomatiques à l'ONU.

5. Les organismes non gouvernementaux canadiens qui travaillent sur le désarmement nucléaire, dont le Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (CNANW, 2016), le Rassemblement canadien pour une convention sur les armes nucléaires et Project Ploughshares, devraient collaborer plus vigoureusement à la diplomatie publique, coordonner les efforts de lobbying au Parlement et mobiliser l'opinion publique pour faire avancer la cause du désarmement nucléaire.

6. Le Canada devrait renforcer son rôle actuel au sein du Partenariat international pour la vérification du désarmement nucléaire, un groupe dirigé par les États-Unis qui réunit 25 États pour étudier les possibilités relatives à des mécanismes efficaces de surveillance et de vérification afin de démanteler les charges militaires nucléaires.

7. Le Canada devrait aussi s'abstenir d'appuyer la plus récente position du département d'État américain sur le désarmement nucléaire, qui demande l'évaluation de la situation actuelle de la sécurité mondiale en remédiant aux « facteurs négatifs dans le contexte de la sécurité » au moyen d'un processus de dialogue multilatéral baptisé « Créer les conditions propices au désarmement nucléaire » et de l'établissement d'un groupe de travail connexe avant de discuter du désarmement nucléaire. Il s'agit d'un faux départ et d'un leurre visant à faire perdre du temps et à freiner l'élan

actuel généré par le TIAN en vue du désarmement nucléaire (Ford, 2018). Comme l'affirment deux universitaires réputés dans le domaine du désarmement, la discorde actuelle entre le Canada et les États-Unis pourrait permettre de rompre avec le passé et d'aller de l'avant (Ramana et Faye, 2018).

8. À moyen terme, le Canada devrait être prêt à reprendre la « stratégie de suffocation » adoptée par Pierre Trudeau à la fin des années 1970, alors que le Canada tentait de mettre un terme à la course aux armements nucléaires entre les États-Unis et l'ancienne Union soviétique (Faye, Ghumman, Shashdevletov et Shum, 2018). Bref, ce serait un bon moment pour le Canada de faire preuve encore une fois de leadership par rapport au désarmement nucléaire, un rôle qui a perdu de son éclat dans les dernières années.

9. Le Canada devrait également étudier de près le TIAN et continuer de collaborer avec ses défenseurs, bien qu'il pourrait être peu pratique pour le Canada d'y adhérer complètement, étant donné son identité nucléaire distincte d'allié occidental.

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Graduate Research Award Presentation 2

Topic: ***How can nuclear supplier states strike a balance between facilitating access by developing states to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology, while ensuring that nuclear embarking states uphold non-proliferation, safety and security obligations, especially those under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)?***

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RISK ASSESSMENT OF DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY AND MONITORING OF CIVIL NUCLEAR PROGRAM IN THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIER GROUP

Nuclear supplier states (NSS) have the hard task of asserting the risk factors of nuclear proliferation that could result from their actions. While monitoring and transparency have been extended and developed further with Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) members over decades of cooperation, dual-use technology and innovation required further efforts to avoid potential risks of additional states taking the path of developing a military nuclear program. In addition, states that are non-signatory to the NPT have shown growing interest in exporting their nuclear expertise. A.Q. Khan's nuclear black market from Pakistan that operated through the 1980s and 1990s and India bid for membership into the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) in 2016 underline the high risk of unregulated trade and the difficulty to integrate the non-signatories into the NSG and the NPT.

Civilian nuclear cooperation has often been considered a tool of non-proliferation rather than a major risk toward nuclear proliferation.[1] While most authors recognize that civilian nuclear cooperation increases technical capabilities, nuclear assistance has developed in a highly regulated system that adapted its regulations to decrease the risk of dual-use and misappropriation and was intended as an incentive to remain nuclear weapon free. Over 2200 bilateral agreements on civil nuclear cooperation (NCAs) have been negotiated and present low to no risk toward proliferation.[2] However, the literature has not ignored the potential effects of the supply side that provides material, technology and expertise that could enable nuclear proliferation.[3] Security threats, militarized disputes, hegemonic ambitions, and status seeking can motivate the acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, restraints on the access to resources, technology, and scientific expertise required to develop nuclear weapons can slow down any military nuclear program. Even though the literature disagrees on the effect of civilian nuclear assistance on nuclear proliferation, none of them wishes a deregulated system. Consequently, NSS needs to pursue their endeavors toward transparency and close monitoring of civil nuclear assistance.

There are two fundamental goals that NSS have to consider in their assessment of the risk of civilian cooperation. First, they need to be able to monitor and sanction states that do not comply with the rules of the NPT and the NSG's guidelines for nuclear transfer (INFCIRC/254). Second, they need to limit the access to sensitive technologies that allow the transition between civilian and military technology. To achieve those goals, transparency and systematized monitoring of dual-use technology are essential.

Not all assistance represents equal risk. Only specific nuclear assistance can increase the risk of nuclear proliferation significantly. Most of civilian assistance is harmless when it comes to the risk it represents in terms of nuclear proliferation. Previous research has shown that assistance specifically related to uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, weapons-grade fissile material, and nuclear weapons design present greater risk to nuclear proliferation.[4] Dual-use assistance is more in a grey area in regard with nuclear proliferation. Many of the dual-use technologies are less regulated with some exception such as uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing. The IAEA and the NSG have made it more difficult to obtain some types of dual-use technology since now any attempt at purchasing them trigger alarms in the existing proliferation monitoring system.

The list of elements to monitor is long and includes the types of facilities, the production levels, the resource configuration, the formation and knowledge possessed by the scientific personnel, the NPT membership and compliance with it, the degree and access allowed to monitoring agencies, the objectives of the nuclear capabilities, and the transport of fissile material.[5] The monitoring of reactor usage is the forefront of the prevention of proliferation. The dual use of a power reactor to produce plutonium for both civil and military purposes can be difficult to monitor. Certain reactor designs including the pebble bed reactors "facilitate their potential use as production facilities for weapons materials" and can be difficult to detect.[6] Potential separation and diversion of special nuclear material for weaponization can be done under the cover of fuel reprocessing also.[7] To minimize the risk of dual-use during reprocessing, NSG's guidelines involved incentives for reprocessing or enriching activities on behalf of the recipient by the supplier. In order to minimize the risk of those dual-use technologies and to improve the monitoring capacities of the IAEA, U.S National Laboratories have developed and conducted trials with remote monitoring integrating sensors, data transmission, and data management in more than 10 nuclear facilities in eight countries.[8] However, periodic physical monitoring will remain essential to avoid any tempering with the remote monitoring systems.

Some NCAs, though ratified, might be canceled if the non-nuclear state is suspected of trying to acquire nuclear weapons or infringes on NPT rules. Over the years, many NCAs have been cancelled. France (though it did not ratify the NPT before 1992) stopped a deal for reprocessing technology to South Korea in 1975-6[9] and for a plutonium reprocessing plant in Pakistan in 1978.[10] Argentina cancelled a deal to sell reprocessing technology to Libya in 1985.[11] Iraq was denied the access by China, Germany, Great Britain, and Yugoslavia to components and materials that were considered as unrestricted dual-use items between 1987-1990.[12] Those cases demonstrate that NSS are willing to suspend their assistance when risk of proliferation is detected.

Among the most threatening and newest dual-use technology, Additive Manufacturing (AM), most commonly known as 3-D printers, will be a puzzling technology to control for NSS. From only a few digital files any actor in possession of AM technology would be able to build crucial components of a nuclear

centrifuge or an ICBM missile with only limited engineering capacities.[13] The majority of the components of a centrifuge have to be precisely built toward specific standards which required high engineering capacities which can be a rare commodity. However, only an operator is required with a 3-D printer. AM technologies possess definitively a dual-use purpose and complexify the effectiveness of monitoring purchases since they can be use for many purposes. The different functions of a 3-D printer make it difficult to assert if they would ever be used toward producing centrifuge components or any pieces of a nuclear weapon. That risk has not concretized yet, since there is no evidence at that effect, but the NSS will have to keep in mind AM capabilities in the assertion and monitoring of proliferation risks.

Proliferation during the second nuclear age has been far more encourage by "networks of second-tiers proliferators 'proliferation rings.'"[14] Among those proliferation rings, the most notable is probably the A.Q. Khan's nuclear black market that contributed to the development of military nuclear programs in North Korea, Iran, Libya, and potentially others. A.Q. Khan network prospered from the early 1980s up until it was exposed in 2003 by a joint US-UK-Germany-Italy operation that uncovered that components for 1000 centrifuges where bound for Libya.[15] The emergence of that network showed that the entire control regime of the NPT and the NSG could become pointless if actors in pursuit of nuclear weapons can obtain the necessary components on unregulated secret markets. Therefore, the IAEA and the NSG must develop additional indirect monitoring mechanisms to be able to implement strategies of inhibition to prevent the proliferation through those black markets.

India's deal with the United States toward civil nuclear cooperation in 2005 that led, in 2008, to end the sanctions on nuclear material toward India by the NSG, and ultimately led to India formal application to join the NSG on May 12, 2016 has raised additional questions since India is not signatory to the NPT. Ironically, India is now asking to become a member of an organization that was founded in reaction to India's "peaceful nuclear explosion" in 1974.[16] While India membership is uncertain after two years of negotiation process and repeated Chinese oppositions, India will remain in an uncertain position regarding its status as a NSS. Transparency and close monitoring of specific elements of civil nuclear program have been essential to strike a balance between providing technical support for civilian use versus safeguarding the NPT core mission. However, if non-member states can access the NSG network without having to meet the requirements of the NPT, they could become a greater risk if they use their access to the NSG to gain additional technologies and knowledge to then export them.

Those two cases underline the limits of the current NPT and NSG structure that will remain exclusionary to non-signatories unless they agree to denuclearization which is unlikely. Potential reforms of the NPT could provide a new status to post-1967 nuclear-weapon states that would allow for IAEA monitoring, but such reforms are not part of the discussion at the moment. The best tool at the disposition of NSS remains strategies of inhibition which includes "treaties; norms; diplomacy; aid; conventional arms sales; alliances and security guarantees; exports, information, and technology controls; intelligence; preemptive counterforce nuclear postures; missile defense; sanctions; coercion; interdiction; sabotage; and even the threat of preventive military action."[17]

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Sujet : ***Comment les États fournisseurs de matières nucléaires peuvent-ils faciliter l'accès des pays en développement aux utilisations pacifiques d'énergie et de technologie nucléaires tout en veillant à ce que les États qui s'engagent sur la voie nucléaire respectent les obligations concernant la non-prolifération, la sûreté et la sécurité, particulièrement celles énoncées dans le Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP)?***

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ÉVALUER LES RISQUES DES TECHNOLOGIES À DOUBLE USAGE ET SURVEILLER LE PROGRAMME NUCLÉAIRE CIVIL AU SEIN DU GROUPE DES FOURNISSEURS NUCLÉAIRES

Les États fournisseurs de matières nucléaires (EFMN) ont la tâche difficile d'évaluer les facteurs de risque de prolifération nucléaire pouvant découler de leurs actions. Bien que la surveillance et la transparence ont été améliorées et davantage élargies dans les États membres du Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP) après des décennies de coopération, les technologies à double usage et l'innovation ont nécessité des efforts supplémentaires pour éviter les risques que d'autres États développent leur propre programme nucléaire à des fins militaires. De plus, les pays non signataires du TNP ont manifesté de plus en plus d'intérêt à exporter leur expertise nucléaire. Le marché noir d'énergie nucléaire A.Q. Khan actif au Pakistan au cours des années 1980 et 1990 et le désir de l'Inde de faire partie du Groupe des fournisseurs nucléaires (GFN) en 2016 ont mis en lumière les risques élevés associés au commerce non réglementé et la difficulté d'intégrer au GFN et au TNP les pays non signataires.

La coopération nucléaire civile a souvent été considérée comme un outil de non-prolifération plutôt qu'un risque de taille pour la prolifération nucléaire (Reiss; Gavin; Miller; Krige et Sarkar). Bien que la plupart des auteurs reconnaissent que la coopération nucléaire civile augmente les capacités techniques, l'assistance nucléaire, qui avait servi au départ d'incitatif pour qu'un État demeure exempt d'armes nucléaires, a pris la forme d'un système hautement réglementé qui s'est adapté de manière à diminuer le risque d'un double usage et d'une utilisation illicite. Plus de 2 200 ententes bilatérales sur la coopération nucléaire civile ont fait l'objet de négociations et présentent peu ou pas de risques de prolifération (Keeley, 3). Cependant, les écrits n'ont pas fait fi des effets potentiels de l'approvisionnement en matériel, technologie et expertise qui pourrait paver la voie à la prolifération nucléaire (Fuhrmann, « Spreading Temptation »; Fuhrmann, *Atomic Assistance*). Les menaces à la sécurité, les différends militarisés, les ambitions hégémoniques et les aspirations à un certain statut peuvent motiver l'acquisition d'armes nucléaires. Par contre, les contraintes relatives à l'accès aux ressources, à la technologie et à l'expertise scientifique nécessaires pour développer des armes nucléaires peuvent mettre un frein à tout programme nucléaire militaire. Même si les recherches n'abondent pas toutes dans le même sens lorsqu'elles examinent les effets de l'assistance nucléaire civile sur la prolifération nucléaire, aucune d'elles ne privilégie un système déréglementé. Par conséquent, les EFMN doivent poursuivre leurs efforts pour accroître la transparence et la surveillance étroite de l'assistance civile nucléaire.

Les EFMN doivent tenir compte de deux objectifs fondamentaux dans leur évaluation des risques associés à la coopération civile. Ils doivent tout d'abord être en mesure d'assurer une surveillance et d'imposer des sanctions aux États qui ne respectent pas les règles du TNP et les lignes directrices du GFN pour le transfert nucléaire (INFCIRC/254). Deuxièmement, ils doivent restreindre l'accès aux technologies judicieuses qui permettent la transition entre les technologies civiles et militaires. Pour atteindre ces objectifs, la transparence et la surveillance systématisée des technologies à double usage sont primordiales.

L'assistance ne comporte pas toujours le même risque. Seule une assistance nucléaire particulière peut accroître considérablement le risque de prolifération nucléaire. La plupart du temps, l'assistance civile ne pose pas de risque de prolifération nucléaire. Les recherches menées ont montré que l'assistance ayant trait précisément à l'enrichissement de l'uranium, au retraitement du plutonium, aux matières fissiles de

qualité militaire et à la conception des armes nucléaires présentent un plus grand risque de prolifération nucléaire (Kroenig « Exporting the Bomb », 117). Il est toutefois plus difficile de trancher pour ce qui est de l'assistance concernant les technologies à double usage. Plusieurs de ces technologies sont moins réglementées à part quelques exceptions, comme l'enrichissement de l'uranium et le retraitement du plutonium. L'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) et le GFN ont rendu plus difficile l'obtention de certains types de technologies à double usage, puisque toute tentative d'en acheter sonne dorénavant l'alarme dans le système actuel de surveillance de la prolifération.

La liste des éléments à surveiller est longue et comprend les types d'installations, les niveaux de production, la configuration des ressources, la formation et les connaissances du personnel scientifique, l'adhésion et la conformité au TNP, l'accès des organismes de surveillance et l'ampleur de leur surveillance, les objectifs des capacités nucléaires et le transport de matières fissiles (Garcia et coll., 98). La surveillance de l'utilisation de réacteurs est à l'avant-plan de la prévention de la prolifération. Le double usage d'un réacteur de puissance visant à produire du plutonium à des fins civiles et militaires peut être difficile à surveiller. Certains réacteurs comprenant des réacteurs à boulets « facilitent leur utilisation potentielle en tant qu'installations de production pour du matériel d'armes » et peuvent être difficiles à détecter (Garcia et coll., 108). La séparation et le détournement de matériel nucléaire spécial pour la production d'armes sous le couvert du retraitement de combustibles constituent également un risque (Garcia et coll., 109). Pour minimiser le risque d'un double usage au cours du retraitement, les lignes directrices du GFN prévoient des incitatifs pour les activités de retraitement ou d'enrichissement par le fournisseur au nom du bénéficiaire. Afin d'atténuer les risques associés aux technologies à double usage et d'améliorer les capacités de surveillance de l'AIEA, les laboratoires nationaux américains ont mis au point et réalisé des essais de capteurs intégrés pour la surveillance à distance, la transmission de données et la gestion de données dans plus d'une dizaine d'installations nucléaires dans huit pays (Hamada, 662-663). Cependant, la surveillance physique périodique demeure essentielle pour éviter toute tentative de déjouer les systèmes de surveillance à distance.

Bien qu'elles soient ratifiées, certaines ententes sur la coopération nucléaire civile pourraient être résiliées si l'État non nucléaire est soupçonné d'acquérir des armes nucléaires ou d'enfreindre des règles du TNP. Au fil des ans, plusieurs de ces ententes ont été résiliées. La France (même si elle n'a pas ratifié le TNP avant 1992) a mis un terme à une entente concernant une technologie de retraitement de la Corée du Sud en 1975-1976 (Katz et Marwah, 227) et pour une usine de retraitement de plutonium au Pakistan en 1978 (Kroenig, *Exporting the Bomb*). L'Argentine a annulé une entente concernant la vente d'une technologie de retraitement à la Libye en 1985 (Jones et coll., 224). La Chine, l'Allemagne, la Grande-Bretagne et la Yougoslavie ont refusé de donner à l'Irak accès à des composants et du matériel jugés pouvant servir à un double usage et qui n'étaient pas assujettis à des restrictions entre 1987-1990 (Albright et Hibbs). Ces cas montrent que les EFMN sont prêts à suspendre leur aide lorsqu'ils détectent un risque de prolifération.

Parmi les plus récentes technologies à double usage qui présentent les plus grandes menaces, la fabrication additive (FA), mieux connue sous le nom d'imprimantes 3D, représentera une technologie difficile à contrôler pour les EFMN. À partir de quelques fichiers numériques seulement, tout acteur possédant une technologie de FA pourrait construire des composants essentiels d'une centrifugeuse ou d'un missile balistique intercontinental (ICBM) uniquement avec des capacités d'ingénierie limitées (Kroenig et Volpe, 9-10). La majorité des composants d'une centrifugeuse doivent être conçus précisément pour répondre à des normes particulières qui exigent des capacités d'ingénierie très sophistiquées et pouvant être rares. Cependant, une imprimante 3D n'exige qu'un opérateur. Les technologies de FA visent assurément un double usage et la surveillance des achats est encore plus complexe étant donné que ces technologies peuvent être utilisées à plusieurs fins. En raison des différentes fonctions d'une imprimante 3D, il est difficile de confirmer si elle peut être utilisée pour la

production de composants de centrifugeuses ou de toutes pièces d'une arme nucléaire. Ce risque ne s'est pas encore matérialisé, puisqu'il n'y a aucune preuve à cet effet, mais les EFMN doivent se rappeler les capacités de la FA lorsqu'ils évaluent et surveillent les risques de prolifération.

La prolifération au cours de la seconde ère nucléaire a de plus été favorisée par des « réseaux de prolifératrices de second niveau, des « cercles de prolifération » (Braun et Chyba, 6). Parmi ces réseaux de prolifération, le marché noir d'énergie nucléaire A.Q. Khan est probablement le plus connu; il a contribué au développement de programmes nucléaires militaires en Corée du Nord, en Iran, en Libye et peut-être dans d'autres pays. Le réseau A.Q. Khan a pris de l'ampleur à partir du début des années 1980 jusqu'à ce qu'il soit découvert en 2003 par une opération conjointe menée par les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni, l'Allemagne et l'Italie qui a permis de mettre la main sur des composants liés à 1 000 centrifugeuses destinées à la Libye (MacCalman, 104). La découverte de ce réseau a montré que le système de contrôle en entier du TNP et des EFMN pouvait être futile si les acteurs désirant se doter d'armes nucléaires sont en mesure d'obtenir les composants nécessaires dans des marchés secrets non réglementés. Par conséquent, l'AIEA et les EFMN doivent mettre au point d'autres mécanismes de surveillance indirecte pour appliquer des stratégies d'interdiction afin de prévenir la prolifération à cause de ces marchés noirs.

L'entente conclue entre l'Inde et les États-Unis en vue d'une coopération nucléaire civile en 2005 ayant mené, en 2008, à la fin des sanctions sur le matériel nucléaire vers l'Inde par le GFN, puis à la présentation d'une demande officielle par l'Inde, le 12 mai 2016, pour se joindre au GFN, a soulevé des questions supplémentaires puisque l'Inde n'est pas signataire du TNP. Ironiquement, l'Inde demande maintenant d'être membre d'une organisation créée en réaction à son « explosion nucléaire pacifique » en 1974 (Hibbs, 277). Malgré les deux années de négociations et les oppositions répétées de la Chine, il n'a toujours pas été déterminé si l'Inde fera partie du GFN, et le pays demeurera dans une position incertaine concernant son statut en tant qu'EFMN. La transparence et la surveillance étroite d'éléments précis du programme nucléaire civile ont été essentielles pour atteindre un équilibre entre la prestation d'un soutien technique pour l'utilisation civile et la protection de la mission fondamentale du TNP. Toutefois, si les États non membres peuvent accéder au réseau du GFN sans devoir respecter les exigences du TNP, ils pourraient présenter un plus grand risque s'ils se servent de leur accès au GFN pour mettre la main sur d'autres technologies et connaissances et les exporter par la suite.

Ces deux cas font ressortir les limites actuelles du TNP et de la structure du GFN, qui continueront d'être hors de portée pour les pays non signataires, à moins que ces derniers n'acceptent la dénucléarisation, ce qui est peu probable. Les réformes potentielles du TNP pourraient offrir un nouveau statut aux États d'armes nucléaires après 1967 qui permettrait à l'AIEA d'assurer une surveillance, mais de telles réformes ne font pas partie des discussions à l'heure actuelle. Les stratégies d'interdiction représentent le meilleur outil à la disposition des EFMN, notamment ce qui suit : « traités; normes; diplomatie; aide; ventes d'armes conventionnelles; alliances et garanties de sécurité; contrôle des exportations, de l'information et des technologies; renseignements; attaques nucléaires anticipées; défense antimissile; sanctions; coercition; interdiction; sabotage; et même la menace d'une action militaire préventive » (Gavin, 11).

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Graduate Research Award Presentation 3

Topic: ***Does attribution lead to accountability under international law? We encourage consideration of recent geopolitical events involving the use of prohibited weapons (chemical weapons), as well as ongoing discussions within the UN on the implications of increasing autonomy in military systems.***

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A FAINT RED LINE: THE ATTRIBUTION OF AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CHEMICAL WEAPON USE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

Chemical weapons have been used more than 200 times since 2012, against targets in states as varied as the UK, Syria, Iraq, and Malaysia. Little more than two decades after the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) banned the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons, in the Syrian Civil War such weapons are now likely to see their seventh consecutive year of use. Although investigations have determined that Syria, North Korea, Russia, and ISIL are responsible for the attacks, each has generally faced a weak or inconsistent response from both the international community and the Executive Council of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Although the concept of accountability does not have a clearly defined meaning in international law, it certainly involves imposing consequences on actors that fail to uphold their international obligations.[1, 2] Given the nature of the international response to chemical weapon attacks, can it be said that the attribution of chemical weapon use to a state leads to the latter's accountability?

In the aftermath of a suspected internationally wrongful act such as the violation of the CWC, the members of a rules-based international order consider it in their best interest to undertake a sequence of actions in order to impose consequences on the actor responsible. Ultimately, this 'accountability pathway' disincentivizes the use of chemical weapons and thereby maintains the global system of restraint, which aims to limit CWC violations by having states voluntarily restrict their own aberrant behaviour.[3] The pathway begins with an OPCW- or state-conducted investigation that confirms the nature of the attack. If the technical evidence collected meets the burden of proof required to secure international legitimacy, the attack can be attributed to a particular actor by the OPCW or the investigating state. Appropriate consequences are then implemented by states party to the CWC, with the long-term impact on the actor's behaviour being monitored in order to determine whether to implement additional consequences or to eventually rehabilitate the actor's good standing. Holding states accountable motivates international compliance with the CWC by preserving the normative framework around chemical weapons and deterring their use. Following an extended period of CWC compliance, strong

taboos develop concerning the use of chemical weapons, while their utility in a potential conflict is obscured. Together, norms, a lack of benefits, strong taboos, and deterrence underpin the global system of restraint.[4]

The problem currently impeding the international community's ability to preserve the system of restraint with respect to chemical weapons is not an absence of investigation or attribution. Recent investigations of chemical weapon attacks have typically led to attribution, a concept defined as "a legal operation through which acts or omissions of individuals performed on behalf of the State are considered legally to be acts and omissions of the latter".[5] In Syria, the UN Joint Identification Mechanism (JIM), employing the technical expertise of the OPCW, successfully attributed multiple chemical weapon attacks to Syrian armed forces and two to ISIL forces in Syria.[6] Similarly, a British investigation attributed the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal to Russian military intelligence agents, while the assassination of Kim Jong-nam was credibly attributed to North Korean operatives by the US and South Korea, despite a secretive Malaysian investigation. In each of these cases, an investigation determined that the perpetrators of a chemical weapon attack were either acting in their official capacity as employees of a state organ or non-state group or could be linked to a state via the 'effective control' test.[7]

Rather, the international community is struggling with the problem of accountability, a concept which refers to the ability to enforce the law of state responsibility subsequent to a state committing an internationally wrongful act, such as violating a treaty. In the case of the CWC, the law of state responsibility is enforced by the application of consequences on the offending state. Consequences that shape state behaviour must be widespread, long-term, and coordinated. However, this requires votes in either the UN Security Council or the OPCW Executive Council, two bodies prone to gridlock due to the presence of Russian and Chinese vetoes in the former and the requirement that a two-thirds majority agree in the latter.[8] Holding states accountable by applying consequences is therefore complicated by the number of states that must cooperate in order to do so, as well as by the fact that consequences, or 'mechanisms of accountability', can be any combination of military, legal, political, diplomatic, economic, and educational.[9] There also exists a high degree of variability regarding the legal character of both culprits and targets of chemical weapon attacks. North Korea, for example, is not party to the CWC, making the path to accountability unclear – though an argument can be made that the provisions of the CWC have become a peremptory norm of customary international law.[10] The OPCW's Working Group on Terrorism recommends that ISIL, as a non-state actor, be prosecuted domestically by Syria, a state party to the CWC that has used chemical weapons against its own population, and by Iraq, a CWC party in good standing.[11] Lastly, the Russian Federation is party to the CWC and executed a chemical weapon attack on the territory of the UK, another CWC party.[12]

The Syrian case – especially regarding Russia's involvement – is illustrative of the complexities facing the international community and the OPCW. In August 2013, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2118 enforced the Kerry-Lavrov Framework, permitting the Executive Council of the OPCW to begin with the destruction and removal of Syria's chemical weapons.[13] Syria then acceded to the CWC on 12 September 2013, with President Assad stating that Syria would observe its CWC obligations immediately.[14] Although hundreds of metric tons of chemicals were destroyed, the use of chemical weapons allegedly resumed in April 2014. In response, the OPCW established the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) to investigate, though this body was not allowed to engage in attribution.[15] In August 2015, UNSCR began the attribution process, establishing the JIM in order to link the attacks investigated by the FFM to the Syrian state. The JIM produced seven reports and attributed four uses of chemical weapons to Syria, but in October 2017, Russia vetoed a UNSCR that would have extended the JIM's mandate.[16] Without the JIM, there currently exists no international attribution mechanism for Syria.

The JIM was nonetheless able to attribute chemical weapon attacks to Syria; beginning with Syria's accession to the CWC in 2013, international attempts to hold Syria accountable have fared worse. In

November 2017, a vote of the OPCW's Executive Council failed to meet the threshold necessary to invoke CWC-based accountability for Syria.[17] Instead, states resorted to military action, with the US, the UK, and France launching missiles and conducting airstrikes against airfields and chemical weapons facilities in Syria. Economic sanctions also proceeded haphazardly after Russia and China used their vetoes in the Security Council to prevent UN sanctions.[18] Instead, the US and European Union sanctioned companies and individuals involved in the use of Syrian chemical weapons. These measures were not enough to deter continued CWC violations in Syria. In the face of UN and OPCW inaction, foreign ministers from 25 countries met in January 2018 to form the International Partnership Against Impunity for the Use of Chemical Weapons, a multilateral effort aiming to hold states accountable where existing international organizations could not.[19] Although the Partnership requires more members in order to truly be considered international rather than multilateral, it represents a step towards linking attribution to accountability without having to rely on the bulkier OPCW or UNSC. Lastly, in June 2018, the Conference of States Parties to the CWC adopted a decision condemning the use of chemical weapons and directing the Technical Secretariat to "identify the perpetrators of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic".[20]

The CWC is the most comprehensive arms-control treaty ever ratified and must be enforced if the international community wishes to preserve the system of restraint that shapes state behaviour. Although UN investigative bodies have successfully attributed some of the recent spate of chemical weapon attacks to state and non-state actors, accountability has thus far been impeded by OPCW and UNSC voting procedures that prevent international rather than multilateral action. Yet the framework is intact: the international law of state responsibility clearly establishes the link between attribution and accountability. New collective efforts such as the Partnership need only target CWC-violating states with strong consistent consequences in order to hold them accountable. If it does not do so, the repeated failure of the international community to effectively respond to CWC violations risks normalizing the future use of chemical weapons by undermining the role of accountability in the global system of restraint.

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Sujet : ***Est-ce que l'attribution mène à la responsabilisation en vertu du droit international? Nous encourageons l'examen d'événements géopolitiques récents impliquant l'utilisation d'armes interdites (armes chimiques), ainsi que des discussions qui se poursuivent au sein des Nations Unies sur les conséquences d'une plus grande autonomie des systèmes militaires.***

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UNE LIGNE ROUGE DISCRÈTE : L'ATTRIBUTION DE L'UTILISATION DES ARMES CHIMIQUES ET LA RESPONSABILISATION DANS LE CADRE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL

Les armes chimiques ont été employées à plus de 200 reprises depuis 2012 pour cibler des pays aussi différents que le Royaume-Uni, la Syrie, l'Irak et la Malaisie. Un peu plus de deux décennies après que l'entrée en vigueur de la Convention sur les armes chimiques (CAC) eut interdit le développement, la production, le stockage et l'utilisation d'armes chimiques, de telles armes sont maintenant susceptibles d'être utilisées pour une troisième année consécutive dans le cadre de la guerre civile qui sévit en Syrie. Des enquêtes ont déterminé que la Syrie, la Corée du Nord, la Russie et l'État islamique en Irak et au Levant (EIIL) étaient responsables des attaques, mais la communauté internationale et le conseil exécutif de l'Organisation pour l'interdiction des armes chimiques (OIAC) n'ont pas généralement réagi fermement ou de manière cohérente. Même si le concept de responsabilisation n'est pas clairement défini dans le droit international, il suppose sans aucun doute l'imposition de conséquences aux acteurs qui ne respectent pas leurs obligations internationales.[1] Étant donné la nature de la réaction internationale aux attaques menées avec des armes chimiques, peut-on dire que l'attribution de l'utilisation des armes chimiques à un État le rend responsable?

Après que l'on ait soupçonné qu'un acte internationalement illicite ait été commis, par exemple une atteinte à la CAC, les membres d'un ordre international fondé sur des règles jugent qu'il est dans leur meilleur intérêt d'adopter une série de mesures afin d'imposer des conséquences à l'acteur responsable. Au bout du compte, « la voie de la responsabilisation » sert à dissuader l'utilisation d'armes chimiques et à préserver le système mondial de contrôle, qui vise à restreindre les violations de la CAC en incitant les États à limiter de leur propre chef leurs comportements indésirables.[2] Cette voie vers la responsabilisation s'amorce avec une enquête réalisée par l'OIAC ou un État en vue de confirmer la nature de l'attaque. Si les données probantes techniques sont suffisantes pour prouver la légitimité au niveau international, l'OIAC ou l'État qui mène l'enquête peut attribuer l'attaque à un acteur en particulier. Des conséquences appropriées sont ensuite appliquées par les États membres de la CAC et les comportements de l'acteur sont surveillés à long terme afin de déterminer s'il doit subir d'autres conséquences ou s'il peut reprendre un rang honorable. Tenir les États responsables favorise la conformité à la CAC en préservant le cadre normatif des armes chimiques et en dissuadant les États de les utiliser. Après une plus longue période de conformité à la CAC, les tabous persistants concernant l'utilisation d'armes chimiques s'établissent, alors que l'utilité de ces armes dans un conflit potentiel n'est plus aussi claire. Ensemble, les normes, l'absence d'avantages, les puissants tabous et la dissuasion sous-tendent le système mondial de contrôle.[3]

Le problème qui nuit actuellement à la capacité de la communauté internationale de préserver le système de contrôle relativement aux armes chimiques n'est pas l'absence d'enquête ou d'attribution de la responsabilité. Les récentes enquêtes sur les attaques au moyen d'armes chimiques ont généralement permis de déterminer l'attribution, un concept défini comme une « opération légale au moyen de laquelle des actes ou des omissions de personnes au nom d'un État sont considérés être légalement des actes ou des omissions de l'État ».[4] En Syrie, le Mécanisme d'enquête conjoint (MEC) de l'OIAC et de l'ONU, qui se sert de l'expertise technique de l'OIAC, est parvenu à attribuer la responsabilité de plusieurs attaques à l'aide d'armes chimiques aux forces armées syriennes et de deux autres attaques aux forces de l'EIIL en

Syrie.[5] De manière semblable, une enquête britannique a déterminé que l'empoisonnement de Sergei et Yulia Skripal avait été le geste d'agents du service russe de renseignements militaires, alors que l'assassinat de Kim Jong-nam a fort probablement été exécuté par des agents nord-coréens répondant à une demande des États-Unis et de la Corée du Sud, même si l'enquête malaisienne est restée secrète. Dans chacun de ces cas, une enquête a statué que les responsables de l'attaque au moyen d'armes chimiques avaient agi en tant qu'employés d'un État ou d'un groupe autre qu'un État ou pouvaient être liés à un État par un test du « contrôle effectif ».[6]

La communauté internationale se heurte plutôt au problème de la responsabilisation, un concept qui fait référence à la capacité de faire appliquer la loi de la responsabilité de l'État après qu'un État eut commis un acte répréhensible sur le plan international, par exemple en enfreignant les règles d'un traité. Dans le cas de la CAC, la loi de la responsabilité de l'État est mise en application par l'imposition de conséquences à l'État fautif. Les conséquences qui influencent les comportements de l'État doivent être appliquées à grande échelle, à long terme et faire l'objet d'une coordination. Cependant, de telles mesures doivent être adoptées au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies ou par le conseil exécutif de l'OIAC, deux organes ayant tendance à se buter à des obstacles en raison de la présence de vetos russes et chinois au Conseil de sécurité et à l'obligation d'obtenir une majorité des deux tiers au conseil exécutif de l'OIAC.[7] L'imposition de conséquences pour responsabiliser les États est donc complexifiée par le fait qu'un certain nombre d'États doivent coopérer en ce sens et parce que les conséquences, ou les « mécanismes de responsabilisation », peuvent représenter une combinaison de mesures dans les sphères militaire, juridique, politique, économique et de l'éducation.[8] Il existe par ailleurs un haut niveau de variabilité en ce qui concerne le statut juridique des coupables et des cibles d'attaques au moyen d'armes chimiques. La Corée du Nord, par exemple, qui n'est pas signataire de la CAC, a obscurci la voie de la responsabilisation, bien qu'on puisse dire que les dispositions de la CAC sont devenues une norme obligatoire du droit international coutumier.[9] Le Groupe de travail de l'OIAC sur le terrorisme a recommandé que l'EIIL, en tant qu'acteur non étatique, fasse l'objet de poursuites au niveau national par la Syrie, un État signataire de la CAC qui a utilisé des armes chimiques contre sa propre population, et par l'Irak, un membre en règle de la CAC.[10] Finalement, la Fédération russe, qui fait partie de la CAC, a perpétré une attaque aux armes chimiques sur le territoire du Royaume-Uni, un autre État membre de la CAC.[11] Le cas syrien, particulièrement en ce qui a trait à la participation de la Russie, illustre les complexités auxquelles sont confrontées la communauté internationale et l'OIAC. En août 2013, la résolution 2118 du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a appliqué le cadre Kerry-Lavrov, en permettant au conseil exécutif de l'OIAC d'amorcer la destruction et le retrait des armes chimiques de la Syrie.[12] La Syrie a ensuite adhéré à la CAC le 12 septembre 2013, et le président Assad a indiqué que la Syrie respecterait immédiatement ses obligations en vertu de la CAC.[13] Bien que des centaines de tonnes métriques d'armes chimiques aient été détruites, la Syrie a de nouveau commencé à utiliser de telles armes en avril 2014. Pour remédier à la situation, l'OIAC a créé une mission d'enquête pour faire la lumière sur cette question, bien que cet organe ne soit pas autorisé à attribuer la responsabilité des attaques.[14] En août 2015, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a entamé le processus d'attribution, en mettant sur pied le MEC afin d'établir un lien entre l'État syrien et les attaques examinées par la mission d'enquête. Le MEC a produit sept rapports et a attribué la responsabilité de quatre utilisations d'armes chimiques à la Syrie, mais en octobre 2017, la Russie a opposé son veto à une résolution du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies visant à prolonger le mandat du MEC.[15] Sans le MEC, il n'existe actuellement aucun mécanisme international d'attribution de responsabilité pour la Syrie.

Le MEC a pu néanmoins attribuer à la Syrie la responsabilité des attaques au moyen d'armes chimiques. À commencer par l'adhésion de la Syrie à la CAC en 2013, les tentatives internationales de tenir la Syrie responsable de ces attaques ont obtenu des résultats médiocres. En novembre 2017, un vote du conseil

exécutif de l'OIAC n'a pas réussi à obtenir la majorité requise pour invoquer la responsabilité de la Syrie en se basant sur la CAC.[16] Les États ont plutôt eu recours à une intervention militaire; les États-Unis, le Royaume-Uni et la France ont lancé des missiles et mené des frappes aériennes contre des aérodromes et des installations d'armes chimiques en Syrie. Des sanctions économiques ont également été imposées de manière aléatoire après que la Russie et la Chine eurent utilisé leur droit de veto au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies pour empêcher les sanctions de l'ONU.[17] Les États-Unis et l'Union européenne ont plutôt imposé des sanctions à des entreprises et des particuliers impliqués dans l'utilisation d'armes chimiques en Syrie. Ces mesures n'ont toutefois pas suffi pour dissuader des violations continues de la CAC en Syrie. Devant l'inaction de l'ONU et de l'OIAC, les ministres des affaires étrangères de 25 pays se sont réunis en janvier 2018 afin de former le Partenariat international contre l'impunité d'utilisation d'armes chimiques, une initiative multilatérale visant à tenir les États responsables lorsque les organismes internationaux en place n'ont pas réussi à le faire.[18] Bien que le Partenariat doive recruter un nombre plus important de membres pour être considéré international plutôt que multilatéral, il représente une étape vers l'établissement de liens entre l'attribution et la responsabilisation sans devoir se fier à la bureaucratie plus lourde de l'OIAC ou du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies.

La CAC est le traité le plus complet sur le contrôle des armes ayant été ratifié et elle doit être appliquée si la communauté internationale désire préserver le système de contrôle qui influence le comportement des États. Même si les organes d'enquête de l'ONU ont réussi à attribuer la responsabilité de certaines attaques récentes au moyen d'armes chimiques à des acteurs étatiques et autres, il n'en demeure pas moins que la responsabilisation a jusqu'à maintenant été entravée par les processus de vote de l'OIAC et du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies qui empêchent l'adoption de mesures internationales plutôt que multilatérales. Le cadre demeure toutefois intact : la loi internationale de responsabilité des États établit clairement un lien entre l'attribution et la responsabilisation. De nouveaux efforts collectifs comme le Partenariat doivent seulement cibler les États qui contreviennent aux dispositions de la CAC en leur imposant de manière constante de lourdes conséquences afin de les tenir responsables. Autrement, les échecs répétés de la communauté internationale ayant pour but de réagir efficacement aux violations de la CAC risquent de normaliser l'utilisation future d'armes chimiques en minant le rôle de la responsabilisation dans un système mondial de contrôl.

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Graduate Research Award Presentation 4

Topic: ***What, in real terms, is the influence and impact of improving gender balance between men and women in broader disarmament discourse, debates, negotiations and other types of engagement? How would this apply in the field of nuclear disarmament?***

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AN ANALYSIS OF EFFECTIVENESS IMPROVEMENTS FROM THE INCREASED PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN DISARMAMENT DISCOURSE

Introduction

Understanding the impacts of improving gender balance between men and women in broader disarmament discourse and engagement requires the recognition of women as agents of both conflict and peace. The variety of roles that women play in disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation initiatives is as vast as those played by men, despite the fact that women are often presented as inherently peaceful or as mere victims of conflict. Seeking gender balance in disarmament discourse and engagement must therefore be primarily motivated by human rights and a desire to improve gender equality for its own sake.

Beyond this, however, there is empirical evidence that shows that women's participation in peace and security initiatives may have key advantages for improving their overall effectiveness. As such, international bodies have begun to formally recognize the importance of including gender considerations in the analysis of conflict. In October, 2000, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1325, the first UN resolution on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) (United Nations Security Council). The resolution urged the inclusion of gender perspectives in prevention, protection, and relief and stressed the importance of women's participation and representation in all levels of decision making. Since the adoption of the WPS agenda, a substantial body of research has concluded that the engagement of women in peace and security, in addition to being essential from a human rights perspective, also improves the outcomes of major decision-making processes. This paper explores the intrinsic linkages between the WPS agenda and broader disarmament discourse, illustrating how improvements in the gender balance between men and women in the spheres of governance, peacekeeping, and conflict resolution can improve the effectiveness of disarmament efforts. It then looks more specifically at the

relationship between gender and weapons of mass destruction and discusses the importance of women's participation in nuclear policy.

Women in Peace, Security, and Disarmament

The relationship between violence and gender equality in governance bodies has been explored in several empirical studies. One such study published in 2001 analyzed state decisions in crises between 1945 and 1994, comparing the percentage of women in the legislature to the severity of violence employed by the government in efforts to manage the crisis (Caprioli and Boyer). The researchers found that a state is nearly five times less likely to use violence as the percentage of women in the legislature increases by 5 percent. Another study published in 2015 analyses the interaction between women's participation in the political sphere and the risk of civil war relapse, suggesting that a one-unit increase in the percent of women in the legislature is associated with an 11.2 percent decrease in the risk of return to civil war (Demeritt, Nichols and Kelly). Governments with higher percentages of women in the legislature have also been correlated with decreased human rights abuses (Melander) and corruption levels (Dollar, Fisman and Gatti). These findings collectively suggest that the promotion of female participation in the political sphere could have important implications for success of disarmament efforts.

The participation of women in peacekeeping operations improves operational effectiveness through better civilian outreach, reduced use of force, and reduced instances of misconduct (Ghittoni, Lehouck and Watson). Women are better able to reach civilian populations on sensitive topics, such as gender-based violence (Bigio and Vogelstein), thus facilitating the protection aspect of peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, women tend to be able to more effectively diffuse violent situations by de-escalating tensions and building trust with communities (Lonsway). Finally, having women present in peacekeeping operations can improve the legitimacy of the operation by reducing misconduct and gender-based violence perpetrated by other peacekeepers (Civic and Miklaucic). As Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) is often a central component of peacekeeping operations, improved operational effectiveness has direct implications on disarmament efforts.

There is strong evidence that the meaningful participation of women in the conflict resolution process can increase the durability and quality of peace (Krause). Although women exercise their agency in a variety of ways throughout a conflict, men are still overwhelmingly the most responsible for the misuse of small arms while women are more often the victims of gender-based violence that these arms facilitate (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs). These dramatically different experiences of conflict necessitate the inclusion of women's voices in the conflict resolution process. Despite this, women were significantly under represented as mediators, negotiators, and signatories in all major peace process between 1990 and 2017 (UN Women). One empirical study tested the role of including women in peace negotiations and found that peace accords with women as participants had better content, higher implementation rates, and longer lasting peace (Krause). The researchers argued that this may be due to the linkages between female signatories and civil society groups that address social inequalities, recognizing the peacebuilding networks that formed in the early stages of recovery from a conflict. However, it is important to recognize that female delegates to peace agreements do not only represent civil society activists, but also combatants or rebel politicians. Further empirical research is needed to examine the role of female ex-combatants in disarmament and conflict resolution processes.

The increased quality and sustainability of peace that comes from women's participation cannot be effectively replaced through other gender-mainstreaming practices, such as through the inclusion of gender-sensitive language. A recent study suggested that the inclusion of gender-sensitive language was actually negatively associated with peace implementation, as those with more holistic language tended to be highly internationalized and lacking real agreement between the parties to the conflict (Bell). This suggests that language alone cannot be a substitute for the meaningful and active participation of women in peace, security, and disarmament initiatives, particularly if the aim is to improve the effectiveness of the agreement.

Women and Nuclear Disarmament

Women have been active in nuclear disarmament activism since the Cold War, where their activism encouraged the signing of the first partial nuclear test ban (Castledine). Today, women remain significantly underrepresented in all disarmament discourse, including nuclear disarmament. In meetings dedicated to weapons of mass destruction, women make up approximately one quarter of the delegates and deliver one fifth of the official statements (Article 36). Responding to this discrepancy, The United Nations Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs Izumi Nakamitsu concluded that the "continued marginalization [of women] in nuclear negotiations is a loss for the entire world" (Nakamitsu).

A recent publication by the international law and policy institute and the United National Institute for Disarmament Research presented three main arguments for the importance of addressing the gender imbalance for nuclear disarmament (Dimmen, Borrie and Hugo). First, they discussed the essential human right to full and equal representation, recognizing it as the key rationale behind the Women, Peace, and Security agenda. They further suggested that as women are even more vulnerable to the biological and social impacts of nuclear radiation, their voice is especially important. The second reason that it is important for women to participate in nuclear disarmament discourse is that women's participation, as discussed above, is generally associated with increased effectiveness of multilateral disarmament work (Borrie and Thornton). The authors cite research that demonstrate the improved collective intelligence and decision making ability of groups when women are active participants (Woolley, Chabris and Pentland). Finally, it concludes that as women have different experiences of nuclear weapons, they can bring in new and often underrepresented perspectives.

Conclusion

The introduction of the Women, Peace, and Security agenda has initiated conversations and research initiatives regarding the importance of the meaningful and equal participation of women. Despite the empirical research presented in this paper, however, the principal reason for including women in disarmament discourse is about fundamental human rights. As half of the earth's population, women deserve a voice in discussions about peace and security. Arguments for including women in peace and security initiatives should furthermore not reply on stereotypes that present women as inherently peaceful or as passive victims, but rather as active agents in global political agendas.

There were several key challenges in conducting this research related to this reliance on stereotypes. For example, there was an overwhelming dominance of unsubstantiated rhetoric over empirical evidence in documents discussing the participation of women. Furthermore, there is little regard to women as agents

of war, and the research regarding the specific disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of women is highly limited. As such, there needs to be further research and analysis of the role of women's agency in a multitude of contexts related to peace and conflict, and a recognition that the spectrum of factors that influence a women's agency is as varied and multifaceted as that of men. Global discourse on disarmament can be significantly advanced by recognizing the equal human rights of women and acknowledging the diverse ways that women exercise their agency.

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Subjet : ***Quels sont l'influence et l'impact, en termes concrets, d'un meilleur équilibre entre les sexes dans le plus vaste plaidoyer pour le désarmement, les débats, les négociations et d'autres types d'engagement? Comment cela s'appliquerait-il au domaine du désarmement nucléaire?***

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UNE ANALYSE DES AMÉLIORATIONS RELATIVES À L'EFFICACITÉ DÉCOULANT D'UNE PLUS GRANDE PARTICIPATION DES FEMMES AU DISCOURS SUR LE DÉSARMEMENT

Introduction

Pour comprendre les répercussions d'un meilleur équilibre entre les hommes et les femmes dans le plus vaste discours sur le désarmement et la participation à cet égard, il faut reconnaître les femmes à la fois comme des agents de conflit et de paix. Les rôles joués par les femmes dans les efforts de désarmement, le contrôle des armes et les initiatives de non-prolifération sont aussi variés que ceux assumés par les hommes, même si les femmes sont souvent présentées comme des personnes intrinsèquement pacifiques ou comme de simples victimes de conflit. Viser à atteindre l'équilibre des sexes dans le discours sur le désarmement et la participation qui s'y rattache doit donc principalement reposer sur les droits de la personne et la volonté de parvenir tout simplement à une plus grande égalité entre les sexes.

Par ailleurs, des données empiriques montrent que la participation des femmes aux initiatives de paix et de sécurité pourrait grandement contribuer à améliorer leur efficacité. Par conséquent, des instances internationales ont commencé à reconnaître officiellement l'importance de tenir compte de questions sexospécifiques dans l'analyse des conflits. En octobre 2000, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a adopté à l'unanimité la résolution 1325, soit la première résolution de l'ONU relative aux femmes, à la paix et à la sécurité (FPS) (Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies). La résolution vise à inclure des perspectives sexospécifiques dans la prévention, la protection et les mesures de secours et souligne l'importance de la participation et de la représentation des femmes à tous les niveaux du processus décisionnel. Depuis l'adoption du programme FPS, une quantité considérable d'études ont conclu que la participation des femmes aux efforts liés à la paix et à la sécurité, en plus d'être essentielle du point de vue des droits de la personne, améliore l'issue des principaux processus décisionnels. Le présent document se penchera sur les liens intrinsèques entre le programme FPS et le plus vaste discours sur le désarmement, en montrant comment les améliorations relatives à l'équilibre entre les hommes et les femmes dans les domaines de la gouvernance, du maintien de la paix et de la résolution de conflits peuvent accroître l'efficacité des efforts au chapitre du désarmement. Il examinera ensuite plus précisément la relation entre le genre et les armes de destruction massive et abordera l'importance de la participation des femmes à la politique nucléaire.

Les femmes par rapport à la paix, à la sécurité et au désarmement

Plusieurs études empiriques ont examiné le lien entre la violence et l'égalité des sexes dans les organismes de gouvernance. L'une de ces études, publiée en 2001, analyse les décisions de l'État dans des crises survenues entre 1945 et 1994, comparant le pourcentage des femmes au sein du pouvoir législatif à la gravité de la violence employée par le gouvernement dans ses efforts pour gérer la crise (Caprioli et Boyer). Les chercheurs ont constaté qu'un État est cinq fois moins susceptible de recourir à la violence chaque fois que le pourcentage des femmes dans le corps législatif augmente de cinq pour cent. Une autre étude, publiée en 2015, analyse les interactions entre la participation des femmes dans la sphère politique et le risque d'une reprise de guerre civile; il semble qu'une augmentation d'un seul point de pourcentage des femmes au sein du pouvoir législatif soit associée à une diminution de 11,2 pour cent du risque de retomber dans une guerre civile (Demeritt, Nichols et Kelly). L'étude note également une

corrélation entre les gouvernements ayant des pourcentages plus élevés de femmes parlementaires et une diminution des abus de droits de la personne (Melander) et des niveaux de corruption (Dollar, Fisman et Gatti). Collectivement, ces constats suggèrent que la promotion de la participation des femmes dans l'arène politique pourrait avoir des retombées importantes pour assurer la réussite des efforts en matière de désarmement.

La participation des femmes aux opérations de maintien de la paix améliore l'efficacité opérationnelle grâce à un meilleur rayonnement au sein de la population civile, à une réduction de l'utilisation de la force, et à une diminution des mauvaises conduites (Ghittoni, Lehouck et Watson). Les femmes sont mieux en mesure de rejoindre les populations civiles sur des questions délicates, comme la violence fondée sur le sexe (Bigio et Vogelstein), facilitant ainsi le travail de protection des opérations de maintien de la paix. De plus, les femmes ont tendance à neutraliser plus efficacement les situations violentes en atténuant les tensions et en bâtissant la confiance avec les collectivités (Lonsway). Finalement, une plus grande présence féminine dans des opérations de maintien de la paix pourrait accroître la légitimité des opérations en diminuant les mauvais comportements et la violence fondée sur le sexe perpétrée par d'autres soldats du maintien de la paix (Civic et Miklaucic). Étant donné que le désarmement, la démobilisation et la réintégration (DDR) sont souvent un volet central des opérations du maintien de la paix, une meilleure efficacité opérationnelle entraîne des répercussions directes sur les efforts en matière de désarmement.

Il existe de fortes preuves selon lesquelles la participation significative des femmes au processus de résolution de conflit peut accroître la durabilité et la qualité de la paix (Krause). Bien que les femmes agissent de plusieurs façons tout au long d'un conflit, les hommes sont encore les plus grands responsables de la mauvaise utilisation des petites armes alors que les femmes sont le plus souvent victimes d'une violence fondée sur le sexe facilitée par ce type d'armes (Bureau des affaires de désarmement des Nations Unies). En raison de ces expériences de conflit radicalement différentes, il faut inclure les voix des femmes dans le processus de résolution de conflit. Les femmes étaient toutefois considérablement sous-représentées dans les rôles de médiateurs, de négociateurs et de signataires dans le cadre de tous les grands processus de paix entre 1990 et 2017 (ONU Femmes). Une étude empirique a mis à l'essai l'inclusion des femmes aux négociations de la paix et a conclu que les accords de paix auxquels des femmes avaient participé avaient un meilleur contenu et des taux de mise en œuvre plus élevés en plus de se solder par une paix plus durable (Krause). La chercheuse a mentionné que cela pouvait être attribuable aux liens entre les femmes signataires et les groupes de la société civile qui luttent contre les inégalités sociales, reconnaissant la formation des réseaux de maintien de la paix lors des premières étapes du relèvement après un conflit. Cependant, il est important de reconnaître que les femmes déléguées aux accords de la paix ne représentent pas seulement des militantes de la société civile; on compte aussi des combattantes et des politiciennes rebelles. Il faudrait mener d'autres études empiriques pour examiner le rôle d'anciennes combattantes aux processus de désarmement et de résolution de conflit.

L'amélioration de la qualité et de la durabilité de la paix associée à la participation des femmes ne peut pas être remplacée efficacement par d'autres pratiques générales visant à favoriser l'égalité entre les sexes, par exemple en employant du langage sexospécifique. Une étude récente a suggéré que l'inclusion d'un langage non sexiste était en réalité associée négativement à la mise en œuvre des initiatives de paix, puisque les accords comportant des termes plus inclusifs avaient tendance à être appliqués davantage à l'échelle internationale et qu'il n'y avait pas de réelle entente entre les parties au conflit (Bell). Cela suggère que le langage ne peut pas à lui seul remplacer une participation significative et active des femmes aux initiatives de rétablissement de la paix, de la sécurité et du désarmement, particulièrement si l'objectif est d'améliorer l'efficacité de l'accord.

Les femmes et le désarmement nucléaire

Les femmes ont milité activement en faveur du désarmement nucléaire depuis la Guerre froide, alors qu'elles encourageaient la signature du premier traité d'interdiction partielle des essais nucléaires (Castledine). De nos jours, les femmes demeurent considérablement sous-représentées dans tous les discours sur le désarmement, notamment le désarmement nucléaire. Dans les réunions consacrées aux armes de destruction massive, les femmes forment environ un quart des délégués et prononcent un cinquième des déclarations officielles (article 36). Pour remédier à cet écart, le Secrétaire général adjoint de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et le Haut-Représentant pour les affaires de désarmement, Izumi Nakamitsu, a conclu que la « marginalisation continue [des femmes] dans les négociations nucléaires constitue une perte pour le monde entier » (Nakamitsu).

Une publication récente de l'International Law and Policy Institute et de l'Institut des Nations Unies pour la recherche sur le désarmement a présenté trois principaux arguments justifiant l'importance de lutter contre le déséquilibre entre les sexes pour le désarmement nucléaire (Dimmen, Borrie et Hugo). En premier lieu, les auteurs ont discuté du droit fondamental d'une personne à une représentation complète et équitable, reconnaissant qu'il s'agit là d'une grande justification du programme relatif aux femmes, à la paix et à la sécurité. L'étude a de plus mis en lumière l'importance de la voix des femmes, compte tenu de la plus grande vulnérabilité de ces dernières aux répercussions biologiques et sociales de la radiation nucléaire. En deuxième lieu, il est important que les femmes participent au discours sur le désarmement nucléaire, puisque, comme nous l'avons mentionné plus haut, leur participation est généralement associée à une plus grande efficacité des efforts multilatéraux sur le désarmement (Borrie et Thornton). Les auteurs citent des études qui font ressortir l'amélioration des renseignements et des processus décisionnels des groupes lorsque des femmes y jouent un rôle actif (Woolley, Chabris et Pentland). Finalement, l'étude conclut que les femmes, en ayant des expériences différentes des armes nucléaires, peuvent fournir de nouvelles perspectives ou des points de vue souvent mal représentés.

Conclusion

L'adoption d'un programme relatif aux femmes, à la paix et à la sécurité a permis d'amorcer des conversations et des projets de recherche concernant l'importance d'une participation utile et égale des femmes. Malgré les études empiriques présentées dans le présent document, la raison principale pour l'inclusion des femmes au discours sur le désarmement concerne les droits fondamentaux de la personne. En formant la moitié de la population de la planète, les femmes méritent de faire entendre leur voix dans les discussions portant sur la paix et la sécurité. Les arguments visant à inclure les femmes dans les initiatives de paix et de sécurité devraient de plus ne pas reproduire les stéréotypes qui présentent les femmes comme des personnes foncièrement pacifiques ou des victimes passives; elles devraient plutôt les considérer comme des agents actifs dans des programmes politiques à l'échelle internationale.

En menant cette étude, nous avons fait face à plusieurs défis relatifs aux stéréotypes. Par exemple, les documents abordant la participation des femmes reposaient d'abord et avant tout sur une rhétorique non fondée plutôt que sur des données empiriques. Par ailleurs, on fait peu mention des femmes comme des agents de la guerre, et la recherche concernant le désarmement, la démobilisation et la réintégration des femmes est très limitée. Par conséquent, il doit y avoir d'autres études et analyses du rôle des femmes dans divers contextes liés à la paix et au conflit, et une reconnaissance que les facteurs qui influencent les actions des femmes, tout comme celles des hommes, sont variés et comportent plusieurs facettes. Il est possible de faire évoluer encore plus le discours mondial sur le désarmement en reconnaissant les droits égaux des femmes et les nombreuses façons dont les femmes peuvent agir.

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Expert Review Panel

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Annex I

2018-2019

GRADUATE RESEARCH AWARDS

for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

$5,000

Competition Details

Graduate Research Awards for Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation are offered by The Simons Foundation and the International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) of Global Affairs Canada (GAC).

A total of **four awards of CAD $5,000** are available to Canadian Master's and/or Doctoral candidates to support the independent research and writing of an academic paper responding to a specific Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament (NACD) topic. Awards also include domestic travel support to Ottawa where successful candidates will present their completed papers during a special event at Global Affairs Canada Headquarters on March 7, 2019.

Deadline for applications:	**February 1, 2019**
Selection of four award recipients:	**March 1, 2019**
Presentations at GAC Headquarters in Ottawa:	**March 28, 2019**

HOW TO APPLY:

Complete applications should be sent to Elaine Hynes at The Simons Foundation by email to: **ehynes@thesimonsfoundation.ca** by the close of business (PST) on February 1, 2019.

Your application must include:

- Your resume, including proof of citizenship status.
- A complete, official transcript of your grades (electronic copies of official transcripts are acceptable).
- An academic paper (1,500 words, MLA format) responding to one of the specific Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament topics shown below.

ELIGIBILITY:

The competition is open to Canadian citizens and Canadian permanent residents/landed immigrants currently enrolled in a graduate programme. Graduate students studying outside Canada are eligible to apply but please note that funding to cover the cost of successful applicants' travel to Ottawa for the event at Global Affairs Canada in March is limited to domestic travel within Canada (or the equivalent).

In order to expand the community of Canadian scholars working on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) issues, employees of Global Affairs Canada, and previous recipients of a Graduate Research Award are not eligible.

SELECTION PROCESS:

Applications will be reviewed by an Expert Review Panel made up of three experts and academics working in this field who will recommend four award winners for final approval by representatives of The Simons Foundation and ISROP. Successful candidates will be notified on March 1, 2019.

PRESENTATIONS AT GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA HEADQUARTERS:

Award winners will present their papers at a special event hosted by Global Affairs Canada at the Lester B. Pearson building in Ottawa on March 28, 2019, and will be asked to produce a PowerPoint deck for their presentation. The cash awards will be issued at the GRA event in Ottawa and a report, including the papers presented, will be published online by The Simons Foundation. ***Please note that attendance at the GRA event in Ottawa is a mandatory requirement of the award.*** Approved domestic travel, accommodation and meal expenses will be provided by The Simons Foundation.

TOPICS for 2018-2019

Master's and Doctoral candidates may choose to address one of the following subjects:

1 The Secretary General has announced a new Agenda for Disarmament and its Implementation Plan. Will the Agenda and its Implementation Plan work? How should Canada engage with it?

2 Does attribution lead to accountability under international law? We encourage consideration of recent geopolitical events involving the use of prohibited weapons (chemical weapons), as well as ongoing discussions within the UN on the implications of increasing autonomy in military systems.

3 How can nuclear supplier states strike a balance between facilitating access by developing states to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology, while ensuring that nuclear embarking states uphold non-proliferation, safety and security obligations, especially those under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)?

4 What, in real terms, is the influence and impact of improving gender balance between men and women in broader disarmament discourse, debates, negotiations and other types of engagement? How would this apply in the field of nuclear disarmament?

For more information, please contact Elaine Hynes at The Simons Foundation by email to ehynes@thesimonsfoundation.ca or by telephone at 778-782-7779.

The primary objective of the Graduate Research Awards is to enhance Canadian graduate level scholarship on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues.

BOURSES DE RECHERCHE AUX CYCLES SUPÉRIEURS *pour le désarmement, le contrôle et la non-prolifération des armements* 2018-2019

5 000 $

Détails de l'appel de candidatures

Les bourses de recherche des cycles supérieurs pour le désarmement, le contrôle des armements et la non-prolifération sont offertes par la Simons Foundation et le Programme de recherche et d'information dans le domaine de la sécurité internationale (PRISI) d'Affaires mondiales Canada (AMC).

En tout, **quatre bourses de 5 000 $ CA** seront remises à des étudiants canadiens à la maîtrise ou au doctorat afin d'appuyer les recherches indépendantes et la rédaction d'un essai universitaire portant sur un sujet précis lié à la non-prolifération, au contrôle des armements et au désarmement. Les bourses prévoient également un soutien pour un voyage à Ottawa au cours duquel les lauréats présenteront leur travail achevé lors d'un événement spécial à Affaires mondiales Canada qui se tiendra le 7 mars, 2019.

Date limite de présentation des candidatures :	**1 février 2019**
Sélection des quatre boursiers :	**1 mars 2019**
Présentations à l'administration centrale d'AMC à Ottawa :	**28 mars 2019**

COMMENT PRÉSENTER SA CANDIDATURE

Les demandes complètes doivent être acheminées par courriel à Elaine Hynes de la Simons Foundation à **ehynes@thesimonsfoundation.ca** avant la fermeture des bureaux (HNP) le 1 février 2019.

Votre demande doit comprendre ce qui suit :

- Votre curriculum vitæ, y compris une preuve de citoyenneté.
- Un relevé de notes complet et officiel (des copies électroniques des relevés officiels sont acceptées).
- Un essai universitaire (1 500 mots, format MLA) portant sur l'un des sujets proposés ci-dessous concernant la non-prolifération, le contrôle des armements et le désarmement.

ADMISSIBILITÉ

Ce concours est ouvert aux citoyens canadiens et aux résidents permanents du Canada actuellement inscrits à un programme d'études supérieures. Les étudiants de cycle supérieur qui poursuivent leurs études à l'étranger peuvent présenter une demande, mais les frais couverts pour le voyage à Ottawa permettant aux lauréats de prendre part à l'événement organisé par Affaires mondiales Canada en mars seront limités aux déplacements à l'intérieur du Canada (ou l'équivalent).

Afin d'accroître le nombre de chercheurs canadiens travaillant dans le domaine de la non-prolifération, du contrôle des armements et du désarmement, les employés d'Affaires mondiales Canada et les personnes ayant déjà obtenu la Bourse de recherche des cycles supérieurs ne sont pas admissibles.

PROCESSUS DE SÉLECTION

Un groupe d'experts formé de trois spécialistes et universitaires travaillant dans le domaine examinera les demandes et recommandera quatre candidats. Des représentants de la Simons Foundation et du PRISI devront approuver les recommandations. Les candidats sélectionnés seront informés le 1 mars 2019.

PRÉSENTATIONS À L'ADMINISTRATION CENTRALE D'AFFAIRES MONDIALES CANADA

Les lauréats présenteront leur travail lors d'un événement spécial organisé par Affaires mondiales Canada à l'édifice Lester B. Pearson à Ottawa le 28 mars, 2019. Ils seront invités à préparer une présentation en format PowerPoint pour leur exposé. Les bourses seront remises lors de l'événement à Ottawa et un rapport comprenant notamment les travaux présentés sera publié en ligne par la Simons Foundation. ***La présence à l'événement visant à décerner les bourses de recherche des cycles supérieurs qui se tiendra à Ottawa est obligatoire.*** Les frais de déplacements au Canada, ainsi que les coûts pour l'hébergement et les repas qui ont été approuvés seront remboursés par la Simons Foundation.

SUJETS pour 2018-2019

Les candidats à la maîtrise et au doctorat peuvent choisir de se pencher sur l'un des sujets suivants :

1. Le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies a annoncé un nouveau programme en matière de désarmement et le plan de mise en œuvre qui s'y rattache. Le programme et son plan de mise en œuvre seront-ils efficaces? Comment le Canada devrait-il y participer?

2. Est-ce que l'attribution mène à la responsabilisation en vertu du droit international? Nous encourageons l'examen d'événements géopolitiques récents impliquant l'utilisation d'armes interdites (armes chimiques), ainsi que des discussions qui se poursuivent au sein des Nations Unies sur les conséquences d'une plus grande autonomie des systèmes militaires.

3. Comment les États fournisseurs de matières nucléaires peuvent-ils faciliter l'accès des pays en développement aux utilisations pacifiques d'énergie et de technologie nucléaires tout en veillant à ce que les États qui s'engagent sur la voie nucléaire respectent les obligations concernant la non-prolifération, la sûreté et la sécurité, particulièrement celles énoncées dans le Traité sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires (TNP)?

4. Quels sont l'influence et l'impact, en termes concrets, d'un meilleur équilibre entre les sexes dans le plus vaste plaidoyer pour le désarmement, les débats, les négociations et d'autres types d'engagement? Comment cela s'appliquerait-il au domaine du désarmement nucléaire?

Pour obtenir de plus amples renseignements, veuillez communiquer avec Elaine Hynes de la Simons Foundation par courriel à ehynes@thesimonsfoundation.ca ou par téléphone au 778-782-7779.

Les bourses de recherche des cycles supérieurs visent d'abord et avant tout à accroître le financement accordé au cycle supérieur pour les recherches en matière de désarmement, de contrôle des armements et de non-prolifération.